The role of all things considered judgements in practical deliberation

Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, ‘all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)’ where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections.     

Moral Instincts and the Problem with Reductionism: A Critical Look at the Work of Marc Hauser

In his most recent book Moral Minds, Marc Hauser argues that many foundational moral instincts have clear biological explanations. To make this argument, Hauser focuses on the similarities between the acquisition of morality and the acquisition of language. Similar to language, one learns a particular moral framework from one's environment, but the biological components necessary for moral development are universal. While I agree with Hauser's overall conclusion regarding moral instincts, I reject the notion that a purely biological analysis of morality can provide an adequate framework for justification. The problem, as I see it, is Hauser acknowledges the bottom-up influences taking place between biology and moral formation, but he refuses to account for the top-down influences that occur between metaphysical assumptions, moral beliefs, and biological conclusions. Thus, the current critique will focus on the connection between Hauser's failure to account for top-down influence and the subsequent shortcoming related to moral justification.     

The analysis of experience: John Dewey and Elsie Ripley Clapp on desire and thinking, 1911

Unpublished correspondence with Elsie Ripley Clapp, along with extensive notes for a 1911 course, The Analysis of Experience, provide the context for a consideration of John Dewey's discussion of the relation between desire and thinking. Dewey's philosophic point of view is portrayed as it was developing in his own mind. The unity of thought and desire, the necessity of making objects of inquiry, the identification of thinking and acting, are themes in these materials which would appear in their published form in such works as Essays in Experimental Logic, Democracy and Education, and Human Nature and Conduct. In the unpublished materials, Dewey is seen as a naturalist at work in his laboratory, reworking his ideas and acknowledging Clapp's assistance in getting Dewey to connect practical situations in life with the philosophic distinctions under development. The 1911 materials are an excellent connection between problematics in Dewey's earlier writings on ethics, epistemology, and logic, and his later writings, on the same subjects in the 1920's and 1930's.     

Cocaine and food as reinforcers: effects of reinforcer magnitude and response requirement under second-order fixed-ratio and progressive-ratio schedules.

Reinforcer magnitude and fixed-ratio requirement were varied under two second-order schedules. Under one, the first sequence of a fixed number of responses completed after the lapse of a 10-min fixed interval produced reinforcement. Under the second, a second-order progressive-ratio schedule, the fixed number of responses increased after each reinforcement. Either cocaine (0 to 300 micrograms/kg/inj) or food (0 to 5,700 mg/delivery) reinforcers were delivered. Under some conditions, a 2-s illumination of stimulus lights occurred on completion of each ratio sequence. Under the second-order schedule, as cocaine dose or amount of food increased, rates of responding increased; at the highest values, rates of responding decreased. Increases in the ratio requirement from 10 to 170 responses minimally decreased overall response rates. Under the second-order progressive-ratio schedule, increases in dose of cocaine or amount of food increased rates of responding; at the highest amounts of food, rates of responding decreased but response rates at the highest dose of cocaine remained relatively high. The highest ratio requirement that was completed (breaking point) depended on the dose of cocaine but was less dependent on the amount of food. Removing brief-stimulus presentations had a greater effect on completion of ratio requirements with cocaine compared to food.     

Food-paired stimuli as conditioned reinforcers: effects of d-amphetamine.

Seven pigeons were studied in two experiments in which key pecks were reinforced under a second-order schedule wherein satisfaction of variable-interval schedule requirements produced food or a brief stimulus. In the second part of each session, responses produced only the brief stimulus according to a variable-interval schedule (food extinction). For the 4 pigeons in Experiment 1, the response key was red throughout the session. In separate phases, the brief stimulus was either paired with food, not paired with food, or not presented during extinction. d-Amphetamine (0.3 to 10.0 mg/kg) dose-dependently reduced food-maintained responding during the first part of the session and, at intermediate dosages, increased responding during the extinction portion of the session. The magnitude of these increases, however, did not consistently depend on whether the brief stimulus was paired, not paired, or not presented. It was also true that under nondrug conditions, response rates during extinction did not differ reliably depending on pairing operations for the brief stimulus. In Experiment 2, 3 different pigeons responded under a procedure wherein the key was red in the component with food presentations and blue in the extinction component (i.e., multiple schedule). Again, d-amphetamine produced dose-related decreases in responding during the first part of a session and increases in responding in the second part of the session. These increases, however, were related to the pairing operations; larger increases were observed when the brief stimulus was paired with food than when it was not or when it was not presented at all. Under nondrug conditions, the paired brief stimulus controlled higher response rates during extinction than did a nonpaired stimulus or no stimulus. These findings suggest that d-amphetamine can enhance the efficacy of conditioned reinforcers, and that this effect may be more robust if conditioned reinforcers occur in the context of a signaled period of extinction.     

Timing matters! The neural signature of intuitive judgments differs according to the way information is presented

One can conceive of intuition as the preliminary perception of coherence. Since this requires holistic perception, it is hypothesized that underlying processing strategies are dependent on the possibility to obtain all relevant information at once. The present study used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to investigate neural mechanisms underlying intuitive coherence perception when semantic concepts are presented all together (simultaneously) or one after the other (sequentially). With simultaneous presentation, absolute activation increases in the left OFC when participants recognize coherence. With sequential presentation activation increases in the right OFC when participants conclude that there is no common associate between the words presented. Behavioral performance was similar in the two experiments. These results demonstrate that the way information is revealed over time changes the processing of intuitive coherence perception. We propose that such changes must be taken into account to disentangle the neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying different accounts of intuition and related phenomena.     

Moral perfectionism and moral values,virtues, and judgments: A preliminary investigation

Moral perfectionism has a long tradition in philosophical inquiry, but so far has been ignored in psychological research. This article presents a first psychological investigation of moral perfectionism exploring its relationships with moral values, virtues, and judgments. In three studies, 539 university students responded to items of the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (Frost et al., 1990) adapted to measure personal moral standards (PMS) and concern over moral mistakes (CMM) and completed measures of moral values, virtues, and forgiveness, gratitude, and wrong behavior judgments. When partial correlations were computed controlling for the overlap between PMS and CMM, PMS showed positive correlations with moral values, virtues, reciprocal helping, forgiveness, and condemnation of wrong behaviors. In contrast, CMM showed a positive correlation only with indebtedness and a negative correlation with self-reliance. The present findings, while preliminary, suggest that moral perfectionism is a personality characteristic that may help explain individual differences in moral values, virtues, and judgments.     

More than words: Judgments of politicians and the role of different communication channels

We collected short video clips of speakers and created five types of stimuli: (1) the original videos, (2) the audio tracks only, (3) single pictures only, (4) speech content, and (5) stick-figure animations displaying body motion. Participants rated these stimuli on a brief Big Five personality inventory. We then used ratings of the incomplete information conditions to predict ratings of the original video condition. Impressions in the audio track condition were strong predictors throughout all trait ratings. However, other cues were also non-negligible contributors to an overall impression. People even make sense of parsimonious cues, e.g., an animated stick-figure. Thus, presenters on a public stage are not only judged by what they say but also by how they move.     

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin’s, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of “making sense of surprising events”. The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people’s perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people’s perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.