Preschoolers’ Thoughts on the Concept of Time

Abstract

This study aimed to examine preschool children’s epistemological views in the context of the concept of time via their drawings of the time machine. The study was conducted with 30 five-year-old children (17 girls and 13 boys) attending state and private preschools in the academic year 2018/2019. The data collection tools used in the study were the Test for Creative Thinking - Drawing Production TCT-DP, Children’s Thoughts on Time Questionnaire (CTTQ) and Children’s Epistemological Views Questionnaire (CEVQ). Of the mixed methods typologies, the fully mixed sequential dominant status-qualitative design was employed. The results obtained from the study indicated that the time machine drawings of almost half the participating children included creative elements and logical thinking products. In addition, 40% of the children’s responses reflected sophisticated epistemological views such as scientific, imaginative/science fiction-based, divergent and eccentric approaches and non-authority figures regarding the concept of time. In conclusion: contrary to Piegatian interpretation, our results show that five-year old children can demonstrate abstract scientific understanding regarding the concept of time and preschoolers’ epistemic approach has a critical role in determining their development of abstract cognitive concepts.     

Healthy Conflict in an Era of Intractability

The essay responds to four critical essays by Rosemary Kellison, Ebrahim Moosa, Joseph Winters, and Martin Kavka on the author’s recent book, Healthy Conflict in Contemporary American Society: From Enemy to Adversary (2018). Parts 1 and 2 work in tandem to further develop my accounts of strategic empathy and agonistic political friendship. I defend these accounts against criticisms that my argument for moral imagination obligates oppressed people to empathize with their oppressors. I argue, further, that healthy conflict can be motivated by a kind of “secular” love. This enables my position to immanently critique and mediate the claims that one must either love (agapically) one’s opponent in order to engage them in “healthy conflict,” on one hand, or that one must vanquish, exclude, or “cancel” one’s opponent, on the other. In Part 3, I demonstrate how my account mediates the challenge of an alleged standing opposition between moral imagination and socio-theoretical critique. I defend a methodologically pragmatist account of immanent prophetic criticism, resistance, and conflict transformation. Finally, I respond to one critic’s vindication of a strong enemy/adversary opposition that takes up the case of white supremacist violence in the U.S. I argue that the time horizon for healthy conflict must be simultaneously immediate and also long-term, provided that such engagements remain socio-critically self-reflexive and seek to cultivate transformational responses.     

On A Reductionist Analysis of William James's Philosophy of Religion

William James undertook to steer his way between a rationalistic systemthat was not empirical enough and an empirical system so materialistic that it could not account for the value commitments on which it rested. In arguing against both the absolutists (gnostics) and the empiricists (agnostics), he defined a position of pluralistic moralism that seemed equally distant from both, leaving himself vulnerable to the criticism that he had rescued morality from scientism only by reducing religion to morals. Such criticism, however, ignores distinctions James made between religion and theology and between monistic theology and dualistic theology. When these distinctions are taken into account, it becomes evident that James can be criticized for reducing religion to morality only from the point of view of either absolute monism or religious humanism and that radical empiricism not only embraces a significant number ofnonmoral religious experiences but also leaves open the possibility of belief in the particular historical God of traditional Christianity.     

Reflective structured dialogue: A conversation with 2018 American Academy of Religion excellence in teaching award winner Jill DeTemple

This conversation between the 2018 American Academy of Religion Excellence in Teaching Award winner Jill DeTemple and the editors of Teaching Theology and Religion continues an occasional series of interviews that has previously featured Jonathan Z. Smith, Stephen Prothero, Mary Pierce Brosmer, Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore, and two previous AAR Teaching Award Winners, Joanne Maguire and Lynn Neal. After initial discussion about teaching the intro course we launch into a long discussion of “Reflective Structured Dialogue” – an effective teaching technique for staging contentious conversations, building trust and understanding, and a dialogic culture of curiosity. 1 1 The authors would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Ruel W. Tyson, Jr., a champion of collaborative scholarship and intellectual community. The research referenced in this article was supported by a subaward agreement from the University of Connecticut with funds provided by Grant No. 58942 from the John Templeton Foundation. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of UCONN or the John Templeton Foundation.
     

What Do Religion Scholars Really Want? Scholarly Values in the Scientific Study of Religion

This article presents selected findings of the Values in Scholarship on Religion (VISOR) project. Conversations about the values and norms that ought to shape the academic study of religion are quite common but typically based on anecdotal evidence and personal experience. The goal of VISOR was to gather data that could ground debates about the values that scholars of religion prize. Here, we present statistical analyses of VISOR data that shed light on the values guiding members of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) and the ways in which these compare with the values of members of other academic associations and other disciplines that study religion. Compared to current members of SSSR, members of the broader field of scholars whose approach to religion is sociological are more likely to be younger, female, liberal, and nonreligious. This sea change will put pressure on the SSSR to adapt.     

PRAGMATISM,REALISM, AND RELIGION

Pragmatism is often thought to be incompatible with realism, the view that there are knowable mind‐independent facts, objects, or properties. In this article, I show that there are, in fact, realist versions of pragmatism and argue that a realist pragmatism of the right sort can make important contributions to such fields as religious ethics and philosophy of religion. Using William James's pragmatism as my primary example, I show (1) that James defended realist and pluralist views in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion, and (2) that these views not only cohere with his pragmatism but indeed are basic to it. After arguing that James's pragmatism provides a credible and useful approach to a number of basic philosophical and religious issues, I conclude by reflecting on some ways in which we can apply and potentially improve James's views in the study of religion.     

HISTORICISM IN PRAGMATISM: LESSONS IN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY

Abstract: Pragmatism involves simultaneous commitments to modes of inquiry that are philosophical and historical. This article begins by demonstrating this point as it is evidenced in the historicist pragmatisms of William James and John Dewey. Having shown that pragmatism focuses philosophical attention on concrete historical processes, the article turns to a discussion of the specific historiographical commitments consistent with this focus. This focus here is on a pragmatist version of historical inquiry in terms of the central historiographical categories of the object of historical inquiry and mode of historical periodization. After describing the basic historiographical consequences of pragmatism's historicism, the article moves to a discussion of the philosophical results of this historicism. The focus here is on the role that historical inquiry can play in the general philosophical perspective of pragmatism as well as on some recent texts that exemplify the dual pragmatist commitment to philosophy and history.     

Tradition,Authority, and Immanent Critique in Comparative Ethics

Drawing on resources from pragmatist thought allows religious ethicists to take account of the central role traditions play in the formation and development of moral concepts without thereby espousing moral relativism or becoming traditionalists. After giving an account of this understanding of the concept of tradition, I examine the ways in which understandings of tradition play out in two contemporary examples of tradition‐based ethics: works in comparative ethics of war by James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay. I argue that a pragmatist approach to tradition‐based ethics allows for a nuanced and flexible understanding of moral traditions, and one that holds great promise for international consensus‐building around shared ethical norms for the use of armed force.