Philosophy of Science in the Twenty‐First Century

Philosophy of science in the past half century can be seen as a reaction against logical empiricism's focus on modern logic as the format in which debates should be expressed and on physics as the canonical science. These reactions have resulted in a fragmentation of the field. Although this provides ways forward for disparate philosophies of various sciences, it threatens the very possibility of general philosophy of science. The debate that most obviously continues to be conducted at the general level—the debate about scientific realism—only does so because of a dangerous naïveté. Nevertheless, this article suggests that there is a place for general work not by starting at the highest level of abstraction but instead by abstracting general lessons from actual science.     

Darwin's lost theory and its implications for the 21st century

This paper reports the reconstruction of the long ignored “second half” or human level completion for Darwin's theory of evolution. Pursuing the striking contradictions between what has been attributed to Darwin by his neo‐Darwinian and sociobiological heirs and what he actually said, in ignored sections of The Descent of Man and Darwin's long unpublished notebooks it uncovers a three‐level theory of the moral agent that foreshadows the emergence of 20th century social science and the late 20th century rise of the fields of systems science and humanistic psychology. Implications for a joint venture of natural science and social science in the completion of the humanistic and action‐oriented theory of evolution called for by the species‐threatening challenges of the 21st century are considered.     

Science,Scientism and Imaginaries of Publics in the UK: Passive Objects,Incipient Threats

Two-way public engagement with science is an important modern democratic practice that paradoxically coincides with the intensifications of state surveillance and policing of publics and social movements engaging with issues involving science. This raises important questions about the contemporary anatomies of publics, and what count as legitimate expressions of public concern over scientific stakes within the knowledge economy. Implicit in the tension between inclusion and surveillance are concerns over the social meaning and authority of science amongst both scientific practitioners and publics. Bringing science and technology studies (STS) and social movement studies (SMS) into dialogue offers a means to explore the neglected ontological stakes in the framing of scientific imaginaries of publics, and public imaginaries of science. Post-WWII UK science–publics relations have emerged in three significant modalities, with publics imagined: as passive non-entities, circa 1950–1990 (continuing); as incipient threats due to presumed deficits in their grasp of science 1990–2000 (continuing); and, since circa 2000, as politicised threats requiring state control. Each modality is shaped by elite denial of the normative commitments embedded within science as surrogate politics—scientism. In each mode, scientistic elite emphasis on epistemic issues forecloses engagement with broader public meanings expressing legitimate normative and ontological differences. Fusing the more epistemic focus of STS with SMS's emphasis on meaning and democratic process offers a route to deeper democratic forms of public engagement with what is called science, which would also precipitate more accountability in elite discourses around science and technology.     

Stem-Cell Spin: Covering the Hwang Affair in Science and Nature

In 2006 the South Korean cloning expert Woo Suk Hwang was found guilty of fraud and scientific misconduct. The scandal reached far beyond Hwang's own laboratory, encompassing national pride, geopolitics and global discussions of stem-cell research. But the Hwang affair was also a case of fierce competition between two of the world's leading scientific journals. Individually, Science and Nature used the Hwang affair and their unique positions to air specific and conflicting agendas resulting in completely different narratives as the scandal unfolded. In Science, where Hwang's fraudulent papers were published, the readers learned about a caring and concerned South Korean research director. Science was true to this narrative over a two-year period until finally, around Christmas 2005, there was no longer any doubt about Hwang's misbehaviour. In Nature, on the other hand, Hwang was, from the very beginning, treated with suspicion and framed as a cynical director of a cloning factory. Media studies of science and technology tend to focus almost exclusively on how this framing process works in the mass media and ignore that this process is already well under way in scientific journals that then feed into mass media news stories. Thus the news coverage of the Hwang affair in Science and Nature demonstrates that these two leading scientific journals frame their news stories in important ways that reflect (and are reproduced by) mass media reporting.     

The Performance of Environmental Science in Research Teams

Scientists' practices rely not only on the discursive production of science but also on routine interactions whereby scientists manage their teams and their publics. The metaphor of the theatre helps explain how researchers perform impressions to different audiences. This metaphor can also help analyse how scientists and researchers cooperate in performance teams in order to manage credibility impressions. How are research teams constructed and maintained? How do team members respond to the challenges of coordinating the team and elaborating a common vision given their differences in aims and understandings? From 2005 to 2007 a scientific team worked together in the city of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to develop land remediation measures for coal waste disposal sites. The team was organised around a common front developed through ongoing negotiation and bargaining. Scientists employed different strategies to maintain the team through the development of the project, such as reciprocity, unanimity and bargaining. To accommodate individual views, the common front emphasised the presentation of results and the process of research over its specific content and impact.     

Modelling the History of Ideas

We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner's objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.     

A Meta-Analysis of Ethics Instruction Effectiveness in the Sciences

Scholars have proposed a number of courses and programs intended to improve the ethical behavior of scientists in an attempt to maintain the integrity of the scientific enterprise. In the present study, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis based on 26 previous ethics program evaluation efforts, and the results showed that the overall effectiveness of ethics instruction was modest. The effects of ethics instruction, however, were related to a number of instructional program factors, such as course content and delivery methods, in addition to factors of the evaluation study itself, such as the field of investigator and criterion measure utilized. An examination of the characteristics contributing to the relative effectiveness of instructional programs revealed that more successful programs were conducted as seminars separate from the standard curricula rather than being embedded in existing courses. Furthermore, more successful programs were case based and interactive, and they allowed participants to learn and practice the application of real-world ethical decision-making skills. The implications of these findings for future course development and evaluation are discussed.     

农药白草枯急性中毒的研究进展

本文对近期百草枯急性中毒研究进展进行了综述,从临床角度对百草枯急性中毒的研究进行哲学思考,指出应从以下几个方面开展研究：研究发现有效拮抗剂;进行综合系统的实验研究;建立全国性救治中心;重视救治成功的个案报道;组织多中心、大样本的临床研究;多学科协作。     

Preliminary examination of the psychometric properties of the Psychiatric Scepticism Scale

Despite much commentary on "psychiatric skepticism", there remains a dearth of appropriate psychometric scales for the measurement of this concept. To overcome this limitation, the present study examined the psychometric properties and correlates of the recently developed Psychiatric Scepticism Scale (PSS). A total of 564 individuals from the community in London, England, completed the PSS along with measures of anti-scientific attitudes, attitudes to authority, knowledge of mental health disorders, and demographics. Results showed that the PSS has a one-dimensional factor structure with very good internal consistency. In addition, it showed adequate convergent (anti-scientific attitudes, knowledge of mental health disorders) and construct validity (attitudes to authority, religiosity). Results also showed that there were small but significant differences in psychiatric skepticism by ethnicity and education, but not sex or previous diagnosis of mental health disorder. These results confirm that the PSS has adequate psychometric properties for the measurement of psychiatric skepticism.     

OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF A SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW

Abstract. Understanding the structure of a scientific world view is important for the dialogue between science and religion. In this essay, I define comprehensive worldview and distinguish it from the more focused non comprehensive worldview. I explain that scientists and the public at large agree that modern research works in a scientific as opposed to nonscientific worldview. I give some of the essential elements of any scientific worldview that differentiate it from nonscientific ones. These elements are the general pre suppositions of science, the methods of science, and the articles of justification for the conclusions science puts forward. I question whether a scientific worldview can allow philosophical and theological tenets, which might appear to stand opposed to scientific paradigms, and conclude that the answer lies in the scope of its comprehensiveness.