When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious?

Attempts to evaluate a belief or argument on the basis of its cause or origin are usually condemned as committing the genetic fallacy. However, I sketch a number of cases in which causal or historical factors are logically relevant to evaluating a belief, including an interesting abductive form that reasons from the best explanation for the existence of a belief to its likely truth. Such arguments are also susceptible to refutation by genetic reasoning that may come very close to the standard examples given of supposedly fallacious genetic reasoning.     

论医学人文精神的重塑

重塑医学人文精神是一个无法回避而又必须作出回答的紧迫问题。把现代医学技术放到人文哲学的大视野中去体认,从人学本体论意义上现代医学技术的价值理性,进一步澄清人们对医学技术无限崇拜的工具理性的错误认识;阐述了现代医学人文精神的内涵,认为以人为本,确立科学理性对医学技术的指导地位,适时约束医学技术行为应该成为现代医学人文精神的核心理念;提出了重塑现代医学人文精神的基本原则,即：坚持医学技术进步与人的全面发展相一致的原则,坚持医学技术进步与医学工作者道德健全相一致的原则,坚持医学进步与卫生事业持续、协调、健康发展相一致的原则。     

成人与中学生科学概念形成过程的四个对比实验

以一组非人工的、自然的科学概念(“反作用力”、“机械能守恒”、“熵”和“场”)为学习内容,分别以成人和中学生为被试,实验研究成人和中学生科学概念形成过程的异同。结论如下：(1)成人与中学生科学概念形成过程均分为振荡渐进期、高原期和突变期。(2)成人的振荡渐进期较长;中学生的振荡渐进期较短且振荡特征比较明显。(3)成人的高原期出现较晚,但持续较长;中学生的高原期出现较早,但持续较短。(4)中学生的突变期的跨度随概念的抽象程度提高而越来越大。     

The error statistical philosopher as normative naturalist

We argue for a naturalistic account for appraising scientific methods that carries non-trivial normative force. We develop our approach by comparison with Laudan’s (American Philosophical Quarterly 24:19–31, 1987, Philosophy of Science 57:20–33, 1990) “normative naturalism” based on correlating means (various scientific methods) with ends (e.g., reliability). We argue that such a meta-methodology based on means–ends correlations is unreliable and cannot achieve its normative goals. We suggest another approach for meta-methodology based on a conglomeration of tools and strategies (from statistical modeling, experimental design, and related fields) that affords forward looking procedures for learning from error and for controlling error. The resulting “error statistical” appraisal is empirical—methods are appraised by examining their capacities to control error. At the same time, this account is normative, in that the strategies that pass muster are claims about how actually to proceed in given contexts to reach reliable inferences from limited data.     

Structural Realism, Scientific Change, and Partial Structures

Scientific change has two important dimensions: conceptual change and structural change. In this paper, I argue that the existence of conceptual change brings serious difficulties for scientific realism, and the existence of structural change makes structural realism look quite implausible. I then sketch an alternative account of scientific change, in terms of partial structures, that accommodates both conceptual and structural changes. The proposal, however, is not realist, and supports a structuralist version of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (structural empiricism).     

Six Different Theological Responses to the Scientific Prediction of the Decaying Universe*

This article explores six different theological responses to the scientific prediction of the ultimately decaying universe. They are atheistic resignation, scientific creationism, futureless eschatology, physical eschatology, process eschatology, and, finally, resurrection hope in mutually critical dialogue with scientific prediction. In the conclusion, the author argues that the ultimate ground for the cosmic hope must be derived from the distinctively theological norm, that is, the gospel of Jesus Christ, which encourages us to envision the new creation as the redemptive transformation of the present universe.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

Action explanation and its presuppositions

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.     

科学心理学的观念与人文科学的逻辑奠基

科学心理学观念的普遍兴起,是19世纪中叶错综复杂的思想史背景的产物。只有在人类思想及其历史作为整体的关系背景中,才能澄清这个观念的内在本性。也只有在系统地接受这个背景的制约关系中,这个观念才能获得其真理的实现。能否在人类思想作为整体中胜任并执行其理论职能,成为我们检验一种心理学体系之真理性的途径之一:科学心理学观念只有实现为现象学心理学,才能执行其为人文科学奠基的逻辑职能; 反之亦然。这个关系还从否定方面暗示着,一切以异化的形式实现的心理学,都不可能真正承担起为人文科学奠基的逻辑职能,并因而违背了我们的常识。