THE CREATIONISTS

Abstract. As the crusade to outlaw the teaching of evolution changed to a battle for equal time for creationism, the ideological defenses of that doctrine also shifted from primarily biblical to more scientific grounds. This essay describes the historical development of "scientific creationism" from a variety of late–nineteenth– and early–twentieth–century creationist reactions to Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, through the Scopes trial and the 1960s revival of creationism, to the current spread of strict creationism around the world.     

The importance of assessing treatment integrity: An example in the anxiety disorders

One purpose of this investigation was to examine the importance of assessing treatment integrity in a study evaluating a treatment for specific anxiety disorders. Three subjects, two social phobics and one simple phobic, received self-instruction training (Phase I) followed by exposure and self-instruction training (Phase II) in a multiple baseline across subjects design. All subjects were assessed during a pretreatment baseline and throughout treatment using measures of treatment integrity and measures of change in phobic severity. Improvement took place at different times for different subjects. Measures of treatment integrity, which consisted of monitoring of self-statements as well as practice outside the session, indicated that treatment was not always received as intended and that improvement was correlated with practice. The usefulness of measures of treatment integrity in both clinical and research settings is highlighted.     

Empirical tests of scientific realism: A quantitative framework

The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects-of-causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method.     

Why philosophy needs a concept of progress

This paper defends the usefulness of the concept of philosophical progress and the common assumption that philosophy and science aim to make the same, or a comparable, kind of progress. It does so by responding to Yafeng Shan's (2022) arguments that the wealth of research on scientific progress is not applicable or useful to philosophy, and that philosophy doesn't need a concept of progress at all. It is ultimately argued that while Shan's arguments are not successful, they reveal the way forward in developing accounts of philosophical progress.     

What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.     

Interobserver agreement and procedural fidelity: An odd asymmetry

We examined articles with experiments published in the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis and in Behavior Analysis in Practice from 2017 through 2021 to determine how frequently procedural fidelity was assessed. When procedural fidelity was assessed, we determined how often a measure of interobserver agreement for those fidelity data was provided. We also determined how often a measure of interobserver agreement for participants' behavior was provided. Across both journals and all years, 54.7% of relevant articles provided a measure of procedural fidelity. Of them, 17.7% provided a measure of interobserver agreement for procedural fidelity. In marked contrast, 96.4% provided interobserver agreement data for participants' behavior. It is unfortunate that applied behavior analysts frequently fail to provide procedural fidelity data and, when they do, often fail to provide interobserver agreement data for the fidelity data. Reviewers for, and editors of, behavior-analytic journals are encouraged to strongly consider the relative value of procedural fidelity and agreement on procedural fidelity measures when rendering recommendations on the suitability of a given submission.     

An Epistolary Conversation

This written exchange is between a senior and a younger Jungian analyst on issues relevant to the development of analytical psychology throughout the world today. The younger analyst, Stefano Carpani, considers himself a neo-Jungian. He explains to John Beebe, known for post-Jungian contributions to the study of typology, integrity, and gender, how important it is to include sociological perspectives alongside those that stem from the Jungian practice of relational psychoanalysis. The degree to which analysis has become an extended meditation on the relation of individual self-exploration to supra-personal Self-realization is emphasized by both authors, who envision this introspection leading to an expanded inner openness that Carpani has called “absolute freedom.” The authors conclude that absolute freedom is a space of engaged reflection that can permit an informed but individualized approach to the complexities of the world soul today.     

BIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Abstract. The sciences may be conceptualized as a hierarchy ranked by level of organization (e.g., many-body physics ranks above particle physics). Each science serves as an antidiscipline for the science above it; that is, between each pair, tense but creative interplay is inevitable. Biology has advanced through such tension between its subdisciplines and now can serve as an antidiscipline for the social sciences—for anthropology, for example, by examining the connection between cultural and biological evolution; for psychology, by addressing the nature of learning and the structure of the unconscious; for economics, by examining economically irrational behavior and by comparing economic activity in humans and other species. Sociology, concerned mainly with advanced literate societies, is relatively remote from the genetic basis of human social behavior. However, moving between biological and social levels of organization generates richness and points to new and unexpected principles.     

ON THE "USE" OF NEOPRAGMATISM

Abstract. The present article continues an earlier critique of Robbins's and Rorty's neopragmatism. Their skepticism about the traditional concept of correspondence and about the criteria for truth are both unjustified, and their own assertion of meaning as usefulness either presupposes a prior notion of linguistic reference or fails to qualify as a sufficient criterion for knowledge. The difficulties with neopragmatism have implications for two other areas of the religion/science discussion, postmodernism and empirical Theology. Postmodernism shares neopragmatism's mistakes regarding the philosophy of language and can be rejected without endangering one's empiricism, humanism, or naturalism. By contrast, the strengths of empirical Theology, and of religious empiricism in general, can be preserved without Robbins's proposed ban on metaphysics.     

Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences

This paper presents and defends the view that reinforcement and natural selection are selection processes, that selection processes are neither mechanistic nor teleological, and that mentalistic and vitalistic processes are teleological but not mechanistic. The differences between these types of processes are described and used in discussing the conceptual and methodological significance of “selection type theories” and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorist view that “operant behavior is the field of intention, purpose, and expectation. It deals with that field precisely as the theory of evolution has dealt with another kind of purpose” (1986, p. 716). The antimentalism of radical behaviorism emerges as a post-Darwinian extension of Francis Bacon's (and Galileo's) influential view that “[the introduction of final causes] rather corrupts than advances the sciences” (Bacon, 1905, p. 302).