Life-Prolonging Killings and their Relevance to Ethics

What makes killing morally wrong? And what makes killing morally worse than letting die? Standard answers to these two questions presuppose that killing someone involves shortening that person's life. Yet, as I argue in the first two sections of this article, this presupposition is false: Life-prolonging killings are conceivable. In the last two sections of the article, I explore the significance of the conceivability of such killings for various discussions of the two questions just mentioned. In particular, I show why the conceivability of life-prolonging killings renders Frances M. Kamm's attempt to provide an answer to the second question problematic.     

A Systematic Review: Non‐Suicidal Self‐injury in Australia and New Zealand's Indigenous Populations

Objective

To undertake a systematic review of non‐suicidal self‐injury (NSSI) prevalence, patterns, functions, and behavioural correlates for the Indigenous populations of Australia (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders) and New Zealand (NZ; Maori).

Method

We searched the following electronic databases: PubMed, MedLine, Scopus, Web of Science, ScienceDirect, PsycInfo, and PsycArticles, CINAHL, and the Informit Health and Indigenous Peoples collections. Studies were included for review if they were published within the last 25 years and reported on NSSI in Australia and NZ's Indigenous populations.

Results

Seven studies were included, six of which came from Australia. The prevalence of NSSI in Australia ranged from 0.9% up to 22.50%; statistics varied by the different samples, types of prevalence, and relationship to alcohol. Several studies found that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples had higher rates of NSSI than other Australians, but that this was not significantly higher. Two studies indicated that NSSI was linked to alcohol use, incarceration, and a younger age. The one NZ study was of injury and not specifically NSSI.

Conclusions

Findings are limited due to a small pool of literature. Cultural variations in NSSI presentation should be considered when working with Indigenous populations. Further research is required to help determine what cultural variations may exist.     

Intentional transaction

The second person is often set in contrast to the first person. And there is a contrast. It does not reside in a difference of what is thought as I from what is thought as you. For that is not different. The contrast is that of monadic and dyadic predication, action and transaction. It is the contrast, not of I and You, but of I and I–You. The second person does not add a You to an I. It divides the I and makes it a relation. We consider, first, the form of predication that is common to first- and second-person thought. Then, we define the second person as a species of this form of thought. Last, we find the source and condition of this form of thought in a thought of this very form. This thought, being the source of its own form, is one of which one cannot be conscious from outside it. It is a last word, or, better, a first word.¹1. Compare Thomas Nagel's notion of a last word (Nagel 2001 Nagel, Thomas. 2001. The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). Nagel's development of the notion reveals no reason why he should call what is last a word. From what he writes in the book, one would think its title to be “The Last Thought”. (Indeed, chapter 2 bears the title “Why We Can't Understand Thought from the Outside”.) However, if the last thought is I–You, then the last thought is a word; indeed, it is the word. In reaching for “The Last Word”, Nagel may express an inchoate appreciation of this.     

The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.     

统计学习与双语认知的关系

统计学习是提取环境输入潜在规则的一种认知机制,其与语言的关联已得到证实。双语认知是学界关注的热点之一。统计学习与双语认知的关系如何?文章先介绍统计学习认知机制及其与语言的关系,然后从“统计学习能力可否预测二语学习表现”、“统计学习训练能否促进二语学习”和“双语经验能否提高统计学习能力”三个维度述评相关文献,并指出未来可从输入特征、个体差异和神经科学角度进一步探讨统计学习与双语认知的关系。     

Skepticism,naturalism, pyrrhonism

Skepticism and naturalism bear important connections with one another. Do they conflict or are they different sides of the same coin? In this paper, by considering the ways in which Sextus and Hume have examined these issues, I offer a Pyrrhonian response to Penelope Maddy's attempt to reject skepticism within the form of naturalism that she calls “second philosophy” (Maddy, 2007, 2017) and to Timothy Williamson's attempt to avoid skepticism from emerging within his knowledge-first approach (Williamson, 2000). Some lessons about Pyrrhonism result.     

Minority religions,litigation, and the prevention of harm

Religious anti-discrimination legislation institutionalises non-violent ways of living with radical difference associated with religious diversity. The need to govern the growing number of conflicts generated by increasingly pluralistic societies is a major reason governments have introduced a range of new laws relating to religion. These laws are important not only because they protect human rights, which they do, but also because they shape social processes that generate extreme harms such as mass murder and the sexual abuse of minors. A detailed examination of three case studies of minority religions illustrates this argument. The histories of the Fundamentalist Latter Day Saints and The Family demonstrate that the socio-cultural processes that result in sexual abuse in minority religions are similar to the processes that result in extreme violence and that litigation plays a key role in preventing the escalation of these processes, although it is of a post hoc nature. The case of the Ordo Templi Orientis demonstrates that religious anti-discrimination legislation proactively disrupts the socio-cultural processes that lead to the escalation of tension that results in serious forms of harm.     

Bildung as an essential disposition in becoming a reflective practitioner: practical application of philosophical hermeneutics to second language teacher education

For a few decades, reflective practice has been employed in second language teacher education (SLTE) as ‘a means by which practitioners can develop a greater level of self-awareness about the nature and impact of their performance, an awareness that creates opportunities for professional growth and development’. Dewey, who initiated the concept of reflective thinking in teacher education, emphasized one’s attitudes toward engagement in reflective process. One such disposition is open-mindedness, ‘a willingness to entertain different perspectives… and acknowledgement of the limitations of one’s own perspectives’. Regarding this concept of open-mindedness, Gadamer, who established philosophical hermeneutics, provided profound insights by using the German word Bildung, which is often translated as education, culture, or self-cultivation. Through this concept, Gadamer emphasized not only one’s open and introspective disposition toward new experience but also one’s mode of being. This paper explores this notion of Bildung and examines its possible practical application to SLTE in combination with reflective practice. Referring to Grondin’s notion that education is to raise true questions, I will argue for the importance of nurturing Bildung of preservice second language teachers and of second language teacher educators.     

Autonomy,Reciprocity, and Responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the Second Person

Abstract

Stephen Darwall’s The Second‐Person Standpoint converges with Emmanuel Levinas’s concern about the role of the second‐person relationship in ethics. This paper contrasts their methodologies (regressive analysis of presuppositions versus phenomenology) to explain Darwall’s narrower view of ethical experience in terms of expressed reactive attitudes. It delineates Darwall’s overall justificatory strategy and the centrality of autonomy and reciprocity within it, in contrast to Levinas’s emphasis on the experience of responsibility. Asymmetrical responsibility plays a more foundational role as a critical counterpoint to ‘mean‐spirited’ reciprocity than Darwall’s laudable distinction between accountability and revenge, and responsibility even founds this distinction. The experience of being summoned to asymmetrical responsibility amplifies the meaning of ‘authority’, which is a presupposition for Darwall. Finally, asymmetrical responsibility helps develop decentred reasoning, invites risk beyond the boundaries of reciprocity at moments when autonomy appears endangered, reconciles respect and care at the experiential level, and presses to extend the scope of moral obligation.