Collusive induction in perverse relating: Perverse enactments and bastions as a camouflage for death anxiety

The author argues that one of the main functions of perverse relatedness is to induce the analyst into becoming the patient's unconscious accomplice in a “perverse pact” against the analytic work aimed at disavowing intolerable aspects of reality. The intense power of collusive induction in perverse relating leads the analyst to participate in transference‐countertransference enactments and to the crystallization of a silent and chronic unconscious collusion between the patient and analyst in the analytic field, stagnating the process (bastion; Baranger and Baranger). The author claims that analysis of perverse pathology should not be limited to interpretation of the patient's intrapsychic functioning but should also focus on the information obtained by the analyst through his participation in collusive enactments; the analyst should also take a “second look” at the analytic “field” to detect underlying bastions. The author reviews the main psychoanalytic contributions that have clarified the phenomenon of collusive induction in perverse relating and as an illustration, describes the analysis of a man with a perverse character; in this patient, one of the main functions of his perverse relatedness was to induce the analyst to become an accomplice in his disavowal of his terror of death. The author highlights the influence of death anxiety in the bastions that develop in the treatment of perverse patients.     

The You Turn

This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person (2014, 17:3). It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made (and denied) in these papers (a) about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and (b) about possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues and debates in this area.     

“FILL AND SUBDUE”? IMAGING GOD IN NEW SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL CONTEXTS

While the social and ecological landscape of the twenty‐first century is worlds away from the historical‐cultural context in which the biblical myth‐symbols of the image of God and the knowledge of good and evil first emerged, Philip Hefner's understanding that Homo sapiens image God as created co‐creators presents a plausible starting point for constructing a second naïveté interpretation of biblical anthropology and a fruitful concept for envisioning and enacting our human future.     

Emergent verbal behavior in preschool children learning a second language

We evaluated the emergence of untaught second‐language skills following directly taught listener and intraverbal responses. Three preschool children were taught first‐language (English) listener responses (e.g., “Point to the horse”) and second‐language (Welsh) intraverbal responses (e.g., “What is horse in Welsh?” [ceffyl]). After intervention, increases in untaught second‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in Welsh?” [ceffyl]) and listener responses (e.g., “Point to the ceffyl”) were observed for all 3 participants.     

Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of History

Hegel’s philosophy of history is fundamentally concerned with how shapes of life collapse and transition into new shapes of life. One of the distinguishing features of Hegel’s concern with how a shape of life falls apart and becomes inadequate is the role that habit plays in the transition. A shape of life is an embodied form of existence for Hegel. The animating concepts of a shape of life are affectively inscribed on subjects through complex cultural processes. This paper examines the argument Hegel puts forward in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History for why civilizations come to atrophy and examines the decisive role habit plays in this process. The paper concludes with a discussion of the way in which the central role of second nature in historical transitions and norm formation conflicts with Brandom’s account of norm formation in Hegel’s thought.     

Can we distinguish an “I” and “ME” during listening?—an event-related EEG study on the processing of first and second person personal and possessive pronouns

Theoretically, stimuli can be related to the self as subject (“I”) or object (“ME”) of experience. This event-related brain potential (ERP) study investigated whether listening to personal and possessive pronouns elicits different modes of self-processing regarding time-course and neural sources. Going beyond previous research, first (1PP) and second person (2PP) pronouns were included to determine the specificity of self-processing. Participants listened passively to German pronouns while the electroencephalogram was recorded. Modulation of ERPs revealed a processing advantage for the 2PP personal pronoun “du” (“you”) already in early time windows. Regarding possessive pronouns, N1 amplitudes indicated increased attention orientation to the 1PP pronoun “mein” (“my”), whereas during later time windows, processing of 1PP and 2PP possessive pronouns did not differ but differed from the third person pronoun “sein” (“his”). ERP source imaging suggests that primary sensory brain regions (auditory cortex), the insula and cortical midline structures are differentially involved into these two processing modes. The results support the idea of distinct self-processing modes (“I” and “ME”) and confirm their dynamic nature. Moreover, they demonstrate that on a neural level neither “I” or “ME” are invariantly tied to the first person, in line with the hypothesis that self-processing is relational and context-dependent.     

The couch and the chador

The authors present a clinical discussion of the psychic functions of the chador, a veil‐like outer garment worn in public by some Iranian women. Drawing on Anzieu’s theoretical concept of the skin ego, the authors suggest that the chador does not just cover the body; it may also envelop the psyche and function as a second skin for the ego. The maternal function of a holding environment is symbolically displaced on any clothing that ‘hides,’‘covers,’‘veils,’ or ‘dresses’ the body. The skin’s containing functions are extended through sensory and metonymic mediations to clothes, thus providing an imaginary maternal sack for the person. The clinical vignettes presented here suggest that for some Iranian women the chador may work, on one hand, as a second skin ego and a shield against a perceived intrusive world. On the other hand, it may work as a punitive maternal superego, a ‘holding cell’ in a jail that paralyses the separation/individuation process. Operating in the service of the patient’s resistance and defense, the chador may also function as a psychic refuge and a place to hide on the couch.     

Second Nature,Critical Theory and Hegel’s Phenomenology

ABSTRACT

While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’.     

Effects of Deception on Children's Understanding of Second‐order False Belief

This research examined two questions: effects of deception on children's understanding of second‐order false belief, and possible effects of number of siblings on second‐order performance. Kindergarten children responded to 3 second‐order problems that varied in the presence and the nature of deception. Performance was better on the problems with deception, but significantly so only when the target for the belief attribution produced the deception. This finding helps to clarify differences between the two main paradigms for assessing second‐order false belief. There was no relation between number of siblings and performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.