Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

Cognitive technology to capture deep computational concepts with combinators

Computational activity is now recognized as a natural science, and computational and information processes have been discovered in the deep structures of many areas. Computations in the natural world were present long before the invention of computers, but a remarkable shift in understanding its fundamental nature occurs, in fact, before our eyes. The present moment, in fact, is a transition from the concept of computer science as an artificial science to the understanding that information processes are abundant in nature. Computing is recognized as a natural science that studies natural and artificial information processes.In everyday computing, operations are performed on the individual generators, with little attention paid to their internal structure. However, many common operations consist of more primitive constructions connected by a combination mode. The interaction of information processes and corresponding structures is carried out in an environment of “applicative interaction”, their applications to each other, and the study of the properties of this environment allows us to understand the nature of the computations.In the present work, the main attention is paid to elucidating the technological features of computations with individual generators, or objects. Their interaction is considered in an applicative environment, which allows us to elucidate the internal structure of ordinary operations, the knowledge of which allows us to understand their properties. The choice of initial constant generators, considered as generic ones and expressed by combinators, is discussed. These initial generators are used as the main “building blocks” that occur within the larger blocks of the applicative environment in interaction with each other. As a result of the interaction, constructions arise that give representative sets of ordinary operators and embedded computing systems.     

Empiricism,probability, and knowledge of arithmetic: A preliminary defense

The topic of this paper is our knowledge of the natural numbers, and in particular, our knowledge of the basic axioms for the natural numbers, namely the Peano axioms. The thesis defended in this paper is that knowledge of these axioms may be gained by recourse to judgments of probability. While considerations of probability have come to the forefront in recent epistemology, it seems safe to say that the thesis defended here is heterodox from the vantage point of traditional philosophy of mathematics. So this paper focuses on providing a preliminary defense of this thesis, in that it focuses on responding to several objections. Some of these objections are from the classical literature, such as Frege's concern about indiscernibility and circularity (Section 2.1), while other are more recent, such as Baker's concern about the unreliability of small samplings in the setting of arithmetic (Section 2.2). Another family of objections suggests that we simply do not have access to probability assignments in the setting of arithmetic, either due to issues related to the ω-rule (Section 3.1) or to the non-computability and non-continuity of probability assignments (Section 3.2). Articulating these objections and the responses to them involves developing some non-trivial results on probability assignments (Appendix A–Appendix C), such as a forcing argument to establish the existence of continuous probability assignments that may be computably approximated (Theorem 4 Appendix B). In the concluding section, two problems for future work are discussed: developing the source of arithmetical confirmation and responding to the probabilistic liar.     

Natural language semantics in biproduct dagger categories

Biproduct dagger categories serve as models for natural language. In particular, the biproduct dagger category of finite dimensional vector spaces over the field of real numbers accommodates both the extensional models of predicate calculus and the intensional models of quantum logic. The morphisms representing the extensional meanings of a grammatical string are translated to morphisms representing the intensional meanings such that truth is preserved. Pregroup grammars serve as the tool that transforms a grammatical string into a morphism. The chosen linguistic examples concern negation, relative noun phrases, comprehension and quantifiers.     

Life of the Second-Order Patient: Factors Impacting the Informal Caregiver

Informal caregivers (ICs) are forced to make adaptive lifestyle changes to meet the significant demand of caring for loved ones who are terminally ill. Open-ended questions were administered with 26 ICs who cared for loved ones diagnosed with terminal illnesses whose prognosis was less than six months. The results add substantive information to parsimonious literature and demonstrate a correlation with existing studies that coincide with the debilitating effects that caregiving has on the informal carer. The study clarifies the complexities of the caregiving role characterized by the involvement that may adversely affect socialization, physical health conditions, and marital dynamics, among other areas of the IC’s personal life.     

A contemporary interpretation of Marx’s thoughts on modernity

Unlike some western scholars who limit their interpretation of modernity and its source to conceptual, cultural, value, and psychological dimensions, Marx pointed out that modernity came mainly from modern production system. Starting from the historical context of his time, Marx explored various aspects of modernity and pointed out that modernity was inherent in the logic of capital, resided in the process of historical evolution, arose in social conflicts and segmentation, and presented itself in a global horizon. The logic of capital, the historical viewpoint, the theory of contradiction and a global perspective are fundamental in Marx’s analysis of the problems of modernity. Marx’s ideas of modernity are methodologically significant to the construction of modernity in contemporary Chinese society. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (China Social Sciences), 2005 (4) by Xing Lijun     

Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement

In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant's puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.