Concurrent second-order schedules of reinforcement

Responses on one key (the main key) of a two-key chamber produced food according to a second-order variable-interval schedule with fixed-interval schedule components. A response on a second key (the changeover key) alternated colors on the main key and provided a second independent second-order variable-interval schedule with fixed-interval components. The fixed-interval component on one variable-interval schedule was held constant at 8 sec, while the fixed interval on the other variable-interval schedule was varied from 0 to 32 sec. Under some conditions, a brief stimulus terminated each fixed interval and generated fixed-interval patterns; in other conditions, the brief stimulus was omitted. Relative response rate and relative time deviated substantially from scheduled relative reinforcement rate and, to a lesser extent, from obtained relative reinforcement rate under both brief-stimulus and no-stimulus conditions. Matching was observed with equal components on both schedules; with unequal components, increasingly greater proportions of time and responses than the matching relation would predict were spent on the variable-interval schedule containing the shorter component. Preference for the shorter fixed interval was typically more extreme under brief-stimulus than under no-stimulus schedules. The results limit the extension of the matching relation typically observed under simple concurrent variable-interval schedules to concurrent second-order variable-interval schedules.     

A comparison of responding maintained under second-order schedules of intramuscular cocaine injection or food presentation in squirrel monkeys.

Key pressing by squirrel monkeys was maintained under second-order schedules of either intramuscular cocaine injection or food presentation. Under one schedule, each completion of a 10-response fixed-ratio unit produced a brief visual stimulus; the first fixed-ratio unit completed after 30 minutes elapsed produced the stimulus paired with either cocaine injection or food presentation. Generally, short pauses followed by high rates of responding were maintained within the fixed-ratio units, and responding was positively accelerated over the 30-minute interval. Under another schedule, each completion of a 3-minute fixed-interval unit produced the brief stimulus; completion of the 10th fixed-interval unit produced the stimulus paired with either cocaine injection or food presentation. Generally, short pauses followed by high rates of responding were maintained within the fixed-ratio units, and responding was positively accelerated over the 30-minute interval. Under another schedule, each completion of a 3-minute fixed-interval unit produced the brief stimulus; completion of the 10th fixed-interval unit produced the stimulus paired with either cocaine injection or food presentation. Rates of responding increased within the fixed-interval units, and to a greater extent over the entire 10 fixed-interval units. Patterns of responding depended more on the schedule of reinforcement than on whether cocaine or food maintained responding. Omitting the brief stimuli following all but the last fixed-ratio or fixed-interval units decreased average rates and altered the patterns of responding. Substituting a visual stimulus that was never paired with cocaine or food following all but the last fixed-ratio or fixed-interval units decreased response rates to a lesser extent and did not substantially alter patterns of responding. When the duration of the paired stimulus was varied from .3 to 30.0 seconds, the highest response rates occurred at intermediate durations (1.0 to 10.0 seconds). The manner in which the stimulus changes affected performances depended more on the schedule of reinforcement than on whether cocaine injection or food presentation maintained responding.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Predicting and scaling hens' preferences for topographically different responses

Six hens were exposed to several concurrent (second-order) variable-interval schedules in which the response requirements on the alternatives were varied. The response requirements were one key peck versus five key pecks, one key peck versus one door push, and five key pecks versus one door push. Response- and time-allocation ratios undermatched the obtained reinforcement ratios but were well described by the generalized matching law. Time and response bias estimates from two pairs of response requirements were used to predict bias in the third pairing. The predicted values were close to those obtained; this result supports the notion that both numerically and topographically different responses act as constant sources of bias within the generalized matching law. The differences between the response and time biases could be accounted for by the different times needed to complete each response requirement. The results also suggest that the door push is a useful operant for research with domestic hens.     

A dissociation between selective attention and conscious awareness in the representation of temporal order information

Previous electrophysiological studies have shown that attentional selection processes are highly sensitive to the temporal order of task-relevant visual events. When two successively presented colour-defined target stimuli are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of only 10 ms, the onset latencies of N2pc components to these stimuli (which reflect their attentional selection) precisely match their objective temporal separation. We tested whether such small onset differences are accessible to conscious awareness by instructing participants to report the category (letter or digit) of the first of two target-colour items that were separated by an SOA of 10, 20, or 30 ms. Performance was at chance level for the 10 ms SOA, demonstrating that temporal order information which is available to attentional control processes cannot be utilized for conscious temporal order judgments. These results provide new evidence that selective attention and conscious awareness are functionally separable, and support the hypothesis that attention and awareness operate at different stages of cognitive processing.     

Fairness lies in the heart of the beholder: How the social emotions of third parties influence reactions to injustice

The present research explores third parties’ (e.g., jurors, ombudsmen, auditors, and employees observing others’ encounters) ability to objectively judge fairness. More specifically, the current research suggests that third parties’ justice judgments and reactions are biased by their attitudes toward the decision recipient and, in particular, the affective aspect of those attitudes as characterized by their felt social emotions. We explore how the congruence of a social emotion (i.e., the extent to which the emotion reflects feeling a subjective sense of alignment with the target of the emotion) can influence their evaluations of recipients’ decision outcomes. The five studies presented show that congruence can lead third parties to react positively to objectively unfair decision outcomes and, importantly, that the influence of social emotions on subjective justice judgments drive third party reactions to decisions, decision makers, and even national policies.     

State-Dependent Memory Effects Using Caffeine and Placebo Do Not Extend to Metamemory

The authors examined the impact of caffeine on human memory and predictions of memory (i.e., metamemory). On Day 1, 83 college students drank a sweetened beverage containing either caffeine (4 mg/kg body weight) or a placebo before they studied 40 pairs of words. While the participants studied, they predicted their future memory performance for each word pair. On Day 2, the participants again received caffeine or a placebo before the memory test. The participants who drank the same beverage on both days (either caffeine or a placebo) recalled more word pairs than did those who drank different beverages (caffeine on 1 day and a placebo on the other day). In contrast, memory predictions were more accurate when the beverages did not match on both days. These data provide evidence for state-dependent memory when caffeine is used, but not for state-dependent metamemory. People's memory and their predictions of memory can be influenced in different ways if they drink caffeine before they study or take a test.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.     

Metacognitive Judgments and Control of Study

ABSTRACT— Recent evidence indicates that people's judgments of their own learning are causally related to their study behavior and not epiphenomenal. I argue here that people use these metacognitions in an effort to selectively study material in their own region of proximal learning. First they attempt to eliminate materials that are already well learned. Then they progress successively from studying easier to more difficult materials. Successful implementation of this metacognitively guided strategy enhances learning. The necessary components are, first, that the metacognitions be accurate, and second, that the appropriate choices are implemented for study. With these parts in place, the individual is in position to effectively take control of his or her own learning.     

A calibration explanation of serial position effects in evaluative judgments

Judges often evaluate stimulus series on dimensions for which no physical scale exists; for example, when judging academic ability in oral examinations. We propose that judges deal with this problem by calibrating an internal judgment scale that maps stimulus input onto available judgment categories. This calibration process implies serial position effects: Judges should initially avoid extreme categories, because using extreme categories reduces judgmental degrees of freedom, thereby increasing the possibility of internal consistency violations. In four experiments, we show that judgments become indeed more extreme later in a series of judgments. Judges evaluated the same good (poor) performances more positive (negative) at the end of a sequence compared to the beginning. Judges’ expertise did not prevent the effect, but allowing end-of-sequence judgments reduced serial position effects. We discuss the implications and possible remedies of these calibration effects on judgment extremity.