The Acquisition and Function of Religious Beliefs: A Review and Synthesis of Proximate and Ultimate Perspectives

ABSTRACT

Two main scientific approaches have renewed in the last decade the scientific study of religion: the cognitive and the adaptationist. The former is focused on proximate causes, the latter is looking for ultimate causes of religious beliefs and behaviours. Both approaches are useful and promising. However, in both cases, various important aspects and contexts associated with the origin, acquisition, and transmission of religious beliefs have been neglected. The present paper offers an approach that conjoins both models after reviewing several critical issues, to highlight a distinction between cognitive conditions and structures, on one side; and developments or applications, on the other. As a result greater attention needs to be paid to religious functions and their cultural framework to better understand religion and to explain some current processes, like massive secularization in several areas.     

The Field of Science and Religion as Natural Philosophy

“Natural philosophy” is an important term from the history of science because it was used to describe the study of nature during medieval and early modern Europe. This article gives an overview of the history of natural philosophy, since the use and eventual disuse of the term helps one to understand the emergence of modern science. Following a suggestion by the historian of science Peter Dear, I argue that the term deserves to be rehabilitated because it draws attention to the complexities of scientific theorizing. The article concludes with an argument that the field of science and religion should be seen as an updated version of natural philosophy.     

The Imperatives of Narrative: Health Interest Groups and Morality in Network News

This article examines some of the story conventions of network television news to explain the ways in which healthcare interest groups develop and maintain their presence in this medium—a process that has significant implications for public understanding of healthcare issues, and therefore to bioethics. The article is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on three major normative conventions of television news: adherence to a simple narrative structure, the balance ethic, and avoidance of the “think-piece” and outlines the basic strategies available to interest groups for exploiting these normative conventions. Section two introduces three case studies of organizations and individuals who have run high-profile media campaigns. Section three explores the implications for bioethics of the observations made in this article.     

协作抑制的认知机制

协作抑制是指当人们在一个记忆小组中一起提取信息的时候,小组提取的信息总量比等量个体提取的信息总量要少.心理学研究者致力于从认知角度对该现象进行解释,主要的理论解释有提取策略破坏假说和提取抑制假说.前者认为小组成员的提取结果对组内其他成员的信息组织策略产生了干扰,导致小组的提取成绩低.而后者认为小组内成员的提取结果会抑制其他成员对非提取项目的表征,降低小组协作提取能力,出现协作抑制.本文对两种理论假说的提出背景,基本观点,证据支持及现有争论进行了介绍,同时指出了未来的研究应关注于对两种机制的关键矛盾点进行区别性检验、对不同认知机制在不同条件下成立可靠性的检验以及通过对编码阶段进行操控来进一步考察协作抑制的认知机制.     

Joining and leaving a new religious movement: A study of ex-members’ mental health

The impact of membership in new, often socially contested, religious movements (NRMs) on mental health of members and ex-members is still a controversial question in the psychological literature. In the present study, we interviewed 20 ex-members of various NRMs who also completed questionnaires measuring several cognitive (need for closure, world assumptions) and affective-emotional (parental and adult attachment, social relationships, depression) constructs. Ex-members were then compared with current NRM members and with individuals not involved in NRMs. It appeared that NRM membership compensated for some previously existing vulnerabilities reported by members (insecure attachment in childhood, few social relationships, negative life events). However, this supportive effect did not persist after the destabilizing experience of disaffiliation. Yet, ex-members remained strong believers and were very inclined to spirituality.     

Self-Knowledge and the ‘Inner Eye’

Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer's iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, but with the finite base which Schiffer proves is capable of generating those iterations. An understanding of this finite base as a primitive, relational property holding between two or more people, allows us to understand the iterations as an implicit and ‘harmless’ intrapersonal feature of what is an interpersonal phenomenon. The paper concludes by relating the account to joint attention in infant interaction.     

Teachers' Gender Stereotypes in South Africa: A Case Study

The study investigated Teachers' gender stereotypes in the Eastern Province of South Africa. Participants were 65 Junior Secondary school teachers (females= 40 and males = 25) who assembled together at a seminar organized by the Department of Education. They completed a ten-statement questionnaire on gender stereotypes that would apply to school boys and girls. Data were analysed by means for differences in proportions endorsing stereotypes in relation to school activities. Gender stereotypes were apparent in the pattern of activities endorsed for males and females.     

Paradigms and possibilities

This paper is a excursus into a philosophy of science for deployment in the study of sport. It argues for the virtues of Thomas Kuhn's account of the philosophy of science, an argument conducted strategically by contrasting that account with one derived from views of Karl Popper. In particular, it stresses, first, that Kuhn's views have been widely misunderstood; second, that a rectified Kuhnianism can give due weight to truth in science, while recognising that social sciences differ in crucial ways from natural sciences. For, as Kuhn recognised, social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences. Yet there Kuhn's jargon, and especially misguided talk of ‘paradigms’, is almost ubiquitous.

These thoughts have relevance for three groups. First, as both sports scientists and exercise scientists come to grips with the claims to scientificity of their work, they will need increasingly to locate it within an epistemological framework provided by philosophy of science. So they must begin to take Kuhn's view seriously. Second, social scientists of sport – faced with the predominant scientism of colleagues in sport and exercise science – must also recognise alternatives to a postmodernist rejection of the concept of truth, where Kuhn's picture of natural science clarifies one such. Finally, philosophers writing on sport must not let antipathy to scientism close off the options they present or the terms in which they (we!) present them. And that may require debate among ourselves on abstract issues not immediately connected with sport.     

The Inner Game of Sport: is Everything in the Brain?

The article deals with the following: (1) Three brain imaging studies on athletes are evaluated. What do these neuroscientific studies tell us about the brain and mind of the athlete? (2) Empirical investigations will need a neuro-theory of mind if they are to make the leap from neural activity to the mental. The article looks at such a theory, Gerald Edelman's ‘Neural Darwinism’. What are the implications of such a theory for sport science and philosophy of sport? (3) The article appreciates some of the neurosciences applications, but questions the hope of giving a complete theory of mind.     

Load theory of selective attention and the role of perceptual load: Is it time for revision?

Perceptual load hypothesis is proposed as a compromise between early and late theory of selective attention which states that the selection will operate early when the load on perception is high and it will operate late when the load on perception is low. Experimental findings have shown that the perceptual load hypothesis is too simplistic in nature as perceptual load is not the only determinant of selection processes. It is difficult to apply the load hypothesis to explain the occurrence of early selection in low load displays as well as the selection processes that operate on distractor and target stimuli that are a part of the same object. Factors like spatial proximity, cues that manipulate the spatial extent of attentional focus, salience of targets as well as the distractors, and perceptual grouping between the target and the distractors should be taken into account while explaining the selective control of attention. Thus, the perceptual load of the display is one such factor that affects selective attention and goal-directed behaviour, but it is not the only factor to affect the selective control of attention.