Cognitive Neuropsychology of HIV-Associated Neurocognitive Disorders

Advances in the treatment of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) have dramatically improved survival rates over the past 10 years, but HIV-associated neurocognitive disorders (HAND) remain highly prevalent and continue to represent a significant public health problem. This review provides an update on the nature, extent, and diagnosis of HAND. Particular emphasis is placed on critically evaluating research within the realm of cognitive neuropsychology that aims to elucidate the component processes of HAND across the domains of executive functions, motor skills, speeded information processing, episodic memory, attention/working memory, language, and visuoperception. In addition to clarifying the cognitive mechanisms of HAND (e.g., impaired cognitive control), the cognitive neuropsychology approach may enhance the ecological validity of neuroAIDS research and inform the development of much needed novel, targeted cognitive and behavioral therapies. The research described was supported by MH73419 and MH62512 from the National Institutes of Health. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, nor the United States Government.     

Social understanding through direct perception? Yes,by interacting

This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.     

Role of personal endorsement of outgroup members' distinctive values and need for cognitive closure in attitude towards the outgroup

The present study was designed to examine the role of the perceived culture of the outgroup and the perceiver's cognitive style on the intergroup process. We conducted a survey among mainland Chinese college students to discover the role of their personal endorsement of Hong Kong Chinese's distinctive values and need for cognitive closure in predicting their attitude towards the Hong Kong Chinese outgroup. Results showed that mainland Chinese who gave a higher endorsement of Hong Kong Chinese values were more likely to show a positive attitude towards Hong Kong Chinese, especially for people with a higher need for cognitive closure. These results were discussed in terms of the function of shared social reality on the formation of positive intergroup attitude. Future directions for intergroup research were proposed based on these findings.     

Yearning for certainty and the critique of medicine as “science”

A debate has simmered concerning the nature of clinical reasoning, especially diagnostic reasoning: Is it a “science” or an “art”? The trend since the seventeenth century has been to regard medical reasoning as scientific reasoning, and the most advanced clinical reasoning is the most scientific. However, in recent years, several scholars have argued that clinical reasoning is clearly not “science” reasoning, but is in fact a species of narratival or hermeneutical reasoning. The study reviews this dispute, and argues that in a theoretical sense, the dispute rests upon a naïve—but very popular—caricature of what constitutes “science reasoning.” But, if the dispute rests upon just such a caricature, why is it so persistent? The study concludes by suggesting that we, as patients and as physicians, have deep psychological tendencies that incline us to adopt the very naïve “science” concept/model of diagnostic reasoning, even if (or when) we understand its inaptness.     

Children's and adults' conceptualization and evaluation of lying and truth‐telling

The present study examined children's and adults' categorization and moral judgment of truthful and untruthful statements. 7‐, 9‐ and 11‐year‐old Chinese children and college students read stories in which story characters made truthful or untruthful statements and were asked to classify and evaluate the statements. The statements varied in terms of whether the speaker intended to help or harm a listener and whether the statement was made in a setting that called for informational accuracy or politeness. Results showed that the communicative intent and setting factors jointly influence children's categorization of lying and truth‐telling, which extends an earlier finding (Lee & Ross, 1997) to childhood. Also, we found that children's and adults' moral judgments of lying and truth‐telling were influenced by the communicative intent but not the setting factor. The present results were discussed in terms of Sweetser's (1987) folkloristic model of lying. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Role of collective self-esteem on youth violence in a collective culture

Youth violence involvement has always been the focus of significant research attention. However, as most of the studies on youth violence have been conducted in Western cultures, little is known about the antecedents of violence in the Asian context. Researchers have suggested that collectivism might be the reason for the lower violent crime rates in Asia. Nevertheless, the present study proposes an alternative approach to the collectivistic orientation and violence relationship: The possibility that allocentrism (collectivist tendency at the individual difference level) might shape the meaning of and the attitudes towards violence; thus not all aspects of a collectivist culture serve as deterrents for violence. Instead of viewing it as a random individual act, violence in a collective cultural context could be seen, under certain circumstances, as a social obligation to one's in-group (especially when one's in-group is supportive of violence) and as an internalization of the norms and values of the culture. Thus, the present study investigates the relationship between allocentrism and its relation to violence in a highly collectivist Asian culture, Singapore. We further hypothesized that collective self-esteem might serve as the mediator between allocentrism and the values of violence. Using a sample of 149 incarcerated Singaporean male adolescents, results support the proposed theoretical model whereby collective self-esteem was found to mediate between allocentrism and the culture's norms and attitudes of violence, which eventually lead to physical violence behaviours.     

Culture and visual perception: Does perceptual inference depend on culture?1,2

Abstract: Some perceptual cues carry information about the overall pattern of an object (holistic cues), whereas others carry information about the distinct parts of an object (part cues). Drawing on recent work on culture and cognition, the authors predicted that people with European‐American cultural backgrounds would be more capable of using part cues in perceptual inference than those with Asian backgrounds. No such cross‐cultural difference was expected for the ability to use holistic cues. In two studies, participants were presented with either one of the two types of cues and asked to infer the identity of the original objects. As predicted, in the part‐cue condition European‐American participants performed better than did Japanese (Study 1) and Asian‐American participants (Study 2). Also as predicted, there was no cultural difference in the holistic‐cue condition. The results were interpreted with reference to other related studies documenting reliable cross‐cultural differences in cognition.     

The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance

David Lewis’s ‘Humean Supervenience’ (henceforth ‘HS’) combines realism about laws, chances, and dispositions with a sparse ontology according to which everything supervenes on the overall spatiotemporal distribution of non-dispositional properties (Lewis 1986a, Philosophical papers: Volume II, pp. ix–xvii, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994, Mind 103:473–490). HS faces a serious problem—a “big bad bug” (Lewis 1986a, p. xiv): it contradicts the Principal Principle, a seemingly obvious norm of rational credence. Two authors have tried to rescue Lewis’s ontology from the ‘big bad bug’ (henceforth ‘the Bug’) by rejecting realism about laws, chances, and dispositions (Halpin 1994, Aust J Phil 72:317–338, 1998, Phil Sci 65:349–360; Ward 2005, Phil Sci 71:241–261). I will argue that this strategy cannot possibly work: it is the ontology, not the realist thesis, that lies at the root of the problem.     

BRIDGING SCIENCE AND RELIGION: "THE MORE" AND "THE LESS" IN WILLIAM JAMES AND OWEN FLANAGAN

There is a kinship between Owen Flanagan's The Really Hard Problem and William James's The Varieties of Religious Experience that not only can help us to understand Flanagan's book but also can help scholars, particularly scholars of religion, to be attentive to an important development in the realm of the "spiritual but not religious." Specifically, Flanagan's book continues a tradition in philosophy, exemplified by James, that addresses questions of religious or spiritual meaning in terms accessible to a broad audience outside the context of organized religions. Both James and Flanagan are concerned to refute the popular perception that the sciences of the mind pose a threat to meaning and particularly to meaningful processes of human growth and transformation. Where James used the subconscious to bridge between science and religion and persuade his readers of the reality of the More, Flanagan uses a scientifically grounded understanding of transcendence to enchant his readers into believing in Less. Although I think that Flanagan's attempt to link the psychological and sociocultural levels of analysis via the concept of transcendence is scientifically premature, his attempt at a naturalistic spirituality raises questions of definition that scholars of religion need to take seriously.     

PERSONS AND THE EXTENDED-MIND THESIS

The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist.