The Non-Conceptual Dimension of Social Mediation: Toward a Materialist Aufhebung of Hegel

ABSTRACT

Sellars’s relationship with Hegel is complex and itself ‘dialectical‘ in interesting ways. Sellars follows Hegel in recognizing that the normativity essential to intentionality and conceptuality is a social phenomenon. But Sellars criticizes Hegel for his inability to independently explain the emergence and function of this essential group phenomenon. I shall argue that Sellars’s critique of Hegel on this count is part of a larger, metaphysically ambitious and rigorously realistic position, which, though turning Hegel’s ontology on its head, shares with Hegel the methodological ambition of arriving at a position which is globally explanatorily closed. Further, it will be suggested that although Sellars would surely have been critical of the ontological reification of Hegel’s dialectical method, he nonetheless reserves an important role for conceptual dialectical development right at the heart of his system, namely in his understanding of the conceptual evolution that leads from the manifest to the scientific image. Finally, I shall argue that Sellars thereby aspires to provide nothing less than a materialist aufhebung of idealist Hegelian dialectics.     

Liberal naturalism and the scientific image of the world

ABSTRACT

This paper distinguishes between the theoretical scientific image (of the posits of the successful sciences) and the practical scientific image (which, besides explanatory posits, includes everything presupposed by the practices of doing science (e.g. scientists, funding agencies, laboratories, chairs and other artifacts, linguistic communication, a just and democratic ethos). The popular idea that there is a conceptual clash between the scientific and manifest images of the world is revealed as largely illusory. From the perspective of a liberal naturalism, the placement problem for ‘problematic’ entities or truths is not solved but dissolved. Persons, say, are not posits of any explanatory science, but beings acknowledged as rational agencies in second-personal space. Core elements of the manifest image (e.g. persons) are more deeply rooted in our conceptual scheme than any version of the scientific image.     

SCIENCE AND OTHER COMMON NOUNS: FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-ESSENTIALISM

The term “science” is a common noun that is used to designate a whole range of activities. If Reeves is right—and I think he is—that there is no essence to these activities that allows them to be objectively identified and demarcated from nonscience, then what qualifies as science is determined by communities. It becomes much more difficult on this antiessentialism position to identify and dismiss pseudo-science. I suggest we might find a way forward, though, by engaging a philosophical tradition that has largely been neglected in English-speaking science and religion studies, and by articulating a theory of consensus along the lines of Oreskes (2019).     

OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF A SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW

Abstract. Understanding the structure of a scientific world view is important for the dialogue between science and religion. In this essay, I define comprehensive worldview and distinguish it from the more focused non comprehensive worldview. I explain that scientists and the public at large agree that modern research works in a scientific as opposed to nonscientific worldview. I give some of the essential elements of any scientific worldview that differentiate it from nonscientific ones. These elements are the general pre suppositions of science, the methods of science, and the articles of justification for the conclusions science puts forward. I question whether a scientific worldview can allow philosophical and theological tenets, which might appear to stand opposed to scientific paradigms, and conclude that the answer lies in the scope of its comprehensiveness.     

PUTTING PRESUPPOSITIONS ON THE TABLE: WHY THE FOUNDATIONS MATTER

Abstract. Over time scientists have developed an effective investigative process that includes the acceptance of particular basic presuppositions, methods, content, and theories. The deeply held presuppositions are the philosophical foundation of scientific thought and do much to define the field's worldview. These fundamental assumptions can be esoteric for many and can become a source of conflict when they are not commonly shared with other points of view. Such presuppositions affect the observations, the conclusions drawn, and the positions taken. Furthermore, in some cases presuppositions in science have undergone important shifts in meaning, causing an increasing dissonance. We argue that disputes in religion and science often are due to these very basic differences in philosophy that are held by members in the different communities. To better understand the nature of science and its differences with religious views, presuppositions rather than conclusions should be articulated and examined for validity and scope of application.     

我国中西医结合科研工作的回顾与思考

针对我国中西医结合事业现状,通过调研,结合文献,提出中西医结合科研工作的发展对策。试从研究方向、人才队伍、科研交流等方面进行阐述,以期有助于我国中西医结合科研工作的健康发展。     

Bayesian test and Kuhn’s paradigm

Kuhn’s theory of paradigm reveals a pattern of scientific progress, in which normal science alternates with scientific revolution. But Kuhn underrated too much the function of scientific test in his pattern, because he focuses all his attention on the hypothetico-deductive schema instead of Bayesian schema. This paper employs Bayesian schema to re-examine Kuhn’s theory of paradigm, to uncover its logical and rational components, and to illustrate the tensional structure of logic and belief, rationality and irrationality, in the process of scientific revolution. __________ Translated from Ziran Bianzhengfa Tongxun 自然辩证法通讯 (Journal of Dialectics of Nature), 2005 (6) by Zhang Jianfeng, proofread by Wang Dong     

JOHN HAUGHT—FINDING CONSONANCE BETWEEN RELIGION AND SCIENCE

John Haught has awarded the debates between religion (Christianity in particular) and science a central place in his ongoing corpus of work. Seeking to encourage and enhance the conversation, Haught both critiques current positions and offers his own perspective as a potential ground for continuing the discussion in a fruitful manner. This essay considers Haught's primary criticisms of the voices on both sides of the debate which his work connotes as polarizing or conflating the debate. It also extrudes from Haught's work themes that provide alternative visions. The essay concludes with two questions for further consideration.     

从一个康复“缺憾”个案看科学思维方法的意义

本文就一例截瘫患者从因分娩诱发患病、误诊误治到康复治疗实施的过程进行分析,通过总结在诊断、治疗和康复过程中的失误与经验,讨论我们在日常的工作中如何正确建立科学思维方法以及利用科学思维方法解决实际问题,以达到提高自身诊疗水平和独立思考能力的目的。     

JEFFREY STOUT ON DEMOCRACY AND ITS CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN CRITICS

Jeffrey Stout addresses two of the main criticisms of liberal democracy by its contemporary neotraditionalist Christian critics: that liberal democracy is destructive of social tradition, and thereby of virtue in the citizenry, and that liberal democracy is inherently secular, committed to expunging religious voices from the public arena. I judge that Stout effectively answers these charges: liberal democracy has its own tradition, it cultivates the virtues relevant to that, and it is not inherently hostile to piety. What Stout does not do, I suggest, is take the next step of showing, positively, that Christianity can and should affirm the substance of liberal democratic society. This is due, in good measure, to the fact that Stout never tells us, except in off‐hand comments, what he takes the substance of liberal democracy to be. And this, in turn, is due to his way of employing pragmatism: he uses pragmatism to give an account of human society generally, not of liberal democratic society. I raise some questions about the general account that pragmatism gives of human society, and thus about the account that it would give of liberal democracy.