Algebraic Kripke Sheaf Semantics for Non-Classical Predicate Logics

In so-called Kripke-type models, each sentence is assigned either to true or to false at each possible world. In this setting, every possible world has the two-valued Boolean algebra as the set of truth values. Instead, we take a collection of algebras each of which is attached to a world as the set of truth values at the world, and obtain an extended semantics based on the traditional Kripke-type semantics, which we call here the algebraic Kripke semantics. We introduce algebraic Kripke sheaf semantics for super-intuitionistic and modal predicate logics, and discuss some basic properties. We can state the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation theorem within this semantics. Further, we show new results on super-intuitionistic predicate logics. We prove that there exists a continuum of super-intuitionistic predicate logics each of which has both of the disjunction and existence properties and moreover the same propositional fragment as the intuitionistic logic.     

The authorship list in science: Junior physicists’ perceptions of who appears and why

A questionnaire probing the distribution of authorship credit was given to postdoctoral associates (“postdocs”) in order to determine their awareness of the professional society’s ethical statement on authorship, the extent of communication with their supervisors about authorship criteria, and the appropriateness of authorship assignments on submitted papers. Results indicate a low awareness of the professional society’s ethical statement and that little communication takes place between postdocs and supervisors about authorship criteria. A substantial amount of authorship credit given to supervisors and other workers is perceived by the postdocs to violate the professional society’s ethical statement.     

The Freedom-based Account of Solidarity and Basic Income

Real-libertarianism, as it is expressed in Philippe Van Parijs' recent monograph Real Freedom for All is characteristically committed to both self-ownership and 'solidarity’ with the infirm or handicapped. In this article it is argued that the conception of (real) freedom that is used to endorse self-ownership is inconsistent with the conception of (social) freedom or opportunity that is used to justify transfer payments to those with no or low earning capacity. The problem turns around the question whether one's freedom consists in the access one has to a share of the social product or in the measure of economic self-sufficiency one enjoys. Accordingly the role of private property in external resources as a condition for freedom is unclear: is it the basis of people's capacity for self-determination or is it the basis of people's bargaining power? Van Parijs' commitment to self-ownership suggests the former, his commitment to solidarity suggests the latter. A similar ambivalence is pointed out in his argument for a universal basic income, for which Real Freedom for All is so well-known.     

Once More into the Breach of Self-Ownership: Reply to Narveson and Brenkert

In reply to Narveson, I distinguish his no-proviso argument from his liberty argument, and I show that both fail. I also argue that interference lacks the strategic status he assigns to it, because it cannot be appropriately distinguished, conceptually and morally, from prevention; that natural resources do enjoy the importance he denies they have; that laissez-faire economies lack the superiority he attributes to them; that ownership can indeed be a reflexive relation; that anti-paternalism does not entail libertarianism; and that he misrepresents the doctrines of a number of philosophers, including John Locke, Ronald Dworkin, and myself. In reply to Brenkert, I show that he seriously misconstrues my view of the nature of freedom, and of its relationship to self-ownership. I then refute his criticisms of my treatment of the contrasts between self-ownership, on the one hand, and autonomy and non-slavery, on the other. I also show that his attempt to exorcize the demon of self-ownership is multiply flawed.     

Contingency,arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status-conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude-based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status-holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter.     

产权安排是社会道德的基础

作为社会经济生活中的一种根本制度安排和人们的一种基本权利,产权是社会道德的基础。一定的利益差别和产权界定,是道德产生的前提;社会产权制度的性质和变迁,规定着社会道德体系的特质和演变;社会产权安排的结构和状况,影响和制约着人们的道德行为选择和社会道德风尚。健全的产权安排有利于规范和约束人们的行为选择,安定人们的生活心态,创造积极的道德环境和条件,从而优化人们的道德行为选择,促进良好社会道德秩序的形成。     

Influence of perceived emotion and gender on social motor coordination

Theorists have long postulated that facial properties such as emotion and sex are potent social stimuli that influence how individuals act. Yet extant scientific findings were mainly derived from investigations on the prompt motor response upon the presentation of affective stimuli, which were mostly delivered by means of pictures, videos, or text. A theoretical question remains unaddressed concerning how the perception of emotion and sex would modulate the dynamics of a continuous coordinated behaviour. Conceived in the framework of dynamical approach to interpersonal motor coordination, the present study aimed to address this question by adopting the coupled-oscillators paradigm. Twenty-one participants performed in-phase and anti-phase coordination with two avatars (male and female) displaying three emotional expressions (neutral, happy, and angry) at different frequencies (100% and 150% of the participant's preferred frequency) by executing horizontal rhythmic left-right oscillatory movements. Time to initiate movement (TIM), mean relative phase error (MnRP), and standard deviation of relative phase (SDRP) were calculated as indices of reaction time, deviation from the intended pattern of coordination, and coordination stability, respectively. Results showed that in anti-phase condition at 150% frequency, MnRP was lower with the angry and the female avatar. In addition, coordination was found to be more stable with the male avatar than the female one when both displaying neutral emotion. But the happy female avatar was found to elicit more stable coordination than the neutral female avatar. These results implied that individuals are more relaxed to coordinate with the female than the male, and the sensorimotor system becomes more flexible to coordinate with an angry person. It is also suggested social roles influence how people coordinate, and individuals attend more to interact with a happy female. In sum, the present study evidenced that social perception is embodied in the interactive behaviour during social interaction.