7~9岁儿童二级错误信念和失言理解的发展

采用二级错误信念任务、失言理解任务分别考察了90名7-9岁学龄儿童心理理论的发展。结果表明,7岁组儿童在二级错误信念和失言理解任务上的成绩与8岁组、9岁组存在显著差异,但8岁组和9岁组儿童之间没有显著差异,提示8岁可能是个体心理理论发展的又一个转折点。三组被试在二级错误信念理解上的成绩显著高于失言理解任务上的成绩,在控制年龄后,他们在两种心理理论任务上的成绩显著相关。另外,失言任务中三种心理状态理解的得分两两相关。综合以上结果,在学龄期,心理理论仍有质的发展,且心理理论的信念、情绪和意图等核心概念仍然相互关联。     

Eye-tracking the cancellation and focus model for preference judgments

By means of a relatively new eye-tracking method that allows for a test situation much closer to reality, we recorded and examined gaze time and fixation number within the cancellation and focus paradigm, a feature-matching model for preference judgments between two alternatives. In line with the cancellation and focus model we found that when subjects encountered the second option in each pair, shared features were canceled out and thus given less consideration whereas unique features were focused on more. We also investigated the role of feature attractiveness as a second important factor in preference judgments and found a U-shaped relationship between attractiveness and visual consideration intensity; that is, attractive and unattractive features received more attention than did those of intermediate attractiveness. Finally, we tested the ability of two models, Franklin’s rule and the WReSt (Weighted Recalled Stepwise Comparing) heuristic, to predict the preference ratings.     

On being happy and gullible: Mood effects on skepticism and the detection of deception

Are we more likely to believe or disbelieve another person depending on our mood state? Based on past research on interpersonal communication and recent work on affect and social cognition, we predicted and found that negative mood increased and positive mood decreased people’s skepticism and their ability to detect deception, consistent with the more externally focused, accommodative processing style promoted by negative affect. After a mood induction using positive, neutral or negative films, participants viewed deceptive or truthful interviews with individuals who denied committing a theft. Judgments of the targets’ guilt and their truthfulness were collected. As predicted, negative mood increased judges’ skepticism towards the targets, and improved their accuracy in detecting deceptive communications, while judges in a positive mood were more trusting and gullible. The relevance of these findings for everyday judgments of trust and the detection of deception are considered, and their implications for recent affect-cognition theories are discussed.     

TIME AND PLACE FOR PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Writing in continuous gratitude to Gary Matthews's wonderful project of rescuing childhood from its disregard, not to say banishment, in professional philosophy, I relate here certain moments in his considerations of early childhood to moments in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, which opens with a scene of childhood from Augustine's Confessions, and also to moments in later stages of childhood (as Matthews also significantly indicates) and, beyond that, to adolescent crises and to what I have called philosophy as “the education of grown‐ups.” I raise the issue of whether we are to see the “odd” questions of early childhood as proto‐science, which will eventually graduate into better science, or as proto‐philosophy, which will be continuously elaborated in philosophical investigation. This raises the question of whether philosophy is to be regarded, early or late, as inseparable from science or, as the later Wittgenstein urges, autonomous with respect to science's glamorous advances.     

Circle graphs and monadic second-order logic

This article is part of a project consisting in expressing, whenever possible, graph properties and graph transformations in monadic second-order logic or in its extensions using modulo p cardinality set predicates or auxiliary linear orders. A circle graph is the intersection graph of a set of chords of a circle. Such a set is called a chord diagram. It can also be described by a word with two occurrences of each letter, called a double occurrence word. If a circle graph is prime for the split (or join) decomposition defined by Cunnigham, it has a unique representation by a chord diagram, and this diagram can be defined by monadic second-order formulas with the even cardinality set predicate. By using the (canonical) split decomposition of a circle graph, we define in monadic second-order logic with auxiliary linear orders all its chord diagrams. This construction uses the fact that the canonical split decomposition of a graph can be constructed in monadic second-order logic with help of an arbitrary linear order. We prove that the order of first occurrences of the letters in a double occurrence word w that represents a connected circle graph determines this word in a unique way. The word w can be defined by a monadic second-order formula from the word of first occurrences of letters. We also prove that a set of circle graphs has bounded clique-width if and only if all the associated chord diagrams have bounded tree-width.     

即刻学习判断的系列位置效应：内外部线索的影响

为了检验即刻学习判断对内外部线索的敏感性,实验一被试为22名高中生,材料为三列含15个词语的清单,先逐个呈现词语系列位置信息,被试在学习前进行即刻学习判断,结果发现学习判断有显著首因效应,表明学习判断对系列位置信息这一外部线索比较敏感。实验二被试为20名高中生,先逐个呈现词语系列位置信息,被试在学习后进行即刻学习判断,结果发现学习判断同样有显著首因效应,表明学习判断对内部线索的敏感性并未强于外部线索。     

跨文化的实证法学研究：文化心理学的挑战与贡献

跨文化的实证法学研究把文化心理学的理论突破和心理学的实证方法引入到对法学基本原理的研究之中。文化心理学研究中发现的东西方文化在价值定向、道德判断和思维方式等方面的差异能够给跨文化实证法学研究带来重要的启示。在对一些重要法律问题的认识上, 例如法律中的因果关系和责任的判定、合同形成以及纠纷调解等方面, 跨文化心理学研究已经发现了显著的跨文化差异, 这些差异可能会影响到不同文化背景的人对法的认识、法的建设以及法律的应用。我们认为跨文化的实证法学研究不仅可以为法学研究提供一条新的研究路径, 更主要的是还可以为中国法学研究的国际化和国际法律纠纷提供理论指导。     

Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.