PALEY'S iPOD: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF THE DESIGN ARGUMENT WITHIN NATURAL THEOLOGY

The argument from design stands as one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine Creator. Yet, for many scientists and philosophers, Hume's critique and Darwin's theory of natural selection have definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design in nature. Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument. From this it becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern purpose in nature. When constructed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument is not presented as conclusive evidence for God's existence but rather as an abductive, probabilistic argument. We examine the cognitive basis of probabilistic judgments in relationship to natural theology. Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the intuitive appeal of Paley's watch analogy. We conclude that the reason why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature but rather in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced by chance events or by a Creator. This difference provides atheists and theists with a rational basis for disagreement.     

Testing primary‐school children's understanding of the nature of science

Understanding the nature of science (NOS) is a critical aspect of scientific reasoning, yet few studies have investigated its developmental beginnings and initial structure. One contributing reason is the lack of an adequate instrument. Two studies assessed NOS understanding among third graders using a multiple‐select (MS) paper‐and‐pencil test. Study 1 investigated the validity of the MS test by presenting the items to 68 third graders (9‐year‐olds) and subsequently interviewing them on their underlying NOS conception of the items. All items were significantly related between formats, indicating that the test was valid. Study 2 applied the same instrument to a larger sample of 243 third graders, and their performance was compared to a multiple‐choice (MC) version of the test. Although the MC format inflated the guessing probability, there was a significant relation between the two formats. In summary, the MS format was a valid method revealing third graders' NOS understanding, thereby representing an economical test instrument. A latent class analysis identified three groups of children with expertise in qualitatively different aspects of NOS, suggesting that there is not a single common starting point for the development of NOS understanding; instead, multiple developmental pathways may exist.     

Führt die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie in einen Relativismus?

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology.

---

Diese Arbeit entstand im Rahmen des Projekts Nr. 11-2224.87 des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds.     

《老子》美学意蕴的现象学解读

借助现象学存在论阐释，《老子》的美学意蕴展现为：“观”的审美态度，“有无相生”的生存体验，以语言悖论为特征的美学话语。它们奠定了中国美学尤其道家美学的基本形态。     

“THE MYSTERY OF HUMAN UNIQUENESS”: COMMON SENSE,SCIENCE, AND JUDAISM

Uniqueness implies singularity, incomparability. Nonetheless, as applied to everything within the human lifeworld, including ourselves, uniqueness is relativized. This becomes clear in the tension between “commonsensical” and “scientific” perspectives on the human. Our commonsense approach posits that human beings are unique among animals—unique because of our properties, most especially our consciousness, as well as because of our significance and value. From a scientific perspective, however, the uniqueness of the human—if it can be affirmed at all—is possibly a matter of degree, not kind. Additionally, the scientific perspective prescinds from judgments of the value of the human. To join these perspectives, without giving up on the importance of either one, is a philosophical and theological challenge. A Jewish approach to the challenge is offered here.     

LOOKING TO CHARLES TAYLOR AND JOSEPH ROUSE FOR BEST PRACTICES IN SCIENCE AND RELIGION

People discussing science and religion usually frame their conversations in terms of essentialist assumptions about science, assumptions requiring the existence (but not the specification) of criteria according to which science can be distinguished from other forms of inquiry. However, criteria functioning at a level of generality appropriate to such discussions may not exist at all. Essentialist assumptions may be avoided if science is understood within a broader context of human practices. In a philosophy of practices, to label a practice as “scientific” is to make a practically motivated provision for a way of speaking. Charles Taylor and Joseph Rouse have produced complementary philosophies of practice that promote this kind of understanding. In this essay I review the work of Taylor and Rouse, identify apparent residues of essentialism that each seems to harbor, and offer a resolution to some of their disagreements. I also criticize a form of essentialism commonly employed in Christian circles and outline an anti‐essentialist view of science that may be helpful in science‐and‐religion discussions.     

Preschoolers’ Thoughts on the Concept of Time

Abstract

This study aimed to examine preschool children’s epistemological views in the context of the concept of time via their drawings of the time machine. The study was conducted with 30 five-year-old children (17 girls and 13 boys) attending state and private preschools in the academic year 2018/2019. The data collection tools used in the study were the Test for Creative Thinking - Drawing Production TCT-DP, Children’s Thoughts on Time Questionnaire (CTTQ) and Children’s Epistemological Views Questionnaire (CEVQ). Of the mixed methods typologies, the fully mixed sequential dominant status-qualitative design was employed. The results obtained from the study indicated that the time machine drawings of almost half the participating children included creative elements and logical thinking products. In addition, 40% of the children’s responses reflected sophisticated epistemological views such as scientific, imaginative/science fiction-based, divergent and eccentric approaches and non-authority figures regarding the concept of time. In conclusion: contrary to Piegatian interpretation, our results show that five-year old children can demonstrate abstract scientific understanding regarding the concept of time and preschoolers’ epistemic approach has a critical role in determining their development of abstract cognitive concepts.     

Reflective structured dialogue: A conversation with 2018 American Academy of Religion excellence in teaching award winner Jill DeTemple

This conversation between the 2018 American Academy of Religion Excellence in Teaching Award winner Jill DeTemple and the editors of Teaching Theology and Religion continues an occasional series of interviews that has previously featured Jonathan Z. Smith, Stephen Prothero, Mary Pierce Brosmer, Mary Elizabeth Mullino Moore, and two previous AAR Teaching Award Winners, Joanne Maguire and Lynn Neal. After initial discussion about teaching the intro course we launch into a long discussion of “Reflective Structured Dialogue” – an effective teaching technique for staging contentious conversations, building trust and understanding, and a dialogic culture of curiosity. 1 1 The authors would like to dedicate this article to the memory of Ruel W. Tyson, Jr., a champion of collaborative scholarship and intellectual community. The research referenced in this article was supported by a subaward agreement from the University of Connecticut with funds provided by Grant No. 58942 from the John Templeton Foundation. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of UCONN or the John Templeton Foundation.
     

What Do Religion Scholars Really Want? Scholarly Values in the Scientific Study of Religion

This article presents selected findings of the Values in Scholarship on Religion (VISOR) project. Conversations about the values and norms that ought to shape the academic study of religion are quite common but typically based on anecdotal evidence and personal experience. The goal of VISOR was to gather data that could ground debates about the values that scholars of religion prize. Here, we present statistical analyses of VISOR data that shed light on the values guiding members of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) and the ways in which these compare with the values of members of other academic associations and other disciplines that study religion. Compared to current members of SSSR, members of the broader field of scholars whose approach to religion is sociological are more likely to be younger, female, liberal, and nonreligious. This sea change will put pressure on the SSSR to adapt.