HIV: How Science Shaped the Ethics

AIDS is a debilitating and fatal disease that was first identified as an infectious disease syndrome in the 1970s. The discovery of a nearly universally fatal infectious and rapidly spreading disease in the post–antibiotics era created apprehension in the medical community and alarm in the general population. Questions about how patients should be handled in medical and nonmedical settings resulted in the ostracizing of many AIDS patients and inappropriate patient management. Scientific investigation into modes of disease transmission and control helped to shape the management of AIDS patient care in such a way that ethical and protective practices could be developed. In this article I discuss some of the ethical questions that were addressed by appropriate scientific inquiry.     

The Public Has to Define Itself

In the article texts by John Dewey, JürgenHabermas and Richard Rorty are discussed in thelight of different meanings of the Public. Thisis done by discussing foundational andnon-foundational claims on a philosophy ofpragmatism and democracy, and by looking atdifferent meanings of intersubjectivity. Onecrucial difference I am pointing at, is thatwhile Dewey's intersubjectivity is stemmingfrom philosophical arguments as well aspolitical, Habermas's intersubjectivity isrestricted to the level of (an almostscientific) philosophical abstractargumentation without any concrete language ofpolitics. When it comes to Rorty I stress thathe is far closer than Habermas to Dewey'spragmatism, especially his ambition to includethe specific individuals and to stressindividuality in a philosophy of communicationand public conduct.     

Educational Theory as a Writerly Practice

Educational theory does not oppose educational practice, as manyseem to think; instead it is a form of practice and the action oftheory exists at two levels. At a cultural level theory ischaracterized by linguistic forms of action and at a social level it is characterized by the day to day practices thatorganize and reward the work of producing educational philosophy.While the social practices that govern the production ofphilosophy certainly beg for ethnographic attention,any consideration anthropologists or philosophers giveit will eventually find its way to the page and hence tothe cultural forms of linguistic action that are thesubject of this paper. Focusing on how educationalphilosophers see the things that they do, as opposedto what they see, I will suggest that the wayeducational philosophy is fashioned is an importantpart of what is fashioned. Ironically, as I will show,the ``way' of educational philosophy can flow with oragainst the ``what' of it – an author, that is, can saythat they are for or against this or that, but their stylized way of saying it can contradict the literalmeaning of their words.     

Politics for Learning or Learning for Politics?

It is argued that political democracyand citizenship should not be taken as primarygoals within university education. Instead theauthor argues for a notion of ``academicdemocracy' with the overall goal or ethos oflearning together. Moreover it is argued that``learning' then should be understood accordingto ``practical traditions of knowledge', whichmeans that truth is not the ultimate goal. Theultimate goal is practices that lead to thegood of men and women.     

成人与中学生科学概念形成过程的四个对比实验

以一组非人工的、自然的科学概念(“反作用力”、“机械能守恒”、“熵”和“场”)为学习内容,分别以成人和中学生为被试,实验研究成人和中学生科学概念形成过程的异同。结论如下：(1)成人与中学生科学概念形成过程均分为振荡渐进期、高原期和突变期。(2)成人的振荡渐进期较长;中学生的振荡渐进期较短且振荡特征比较明显。(3)成人的高原期出现较晚,但持续较长;中学生的高原期出现较早,但持续较短。(4)中学生的突变期的跨度随概念的抽象程度提高而越来越大。     

The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist

We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data.     

Making sense of the libertarian’s semantic claim about agential phenomenology

Libertarians about free will sometimes argue for their position on the grounds that our phenomenology of action is such that determinism would need to be false for it to be veridical. Many, however, have thought that it would be impossible for us to have an experience that is in contradiction with determinism, since this would require us to have perceptual experience of metaphysical facts. In this paper I show how the libertarian claim is possible. In particular, if experience depicts the world such that there is more than one physically possible future, then determinism would need to be false for that experience to be veridical. I show that we have experiences, or perceptual episodes, of this kind on the basis of recent work in the study of perception. Theorists in this area have argued that we have vision-for-action, and that what we visually perceive are not just objects but also possibilities for action. If we experience that it is possible that we ?, then we also experience that it is possible that we not ?. Furthermore, we probably experience more than one possibility for action at any one moment. I argue that these are physical possibilities, and therefore that we experience the world such that there is more than one physically possible future. So the libertarian claim about the semantics of agential phenomenology is highly plausible, even if this does not entail libertarianism.     

Six Different Theological Responses to the Scientific Prediction of the Decaying Universe*

This article explores six different theological responses to the scientific prediction of the ultimately decaying universe. They are atheistic resignation, scientific creationism, futureless eschatology, physical eschatology, process eschatology, and, finally, resurrection hope in mutually critical dialogue with scientific prediction. In the conclusion, the author argues that the ultimate ground for the cosmic hope must be derived from the distinctively theological norm, that is, the gospel of Jesus Christ, which encourages us to envision the new creation as the redemptive transformation of the present universe.