Wisdom and good lives: A process perspective

Wisdom and good lives are related. On one hand, judgments about whether wisdom has been manifested are often based on conceptions of what is a good life. On the other hand, wisdom, as manifested by human endeavors throughout history which contributed to the common good over the long term, can itself transform the standards that we use to evaluate good lives. In this article, wisdom is defined as a process encompassing three core components—cognitive integration, embodiment in action, and positive effects for oneself and others. One form of wisdom, which transforms our conceptions of a good life, is discussed, using Mother Teresa's endeavor as an example. Her endeavor which embodied an integrated idea—serving Christ by serving the poorest of the poor—generated positive effects for herself and others, and has transformed people's conceptions of a good life. The relationship of this form of wisdom to hardship, happiness, and old age is also discussed.     

Moral Lumps

Can all goods or bads be broken down into smaller and smaller pieces? Can all goods or bads be added together with some other good or bad to get a larger amount? Further, how does moral significance track the disaggregation and the aggregation of moral goods and bads? In Part 1, I examine the limits placed on aggregation by moderate deontological moral theories. This paper focuses in particular on the work of Judith Thomson and T.M. Scanlon as well as on some of my own past work on the question of aggregation in the context of overriding rights. In Part 2, I examine consequentialist criticism that harms and benefits can be broken down into smaller pieces than the deontological theory allows and the argument that the moderate deontological view is too permissive since it allows aggregation of benefits within a single person's life. In Part 3 I suggest how a moderate deontological moral theory might respond to the criticisms. I cast my answer in terms of the existence of lumpy goods and bads. I argue that consequentialist critics of deontology are wrong to insist that all goods and bads can be disaggregated and aggregated at will. Instead, I offer the suggestion that most, or many, goods and bads come in morally significant lumps. That said, it will not always be obvious what those lumps are. Determining the texture of moral value is a substantive project in normative ethics. All I have hoped to do in this paper is suggest that two standard positions on how to group moral value are mistaken and give hope that we need not adopt one of the two. Part 4 of the paper responds to an objection and sets the stage for further work in value theory.     

Paradoxes of happiness

To get happiness forget about it; then, with any luck, happiness will come as a by-product in pursuing meaningful activities and relationships. This adage is known as the paradox of happiness, but actually it contains a number of different paradoxes concerning aims, success, freedom, and attitudes. These paradoxes enhance our understanding of the complexity of happiness and its interaction with other values in good lives, that is, lives which are happy as well as morally decent, meaningful, and fulfilling. Yet, each paradox conveys a one-sided truth that needs to be balanced with others. Happiness, understood as subjective well-being, involves positively evaluating our lives and living with a sense of well-being. As such, it should not be confused with either pleasure or normative conceptions of “true” happiness.     

After the Terror: A Book and Further Thoughts

There are great goods desired by all of us, and the lack of themmakes for bad lives. One sample of bad African lives involves aloss of 20 million years of living time. The questions raised bythese and other facts are to be answered by the Principle ofHumanity, about bad lives and rationality. It is superior tomorality of relationship and all else, and in a way is undeniable.The principle together with other things issues in six propositions.One gives us a moral responsibility, our politicians at our head,for the terrorism of September 11. To be ordinary is not to beinnocent. Another proposition is that the Palestinians have a moralright to their terrorism. The latter proposition can be given stillmore support than in the book from which this paper derives.     

水资源态度与节水行为关系研究现状及发展趋势

文章综述了相关水资源态度与节水行为的概念,介绍了近些年来有影响力的模型。如理性行为理论、计划行为理论,价值—态度—行为层次理论,并简述了水资源态度与节水行为关系的相关研究,最后提出了对未来相关研究的的几点启示。     

中国人心理账户的内隐结构

“心理账户”是个人、家庭或企业集团在心理上对结果（尤其是经济结果）的记录、编码、分类和估价的心理过程,它揭示了人们进行资金（财富）决策时的内在认知编码。研究对全国9个省市1268名有效被试进行问卷调查,经过探索性因子分析、验证性因子分析以及二阶因子验证发现：中国人的心理账户系统有一个相对稳定的“3－4－2”分类结构。即收入账户有“工作相关的常规收入”、“非常规的额外收入”和“经营收入”三个账户;开支账户有“生活必需开支”、“家庭建设与个人发展开支”、“情感维系开支”和“享乐休闲开支”四个账户;存储账户有“安全型保障账户”和“风险型存储账户”两个账户。心理账户的分类研究对探究人们的经济决策行为有重要意义     

Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities

In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each. Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to be made: either numbers matter, in which case we should save the greater number, or numbers don't matter, but rather there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, and therefore we should toss a coin. My claim is that we do not have to make a choice in this way. Rather, numbers do matter, but it doesn't follow that we should always save the greater number. And likewise, there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but it doesn't follow that we should always toss a coin. In addition, I argue that a similar approach can be applied to situations in which we can save one person or another, but the chances of success are different.