Tomorrow I’ll be me: The effect of time perspective on the activation of idealistic versus pragmatic selves

It is widely accepted that the self-system is dynamic and consists of multiple selves that emerge under different contexts. The present research describes two types of diverging self-conceptions, the idealistic and pragmatic selves. Building on a synthesis of construal level theory with research on the self, we propose that a more distal time perspective activates an idealistic versus a pragmatic self. Self-activation, in turn, influences the preference between two major motives: maximizing identity versus instrumental benefits. A series of five studies supported this conceptualization by demonstrating that: (a) distal rather than proximal time perspective enhances the preference for identity over instrumental benefits; (b) people construe themselves as relatively more idealistic than pragmatic when primed with a distal than proximal time perspective, and (c) self-activation mediates the effect of time perspective on preference. The studies also investigate boundary conditions and process measures that shed light on the interface between time, self, and preference. The final section discusses the theoretical implications for the literatures on construal level, self, and justice and the practical implications for organizational behavior, political psychology, and human decision-making.     

A (Post)Foundational Approach to the Philosophy of Science: Part II

Summary  This is a sequel to my paper, “Searching for a (Post)Foundational Approach to Philosophy of Science”, which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal [Ginev 2001, Journal for General Philosophy of science 32, 27–37]. In the present paper I continue to scrutinize the possibility of a strong hermeneutics of scientific research. My aim is to defend the position of cognitive existentialism that combines the advocacy of science’s cognitive specificity and the rejection of any form of essentialism. A special attention will be paid to the notion of the thematizing project of scientific research.     

医生的探索与发现

临床工作中有着许多未知、疑难问题,这就是医生们探索与发现的起点。通过对桂希恩等多位医学专家临床探索发现事例的分析,得到许多启示,指出临床探索发现是一个系统的科学活动过程,也是临床决策的重要组成部分;找到客观存在的事物或规律,有利于疾病的诊治,充满了大医精诚精神;有利于人才培养,医学创新和进步,应予大力提倡和鼓励。     

浅析当前临床科学决策的几个影响因素

随着循证医学在我国的发展和"医疗举证责任倒置"等相关法律的实施,我国临床医生在进行诊治决策时已逐步向临床科学决策迈进。而防御性医疗、不健全的医疗制度及相关法律等却严重影响着这一科学决策的转变过程。只有有效解决了导致干扰科学决策的各种社会影响因素,如扩大基本医疗保险的覆盖率,实施医疗风险保险制度,提高医务人员认知和职业素质,保障行医安全等,临床科学决策的真正落实就大有希望。     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.     

GETTING UNDER MY SKIN: WILLIAM JAMES ON THE EMOTIONS, SOCIALITY, AND TRANSCENDENCE

“You are really getting under my skin!” This exclamation suggests a series of psychological, philosophical, and metaphysical questions: What is the nature and development of human emotion? How does emotion arise in social interaction? To what extent can interactive situations shape our embodied selves and intensify particular affective states? With these questions in mind, William James begins to investigate the character of emotions and to develop a model of what he terms the social self. James's studies of mimicry and his interest in phenomena now often investigated using biofeedback begin to explain how affective states develop and how it might be possible for something to “get under one's skin.” I situate these studies in the history of psychology between the psychological schools of structuralism and behaviorism. More important, I suggest continuity between James's Psychology and recent research on mirror neurons, reentrant mapping, and emotional mimicry in the fields of clinical psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This research supports and extends James's initial claims in regard to the creation of emotions and the life of the social self. I propose that James's work in the empirical sciences should be read as a prelude to his metaphysical works that speak of a coordination between embodied selves and wider environmental situations, and his psychological studies should be read as a prelude to his reflections on spiritual transcendence.     

A confusion of tongues between psychoanalysis and philosophy: Is the controversy over drive versus relational theory a philosophical one?

In recent years the controversy over Drive versus Relational models of the psyche has become entangled in a philosophical controversy over epistemology. Some have argued that the Drive model was a relic of an age of positivistic science, while Relational models are a product of a postmodern condition. This paper argues that the controversy need not be a philosophical one, and that Relational views are not, in fact, a product of postmodernism, nor are they necessarily dependent on a postmodern epistemology. Separating the epistemological from the psychological more carefully may help return the debate to its proper, psychoanalytic domain, and perhaps contribute to a more fruitful dialogue across what, at times, seems like an abyss between Relational views and Drive theory.     

科学隐喻的方法论意义

The essential significance of scientific metaphor lies in applying the general metaphorical theory to specific interpretations and elaborations of scientific theories to form a methodology of scientific explanation. It is a contextual grasp of objective reality. A given metaphorical context and its grasp of the essence of reality can only be valid when the context is continually restructured. Taking the context as a whole, the methodological characteristic of scientific metaphor lies in the unity of understanding and choice, experience and concepts, semantic structures and metaphorical domains, rationality and irrationality. As a form of thinking based on reasons, scientific metaphor plays an important role in invention, representation, explanation, evaluation, and communication. Translated by Liu Yiyu from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (Social Sciences in China), 2004, (2): 92–101     

Freestanding Pragmatism in Law and Bioethics

This paper represents the first installment of alarger project devoted to the relevance of pragmatism forbioethics. One self-consciously pragmatist move would be toreturn to the classical pragmatist canon of Peirce, James andDewey in search of substantive doctrines or methodologicalapproaches that might be applied to current bioethicalcontroversies. Another pragmatist (or neopragmatist) move wouldbe to subject the regnant principlist paradigm to Richard Rorty'ssubversive assaults on foundationalism in epistemology andethics. A third pragmatist method, dubbed ``freestandingpragmatism' by its proponents, embraces a ``pragmatist' approachto practical reasoning without discernable moorings either to theclassical canon or to Rorty's neopragmatism. This thirdpragmatist approach to method in practical ethics is the subjectof this article. I begin with an examination of freestandingpragmatism in the theory of judicial decision making. I arguethat this version of legal pragmatism – so described on account ofits commitments to contextualism, instrumentalism, eclecticism,and freedom from grand theory – bears a striking resemblance tomuch self-described pragmatist work in bioethics today. Ifurther argue that if this is what we mean by ``pragmatism,' thenin a certain sense ``we are all pragmatists now.'     

COMMENTS ON SIX RESPONSES TO DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION

This paper is a rejoinder to papers by Sabina Lovibond, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Sumner B. Twiss, G. Scott Davis, M. Cathleen Kaveny, and John Kelsay on the author's recent book Democracy and Tradition. The argument covers a host of topics, ranging from epistemology and methodology to human rights, the common law, and Islamic ethics.