The many-worlds theory of consciousness

This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The theory offers a novel way of capturing the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper also looks at some scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through the proposed lens and reconsiders the hard problem of consciousness.     

New developments in transference focused psychotherapy

This paper will summarize recent clinical developments in the treatment of borderline patients at the Personality Disorders Institute at Cornell. The experiences under review will include the careful, ongoing monitoring of developments in the patient's life outside the sessions, and their consideration in diagnosing affective dominance during the hours. Other issues include the discussion of a ‘second chance’ approach to contract violations; the assessment and concern with the patient's assumption of responsibility for himself; the contradictions between actual behavior patterns and life goals, and between personality potentials and present functioning; the technical implications of particular constellations of regressive narcissistic features; drug dependence and antisocial behavior; and life goals and treatment goals.