On using what we know about ourselves in thinking about others: Not so fast

Abstract

We argue that the frequently assumed privileged role of the self as a habitual reference point in social judgments is often hindered by the fact that, unlike other persons, the self is typically represented primarily in terms of internal, unobservable characteristics. This idiosyncratic feature of self-representations may render them incompatible with many other social representations. Yet, such limitations are not universal. In particular, incompatibility is less of a problem when (1) the judgment target is someone psychologically close; (2) accessible self-representations involve distant (rather than recent) self-memories; (3) accessible self-representations are relatively abstract, (semanticized) rather than event-specific; or, (4) social judgements concern not a specific other person but more abstract social concepts such as traits.     

The future is now: the impact of present fluency in judgments about the future

Recent research has emphasised the role of episodic memory in both remembering past events and in envisaging future events. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly shown that judgments about past events are affected by the fluency with which retrieval cues are processed. In this paper we investigate whether perceptual fluency also plays a role in judgments about future events. For this purpose we conducted four experiments. The first experiment replicated recent findings showing that stimuli that are processed fluently tend to be wrongly recognised as having been encountered in the past outside the laboratory walls [Brown, A. S., & Marsh, E. J. (2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534–538. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337.x]. Two follow-up experiments using Brown and Marsh’s [(2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534–538. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337] task tested the influence of perceptual fluency on future judgments. The fourth and last experiment was designed to rule out a potential confounding factor in the two previous experiments. Across experiments, we found that people rely on fluency when making judgments about events that are yet to come. These results suggest that fluency is an equally valid cue for past and future judgments.     

Do Bettors Correctly Perceive Odds? Three Studies of How Bettors Interpret Betting Odds as Probabilistic Information

This paper reports on three studies investigating how accurately bettors (=people who regularly bet on sports events) interpret the probabilistic information implied by betting odds. All studies were based on data collected by web surveys prompting a total of 186 experienced bettors to convert sets of representative odds into frequency judgments. Bayesian statistical methods were used to analyze the data. From the results, the following conclusions were made: (i) On the whole, the bettors produced well‐calibrated judgments, indicating that they have realistic perceptions of odds. (ii) Bettors were unable to consciously adjust judgments for different margins. (iii) Although their interval judgments often covered the estimates implied by the odds, the bettors tended to overestimate the variation of expected profitable bets between months. The results are consistent with prior research showing that people tend to make accurate probability judgments when faced with tasks characterized by constant and clear feedback. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A dissociation between selective attention and conscious awareness in the representation of temporal order information

Previous electrophysiological studies have shown that attentional selection processes are highly sensitive to the temporal order of task-relevant visual events. When two successively presented colour-defined target stimuli are separated by a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of only 10 ms, the onset latencies of N2pc components to these stimuli (which reflect their attentional selection) precisely match their objective temporal separation. We tested whether such small onset differences are accessible to conscious awareness by instructing participants to report the category (letter or digit) of the first of two target-colour items that were separated by an SOA of 10, 20, or 30 ms. Performance was at chance level for the 10 ms SOA, demonstrating that temporal order information which is available to attentional control processes cannot be utilized for conscious temporal order judgments. These results provide new evidence that selective attention and conscious awareness are functionally separable, and support the hypothesis that attention and awareness operate at different stages of cognitive processing.     

Pseudoneglect: evidence for both perceptual and attentional factors

When neurologically normal individuals bisect a horizontal line as accurately as possible, they reliably show a slight leftward error. This leftward inaccuracy is called pseudoneglect because errors made by neurologically normal individuals are directionally opposite to those made by persons with visuospatial neglect (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). In the current study, normal right-handed observers bisected horizontal lines that were altered to bias line length judgments either toward the right or the left side of the line. Non-target dots were placed on or near the line stimuli using principles derived from a theory of visual illusions of length called centroid extraction (Morgan, Hole, & Glennerster, 1990). This theory argues that the position of a visual target is calculated as the mean position of all stimuli in close proximity to the target stimulus. We predicted that perceptual alterations that shifted the direction of centroid extraction would also shift the direction of line bisection errors. Our findings confirmed this prediction and support the idea that both perceptual and attentional factors contribute to the pseudoneglect effect.     

