《易传》天论的哲学意义--兼论中国哲学有没有哲学概念

"天人关系"是中国哲学的基本问题,这一基本问题在<易传>中表现得比较典型.<易传>之"天"概念蕴涵自然、自然规律、义理、天帝、阳气等数重内涵,逻辑内涵混杂,外延不确定.中国哲学之"天"从未获得"纯粹的哲学形式",天不是一个纯粹哲学概念,只是一个前哲学概念.实际上,气、道、理等中国哲学主干概念具有同样的哲学性质.学术界有必要共同讨论一个问题中国有哲学概念如何可能?     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

Information and the complementarity game

Complementarity games are explorative games between two players. The deterministic rules of the game are known to both players. The first player freely chooses among a finite number of states of the game but tells nobody of this decision. The second player accesses the game only by primitive, symbolic input‐output interfaces. The task of the second player is to find out the unknown state by input‐output experiments. The logic resulting from this scenario resembles‐ quantum logic in many aspects. It is the empirical logic of choice for virtual realities.     

Creative Thinking

Life, and therefore evolution, is a creative process; creativity is not an attribute of a few gifted people. The way we think obscures this truth. Three ways of dealing with a problem are creativity, calculation, and choice. Creativity can occur when a single idea is held in two contradictory frames of reference. Thus to be creative we have to put aside our usual ways of thinking, which are based on either/or. When we put aside this way of thinking we will see that things do not change: they are change.     

Life,Chaos, and Transdisciplinarity: A Personal Journey

This article uses an autobiography as an object of research, to both illustrate some principles of chaos theory in analytic practice, and give those ideas a personal and social context, thereby producing a unique but explanation-rich history of chaos theory and recent intellectual history of transdisciplinarity and social research in the West. The ideas from Chaos Theory it uses and illustrates include: three-body analysis (Poincaré); fractals (Mandelbrot); fuzzy logic (Zadeh); and the butterfly effect (Lorenz).     

Experimental Philosophy: A Methodological Critique

This article offers a critique of research practices typical of experimental philosophy. To that end, it presents a review of methodological issues that have proved crucial to the quality of research in the biobehavioral sciences. It discusses various shortcomings in the experimental philosophy literature related to (1) the credibility of self‐report questionnaires, (2) the validity and reliability of measurement, (3) the adherence to appropriate procedures for sampling, random assignment, and handling of participants, and (4) the meticulousness of study reporting. It argues that the future standing of experimental philosophy will hinge upon improvements in research methods.     

The role of all things considered judgements in practical deliberation

Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, ‘all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)’ where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections.