The role of scientific associations in promoting research integrity and deterring research misconduct

The nature of scientific societies’ relationships with their members limits their ability to promote research integrity. They must therefore leverage their strengths as professional organizations to integrate ethical considerations into their ongoing support of their academic disciplines. This paper suggests five strategies for doing so.     

Pragmatism, Critical Realism, and the Cognitive Value of Religion and Science

Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science.     

Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is Putnam's Causal Theory of Meaning Compatible with Internal Realism?

Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability. Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force as a weapon against incommensurability. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Embodied AI, Creation, and Cog

This is a reply to comments on my paper Cog, a Humanoid Robot, and the Questions of the Image of God ; one was written by Mary Gerhart and Allan Melvin Russell, and another one by Helmut Reich. I will start with the suggested analogy of the relationship between God and us and the one between us and the humanoid robot Cog and will show why this analogy is not helpful for the dialogue between theology and artificial intelligence (AI). Such a dialogue can succeed only if both our fascination for humanoids and our fear of them are equally accepted. Any avoidance of these emotions, as well as any rejection of the possibility that Cog might one day be humanlike, destroy the dialogue. The interpretation of both scientific theories and religious metaphors as stories replaces seemingly "rational" arguments with the confession of the respective commitments to a body of stories and opens up a space for exchange and friendship between AI-researchers and theologians—an option that usually remains closed.     

Scientific societies and whistleblowers: the relationship between the community and the individual

Formalizing shared ethical standards is an activity of scientific societies designed to achieve a collective goal of promoting ethical conduct. A scientist who is faced with the choice of becoming a “whistleblower” by exposing misconduct does so in the context of these ethical standards. Examination of ethics policies of scientific societies which are members of the Council of Scientific Society Presidents (CSSP) shows a breadth of purpose and scope in these policies. Among the CSSP member societies, some ethics policies chiefly present the ethical culture of the community in an educational context and do not have enforcement procedures. Other policies are more comprehensive and include standards for certification, procedures for addressing ethical issues, and established sanctions. Of the 36 member societies of CSSP that have developed a code or adopted a code of another professional society, 18 specifically identified a responsibility to expose ethical misconduct, demonstrating an acknowledgment of the possible critical role of the whistleblower in addressing ethical issues. Scientific societies may revise their ethics codes based upon experience gained in addressing cases of ethical misconduct. In most cases, the action of a whistleblower is the initial step in addressing an ethics violation; the whistleblower may either be in the position of an observer or a victim, such as in the case of someone who discovers that his or her own work has been plagiarized. The ethics committee of a scientific society is one of several possible outlets through which the whistleblower can voice a complaint or concern. Ethical violations can include falsification, fabrication, plagiarism and other authorship disputes, conflict of interest and other serious violations. Commonly, some of these violations may involve publication in the scientific literature. Thus addressing ethical issues may be intertwined with a scientific society’s role in the dissemination of new scientific results. For a journal published by a scientific society, the editor can refer at some point to the ethics committee of the society. Whereas, in the case of a journal published by a commercial publisher, the editor may be without direct support of the associated scientific community in handling the case. The association of a journal with a scientific society may thus direct a whistleblower towards addressing the issue within the scientific community rather than involving the press or talking to colleagues who may gossip. A formal procedure for handling ethics cases may also discourage false accusers. Another advantage of handling complaints through ethics committees is that decisions to contact home institutions or funding agencies can be made by the ethics committee and are not the responsibility of the whistleblower or the editor of the journal. The general assessment is that the establishment of ethics policies, especially policies covering publication in society journals, will promote a culture supportive of whistleblowers and discouraging to false accusers. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium entitled “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: What the Scientific Community Can Do About Whistleblowing” held during the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Seattle, Washington, 15 February, 1997.     

THE LIMITS OF PRAGMATISM AND THE LIMITS OF REALISM

Abstract. I argue here for a limited version of pragmatism—called conceptual pragmatism—that recognizes that conceptual systems are to be evaluated according to their usefulness for helping us get around in the world. Once a conceptual system is in place, however, the truth of sentences is a matter of both empirical tit and coherence with the rest of our knowledge. The error of critical realists is to fail to take into account the limited conceptual relativity that is to be expected on the basis of conceptual pragmatism. The conceptual realist thesis applies equally in science and theology.     

The potential of medicine as a resource for philosophy

In addition to the neglect of philosophy by medicine, emphasized in a recent editorial in this journal, there has been an equally important neglect of medicine by philosophy. Philosophy stands to gain from medicine in three respects: in materials, the conceptual difficulties arising in the practice of medicine being key data for philosophical enquiry; in methods, these data, through their problematic character, being ideally suited to the technique of linguistic analysis; and in results, the practical requirements of medicine placing a direct demand for progress on philosophical theory. The future of the relationship between philosophy and medicine depends on the development of a positive two-way trade between them.