Trustworthy research—An editorial introduction

She is guest editor for this special issue ofScience and Engineering Ethics on “Trustworthy Research”.     

Pierre de La Ramée et le déclin de la rhétorique

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient philosophers, above all Aristotle, though experience does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the new rhetoric, aims to fill the gap thus created.

     

The role of the psychologist expert witness: Provider of perspective and input

The definition and role of the expert witness is reviewed. Two conceptual systems for viewing the world, the scientific method and the adversarial system, are compared. The reconciliation and integration of these two discrepant systems are discussed in terms of input versus outcome. The rules of evidence, as well as problems of communication between the systems, are reviewed with the aim of providing expert witnesses with a better understanding of effective testimony. Finally, collaboration between the two systems is called for in order to provide guidelines for both neuropsychologists and attorneys.     

Development of rules and strategies: balancing the old and the new

The experiments described in the lead articles replicate findings from previous studies of development of knowledge about balance scales, add several new findings, and raise four key questions: (a) How can rule use best be assessed? (b) How can we reconcile systematic use of rules with variable use of strategies? (c) When do children begin to use rules? and (d) How do children generate new rules? In this Reflection, we summarize current understanding of development of knowledge about balance scales and consider each of the four questions.     

Beyond conflict of interest: the responsible conduct of research

This paper reports data and scholarly opinion that support the perception of systemic flaws in the management of scientific professions and the research enterprise; explores the responsibility that professional status places on the scientific professions, and elaborates the concept of the responsible conduct of research (RCR). Data are presented on research misconduct, availability of research guidelines, and perceived research quality. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland, 5–6 April, 2002. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of Research Integrity, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, or any other federal agency.     

From case management to prevention of scientific dishonesty in Denmark

In 1992, The Danish Medical Research Council established a national committee on scientific dishonesty with the twofold task of handling cases of scientific misconduct and taking preventive initiatives. Scientific dishonesty was proven in only five cases, but in another nine cases lesser degrees of deviations from good scientific practice were found. The experiences from a total of 24 treated cases indicated that three key areas were at the basis of most of the accusations and the deviations from good practice: uncertainty about 1) authorship, about 2) rights and duties to use scientific data and about 3) agreements at the initiation of joint studies. As a consequence guidelines on good practice have been issued on these key subjects. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct. An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998.     

The American experience: Lessons learned

This paper discusses ten lessons learned since 1989 about handling allegations of scientific misconduct involving biomedical and behavioral research supported by the U. S. Public Health Service. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, Scientific Misconduct: An International Perspective, organised by The Medical University of Warsaw, 16 November, 1998. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of Research Integrity, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, or any other federal agency.     

Auguste Comte on Positivism and Happiness

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) is the founder of a French school of thought that became famous for its encyclopaedic account of the sciences as well as for its exposition of what was designed as a way out of a state of intellectual and moral crisis. This essay demonstrates that there is a linkage between the diagnosis of crisis and the pursuit of happiness in Comte's foundation of positivism. It begins by distinguishing Comte's notion of positivism from that of a value-free science. In analysing Comte's peculiar usage of the term happiness, the essay shows that happiness is understood as the result of the convergence (consensus) of three components: a scientific conception of the world, the feelings of love and veneration, and a wisely ordered activity. The essay then demonstrates that the first of these components is of primary importance inasmuch as it is to frame a new horizon within which man is expected to return to a healthy state of mind, to reshape both his hopes and activities, and to discover his own participation in a supreme order acting through the laws of nature as well as through those of the civilization in which he lives. Conveying this new horizon to citizens of a lasting Republic is the sacred mission of sociology. The essay concludes by pointing out that Comte's conception of happiness can be assessed as unifying some main qualities of life as they are classified in Ruut Veenhoven's fourfold matrix.     

Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses as Relations

Summary  In spite of several attempts to explicate the relationship between a scientific hypothesis and evidence, the issue still cries for a satisfactory solution. Logical approaches to confirmation, such as the hypothetico-deductive method and the positive instance account of confirmation, are problematic because of their neglect of the semantic dimension of hypothesis confirmation. Probabilistic accounts of confirmation are no better than logical approaches in this regard. An outstanding probabilistic account of confirmation, the Bayesian approach, for instance, is found to be defective in that it treats evidence as a formal entity and this creates the problem of relevance of evidence to the hypothesis at issue, in addition to the difficulties arising from the subjective interpretation of probabilities. This essay purports to satisfy the need for a successful account of hypothesis confirmation by offering an original formulation based on the notion of instantiation of the relation urged by an hypothesis.