Free belief

The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith's (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith's emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of an unreflective, sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the kind of situations in which the reflective critical abilities constitutive of responsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed.     

A Fine Risk To Be Run? The Ambiguity of Eros and Teacher Responsibility

Teachers are often placed in a space of tensionbetween responding to students as persons andresponding to students through theirinstitutionally-defined roles. Particularlywith respect to eros, which has becomeincreasingly the subject of strictinstitutional legislation and regulation,teachers have little recourse to a language ofresponsibility outside an institutional frame. By studying the significance of communicativeambiguity for responsibility, this paperexplores what is ethically at stake forteachers in erotic forms of communication. Specifically, it is Levinas's own ambiguousunderstanding of the ethical significance oferos, and what we have to learn from it, thatoffers a way of reading the place of eros inresponsibility. I conclude my discussion withsome thoughts on what a renewed understandingof responsibility might mean at the personaland institutional levels.     

FREE YOUR MIND: BUDDHISM,CAUSALITY, AND THE FREE WILL PROBLEM

The problem of free will is associated with a specific and significant kind of control over our actions, which is understood primarily in the sense that we have the freedom to do otherwise or the capacity for self-determination. Is Buddhism compatible with such a conception of free will? The aim of this article is to address three critical issues concerning the free will problem: (1) what role should accounts of physical and neurobiological processes play in discussions of free will? (2) Is a conception of mental autonomy grounded in practices of meditative cultivation compatible with the three cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness, dependent arising, and no-self? (3) Are there enough resources in Buddhism, given its antisubstantialist metaphysics, to account for personal agency, self-control, and moral responsibility?     

Jus Ad Bellum,Values, and the Contemporary Structure of International Law

In “Religion, Violence, and Human Rights: Protection of Human Rights as Justification for the Use of Armed Force,” James Johnson discusses an important dilemma for contemporary society: when should transnational military force be permitted to protect human rights? Professor Johnson uses the relatively recent doctrine of a “responsibility to protect” as the centerpiece of his paper, characterizing it as a reaction to legal concepts that emerged in the “Westphalian system.” Yet the doctrine, at least as it relates to the use of military force, is not a reaction to that system but, rather, to the relatively recent system of the UN Charter, particularly its relegation to the Security Council of the exclusive authority to determine when military force should be used for purposes other than self‐defense. When the Cold War ended and the Security Council failed to act to protect human rights, the doctrine was born.     

Evolutionary Development: Sustainability … and Beyond!

The act of observation can appear to affect the results of certain scientific experiments. Research has shown that the mind is much more than the brain. The perception of an observer may be significantly affected by the local and non-local environment, and is dependant on the time of the day, month, or year on which those measurements are made. This research has led toward a greater understanding of the structure of the universe, including its connection to consciousness and information. For example, it is demonstrated that the mind's ability to communicate information from across the solar system is much faster than the speed of light.     

Psychology of Science/Theology of Science: Reaching Out or Narrowing?

Formalizing a “psychology of science” today will constrain intellectual freedom in ways more likely stultifying than liberating. We should be more improvisational in seeking ideas from academic psychology to develop a more comprehensive purview. I suggest that a psychology of science should look at systematic theology and empirical theology. Liberal theologians have long experience trying to distill from religion those structural aspects that affirm openness in a search for truth. Science, as well as religion, has its myths and rituals, but theologians are more experienced than scientists at a large mythohistorical scale. There are distortions in the extreme degree to which psychological science has traditionally emphasized empiricism, positivism, hypothesis testing, and falsifiability. I argue for less critical reduction and more creative augmentation. This could include looking outside academia at cognitive competencies of people in trades. Exaggerated parsimony is an old story. This is illustrated by the opposition to David Hartley's 1749 theory of neural oscillations. There is an inexorable “margin of uncertainty” where scientific prediction and control can never outstrip the new uses to which human beings put ideas. Facts and values interact in this margin; theology has long made a home there, but scientists sometimes have been excessive in rejecting the “naturalistic fallacy.” There is also often a degree of disingenuousness in psychology's reluctance to take subjective phenomena seriously; here there may be lessons in how empirical theology has handled subjectivity, as well as in taking an honest look at the way much of the methodology of experimental psychology incorporates subjective assessments. Feist's book is a start, but these things need more thought before codifying a psychology of science.     

Existential Responsibility - The Civic Virtue

Responsibility can cast light on the context of consensus, conflict, and education. In terms of juridical responsibility, the person responds to a defined claim or duty. Education as an alive relationship between unique persons is characterized by existential responsibility - the response to a unique and problematic situation. Depending on which kind of society we are referring to, responsibility will serve society best as juridical responsibility when it is a closed society and as existential responsibility when it is an open democratic society. Education as such will create the potentiality of provocation of conflicts in any kind of society.     

Redundant publication in biomedical sciences: Scientific misconduct or necessity?

Redundant publication in biomedical sciences is the presentation of the same information or data set more than once. Forms of redundant publication include “salami slicing”, in which similar text accompanies data presented in disaggregated fashion in different publications and “duplicate or multiple publication” in which identical information is presented with a virtually identical text. Estimates of prevalence of the phenomenon put it at 10 to 25% of published literature. Redundant publication can be considered unethical, or fraudulent, when the author(s) attempt to conceal the existence of duplicate publication from editors and readers. Redundant publication in the area of clinical trials is potentially dangerous as it tends to overestimate the effects of interventions. The scientific community at large and governments should take urgent steps to safeguard the public from the possible effects of fraudulent multiple publications.     

How to blow the Whistle and still have a career afterwards

Filing charges of scientific misconduct can be a risky and dangerous endeavor. This article presents rules of conduct to follow when considering whether to report perceived misconduct, and a set of step-by-step procedures for responsible whistleblowing that describe how to do so once the decision to report misconduct has been made. This advice is framed within the university setting, and may not apply fully in industrial settings. Ms. Gunsalus, an attorney, has been responsible for a wide range of compliance issues and academic policy matters at her university including responding to allegations of scientific misconduct. She served on the United States Commission on Research Integrity and spent six years on the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, four of them as chair. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium entitled “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: What the Scientific Community Can Do About Whistleblowing” held during the Annual Meeting of the AAAS, Seattle, Washington, 15 February, 1997.