追踪现代科学心理学发展的十个线索

追踪现代科学心理学的发展可以有十个线索：文化的线索、国别的线索、时间的线索、组织的线索、人物的线索、事件的线索、器物的线索、思想的线索、学说的线索、学科的线索。这是理解和把握现代科学心理学产生、演变、发展和趋势的重要内容。     

论心理学发展的困境与出路

近年来西方心理学家对心理学发展取向提出强烈批评。综合各家所论,心理学以往发展的困境乃是由于：(1)自哲学心理学到科学心理学对人性解释的理论始终纷歧,以致无法形成常规科学条件;(2)科学心理学自始即标榜自然科学而缺独立意识;(3)强调科学方法,忽视人性特质而陷入削足适履困境。因此,今后国内心理学的发展势不能再全盘西化,而应在人性特质与本土文化基础上吸取西方心理学精义,针对国人心理特质研究发展出属於自己的理论与应用心理学。本文最后提出的四会能力教学构想,希望对本土文化取向应用心理学的研究发挥一点抛砖引玉作用。     

Verisimilitude and the Dynamicsof Scientific Research Programmes

Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to this kind of studies. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

青少年科学创造力测验的编制

基于科学创造力的结构模型、青少年科学创造力的表现及托兰斯的创造性测验,编制了青少年科学创造力测验,并用该测验施测于英国的1087名中学生和中国的1087名中学生,结果表明:(1)《青少年科学创造力测验》具有较高的信度,Cronbachα系数、评分者信度、重测信度均达到心理测验学要求的水平;(2)《青少年科学创造力测验》具有较高的结构效度。     

制约研究生科研选题的几点因素

研究生的科研选题的意义是十分重要的,除了作为培养未来的科研人才的一条有效途径以外,研究生的科研方向代表着目前各研究领域的最基础部分,但是,由于学生自身的各种主观因素以及学校和社会的多种客观因素导致了目前的局面：只有好的愿望达不到好的目的。要推动整个社会的科技进步,需要更深入更长远对人才的培养问题进一步思考。     

OAKESHOTT ON THE CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: NEED THERE BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Michael Oakeshott reflected on the character of religious experience in various writings throughout his life. In Experience and Its Modes (1933) he analyzed science as a distinctive “mode,” or account of experience as a whole, identifying those assumptions necessary for science to achieve its coherent account of experience in contrast to other modes of experience whose quests for coherence depend on different assumptions. Religious experience, he thought, was integral to the practical mode. The latter experiences the world as interminable tension between what is and what ought to be. The question, Is there a conflict between science and religion? is, in Oakeshott's approach, the question, Is there a conflict between the scientific mode of experience and the practical mode? Insofar as we tend to treat every question as a practical one, these questions seem to make sense. But Oakeshott's analysis leads to the view that scientific experience and religious experience are categorically different accounts of experience abstracted from the whole of experience. They are voices of experience that may speak to each other, but they are not ordered hierarchically. Nor can either absorb the other without insoluble contradictions.     

PRECURSORS OF THE EUREKA MOMENT AS A COMMON GROUND BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY

Abstract. "Eureka moments" can be said to be based on intuition, but their deeper foundations are phylogenetic evolution and subconscious gestalt processes, as analyzed by the late Nobel laureate Konrad Lorenz. By incorporating Lorenz's findings, modern epistemology could avoid three common errors which have crept into the discussion. Those errors are: (1) that epistemology is language-dependent; (2) that epistemology is primarily subjective; and (3) that epistemology is creative and not methodological.     

Narrative rationality and the logic of scientific discourse

This essay argues that scientific discourse is amenable to interpretation and assessment from the perspective of the narrative paradigm and its attendant logic, narrative rationality. It also contends that this logic entails a revised conception of knowledge, one that permits the possibility of wisdom. The text analyzed is James D. Watson and Francis H. Crick's proposal of the double helix model of DNA.     

Social Epistemology,scientific practice and the elusive social

Social Epistemology, as formulated by Steve Fuller, is based on the suggestion that rational knowledge policy must be held accountable to brute facts about the nature of our human cognitive pursuits, whatever these may be. One difficulty for Fuller concerns the conception of the social which underwrites social epistemology. I argue that social epistemology conflates the social with human psychological properties that are available for public scrutiny and, accordingly, that social epistemology is best viewed as a brand of psychologism. Though Fuller's proposal signifies an important step in the ongoing attempt by scholars to eradicate the last traces of Descartes' epistemological device of a disembodiedres cogitans, I conclude that his conception of the social is too weak to serve as the basis for a socially-embedded discipline in anything but name only.