The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist

We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data.     

Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures

Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).     

Six Different Theological Responses to the Scientific Prediction of the Decaying Universe*

This article explores six different theological responses to the scientific prediction of the ultimately decaying universe. They are atheistic resignation, scientific creationism, futureless eschatology, physical eschatology, process eschatology, and, finally, resurrection hope in mutually critical dialogue with scientific prediction. In the conclusion, the author argues that the ultimate ground for the cosmic hope must be derived from the distinctively theological norm, that is, the gospel of Jesus Christ, which encourages us to envision the new creation as the redemptive transformation of the present universe.     

Heidegger,Dreyfus, and the Intelligibility of Practical Comportment

Most scholars agree that meaning and intelligibility are central to Heidegger’s account of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, but there is some confusion about the nature of this intelligibility. In his debate with McDowell, Dreyfus draws on phenomenologists like Heidegger to argue that there are two kinds of intelligibility: a basic, nonconceptual, practical intelligibility found in practical comportment and a conceptual, discursive intelligibility. I explore two possible ways that Dreyfus might ground this twofold account of intelligibility in Heidegger: first in the distinction between the hermeneutic and apophantic “as”, and second in the presence and absence of the as-structure. I argue that neither approach succeeds because practical intelligibility is always already discursive and discursive articulation is a condition of practical comportment.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

科学心理学的观念与人文科学的逻辑奠基

科学心理学观念的普遍兴起,是19世纪中叶错综复杂的思想史背景的产物。只有在人类思想及其历史作为整体的关系背景中,才能澄清这个观念的内在本性。也只有在系统地接受这个背景的制约关系中,这个观念才能获得其真理的实现。能否在人类思想作为整体中胜任并执行其理论职能,成为我们检验一种心理学体系之真理性的途径之一:科学心理学观念只有实现为现象学心理学,才能执行其为人文科学奠基的逻辑职能; 反之亦然。这个关系还从否定方面暗示着,一切以异化的形式实现的心理学,都不可能真正承担起为人文科学奠基的逻辑职能,并因而违背了我们的常识。     

医学科研与医学科研伦理的辩证思考

医学科研中出现许多伦理问题。其必然性在于科学与伦理的不同：即属性不同、评价标准不同、变革速度不同。医学伦理可以告诉人们什么样的医学科研活动是善的,什么样的科研行为是应该做的。医学科研中要把握医学伦理观,体现医学科技观,富有医学创新观。     

论医学教育中医学科学精神与人文精神培养之统一

培养出医术精湛、医德高尚的全面发展的医学人才是现代医学教育的目标。现代医学的发展,要求厘清现代医学教育中医学科学精神与人文关怀精神的概念,探析现代医学教育中科学精神与人文关怀精神的矛盾冲突,适应经济与社会的发展要求,实现现代医学教育中科学精神与人文关怀精神培养的统一。     

纳米医学的哲学迷思

自诺贝尔医学奖设立以来,就没有一个真正的中国本土科学家获奖,其因素是多方面的,教育方法的颠覆,科研态度的浮躁,科研政策的困扰和科研资源的散落是其中最重要的四大因素。另外,人文素养的缺乏和一些传统的思维理念的局限,对此也有不小的影响。     

论解放思想的哲学基础

党的十七大在新的历史起点上,号召全党坚持马克思主义思想路线,解放思想,实事求是,与时俱进,不断研究新情况,解决新问题。“解放思想”与“实事求是”是一致的;它是坚持与发展社会主义,实现现代化的法宝。邓小平在重新确立党的正确的思想路线起了决定性作用。它的哲学理论基础是马克思主义世界观和方法论。文章着重阐释了马克思恩格斯新唯物主义与辩证方法若干原创点。