State-Dependent Memory Effects Using Caffeine and Placebo Do Not Extend to Metamemory

The authors examined the impact of caffeine on human memory and predictions of memory (i.e., metamemory). On Day 1, 83 college students drank a sweetened beverage containing either caffeine (4 mg/kg body weight) or a placebo before they studied 40 pairs of words. While the participants studied, they predicted their future memory performance for each word pair. On Day 2, the participants again received caffeine or a placebo before the memory test. The participants who drank the same beverage on both days (either caffeine or a placebo) recalled more word pairs than did those who drank different beverages (caffeine on 1 day and a placebo on the other day). In contrast, memory predictions were more accurate when the beverages did not match on both days. These data provide evidence for state-dependent memory when caffeine is used, but not for state-dependent metamemory. People's memory and their predictions of memory can be influenced in different ways if they drink caffeine before they study or take a test.     

The Relation of Distressful Childhood Experiences and Empathy in College Undergraduates

We assessed the relation between the empathic responsiveness of young adults and the relative frequency and intensity of distressful events they experienced as children. Undergraduate subjects (N = 111; 56 men and 55 women) were led to believe that they were participating in two separate studies. In the first study, students completed the Distress Experiences in Childhood questionnaire, a filler task, and a slightly abbreviated version of the Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) empathy measure. In the second study, students watched an emotion-laden videotape of a patient (actually an actress) in a therapy session and subsequently completed an emotional-response questionnaire adapted from Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, and Isen (1983). Students who rated their distressful childhood experiences as highly distressing scored higher on both measures of empathy than did students who rated their experiences as relatively less distressing. In contrast, the number of distressful childhood experiences reported was generally unrelated to empathy scores.     

Kinesthetic Aftereffect and Augmenting/Reducing: A Two-Session Procedure,and Hence Identification of Stimulus-Governed Subjects,is Contraindicated

A few of the recent researchers of kinesthetic aftereffect (KAE) as an index of augmenting/reducing have continued to employ a two-session procedure. Findings that have accrued in the past decade indicate (a) The first administration of KAE is a reliable (internally consistent) and valid index of augmenting-reducing; (b) there are carry-over effects from the first to the second administration that bias the second session's preinduction scores; (c) KAE scores from sessions after the first do not relate to first-session scores (low retest reliability) and do not measure augmenting/reducing; and (d) unless special procedures are undertaken to avoid using the biased second- (or later-) session preinduction scores, a KAE procedure involving more than one session is contraindicated. When we reached a similar conclusion earlier (Baker et al., 1974), Petrie (1974) disagreed, arguing that a two-session procedure was needed to identify and eliminate an atypical subgroup, the “stimulus governed.” The case for determining which subjects are stimulus-governed is assessed and found wanting. Except in special circumstances, a one-session KAE procedure, in which all preinduction trials precede the first exposure to aftereffect induction, is indicated.     

Fairness lies in the heart of the beholder: How the social emotions of third parties influence reactions to injustice

The present research explores third parties’ (e.g., jurors, ombudsmen, auditors, and employees observing others’ encounters) ability to objectively judge fairness. More specifically, the current research suggests that third parties’ justice judgments and reactions are biased by their attitudes toward the decision recipient and, in particular, the affective aspect of those attitudes as characterized by their felt social emotions. We explore how the congruence of a social emotion (i.e., the extent to which the emotion reflects feeling a subjective sense of alignment with the target of the emotion) can influence their evaluations of recipients’ decision outcomes. The five studies presented show that congruence can lead third parties to react positively to objectively unfair decision outcomes and, importantly, that the influence of social emotions on subjective justice judgments drive third party reactions to decisions, decision makers, and even national policies.     

A General Setting for Dedekind's Axiomatization of the Positive Integers

A Dedekind algebra is an ordered pair (B, h), where B is a non-empty set and h is a similarity transformation on B. Among the Dedekind algebras is the sequence of the positive integers. From a contemporary perspective, Dedekind established that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable. The purpose here is to show that this seemingly isolated result is a consequence of more general results in the model theory of second-order languages. Each Dedekind algebra can be decomposed into a family of disjoint, countable subalgebras called the configurations of the algebra. There are ?₀ isomorphism types of configurations. Each Dedekind algebra is associated with a cardinal-valued function on ω called its configuration signature. The configuration signature counts the number of configurations in each isomorphism type that occurs in the decomposition of the algebra. Two Dedekind algebras are isomorphic iff their configuration signatures are identical. The second-order theory of any countably infinite Dedekind algebra is categorical, and there are countably infinite Dedekind algebras whose second-order theories are not finitely axiomatizable. It is shown that there is a condition on configuration signatures necessary and sufficient for the second-order theory of a Dedekind algebra to be finitely axiomatizable. It follows that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable.