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881.
882.
John Woods 《Argumentation》2002,16(1):59-79
When someone is asked to speak his mind, it is sometimes possible for him to furnish what his utterance appears to have omitted. In such cases we might say that he had a mind to speak. Sometimes, however, the opposite is true. Asked to speak his mind, our speaker finds that he has no mind to speak. When it is possible to speak one's mind and when not is largely determined by the kinds of beings we are and by the kinds of resources we are able to draw upon. In either case, not speaking one's mind is leaving something out whose articulation would or could matter for the purposes for which one was speaking in the first place. Inarticulation is no fleetingly contingent and peripheral phenomenon in human thinking and discourse. It is a substantial and dominant commonplace. In Part One I attempt to say something about what it is about the human agent that makes inarticulateness so rife. In Part Two, I consider various strategies for making the unarticulated explicit, and certain constraints on such processes. I shall suggest, among other things, that standard treatments of enthymematic reconstruction are fundamentally misconceived. 相似文献
883.
Kevin C. Klement 《Argumentation》2002,16(4):383-400
Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning. 相似文献
884.
ONE TRUE LOGIC? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Gillian Russell 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(6):593-611
This is a paper about the constituents of arguments. It argues that several different kinds of truth-bearer may be taken to
compose arguments, but that none of the obvious candidates—sentences, propositions, sentence/truth-value pairs etc.—make sense
of logic as it is actually practiced. The paper goes on to argue that by answering the question in different ways, we can
generate different logics, thus ensuring a kind of logical pluralism that is different from that of J. C. Beall and Greg Restall. 相似文献
885.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):229-246
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional
fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on
a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be
abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed
in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof
invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
886.
Prior’s three-valued modal logic Q was developed as a philosophically interesting modal logic. Thus, we should be able to modify Q as a temporal logic. Although a temporal version of Q was suggested by Prior, the subject has not been fully explored in the literature. In this paper, we develop a three-valued
temporal logic Q
t
and give its axiomatization and semantics. We also argue that Q
t
provides a smooth solution to the problem of future contingents.
Presented by Daniele Mundici 相似文献
887.
In this article, we reflect on the use of formal methods in the philosophy of science. These are taken to comprise not just
methods from logic broadly conceived, but also from other formal disciplines such as probability theory, game theory, and
graph theory. We explain how formal modelling in the philosophy of science can shed light on difficult problems in this domain. 相似文献
888.
Albert J. J. Anglberger 《Studia Logica》2008,89(3):427-435
In Meyer’s promising account [7] deontic logic is reduced to a dynamic logic. Meyer claims that with his account “we get rid
of most (if not all) of the nasty paradoxes that have plagued traditional deontic logic.” But as was shown by van der Meyden
in [4], Meyer’s logic also contains a paradoxical formula. In this paper we will show that another paradox can be proven,
one which also effects Meyer’s “solution” to contrary to duty obligations and his logic in general.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
889.
Rodolfo de Cristofaro 《Synthese》2008,163(3):329-339
The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained
a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such
a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities
cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer
supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination
of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for. 相似文献
890.
Jouko Väänänen 《Synthese》2008,164(3):401-420
The Craig Interpolation Theorem is intimately connected with the emergence of abstract logic and continues to be the driving force of the field. I will argue in this paper that the interpolation property is an important litmus test in abstract model theory for identifying “natural,” robust extensions of first order logic. My argument is supported by the observation that logics which satisfy the interpolation property usually also satisfy a Lindström type maximality theorem. Admittedly, the range of such logics is small. 相似文献