生命需要心理学理论与生命教育方法

＂生命需要心理学理论与生命教育方法＂是研究者开展了为期五年的生命发展研究后获得的心理学与教育学的研究成果。五年中,研究者以0～6岁正常学前儿童为对象,对其实行生命发展教育,获取了大量的生命发展事实,证明了：1）人类生命具有人人可遵循的生长发展规律——＂需要＂的生长发展规律;2）＂需要＂的生物性基础的早期建构是＂需要＂生长发展规律的核心内容;3）马斯洛的＂需要层次＂中心理需要的低级阶段——＂安全需要＂之前还存在一个生命的原始需要——以＂新奇、探索、操作＂为对象的＂需要＂,其贯穿在0～6岁的儿童早期生命阶段;4）0～6岁时期,＂儿童需要＂不是恒定的、稳定的、成熟的心理机能,而是处在生长过程中。＂需要＂强度的提升是0～6岁时期以＂需要＂为核心的心理整体建构的鲜为人知的生命法则;5）0～6岁时期＂需要＂的良好建构,使＂需要＂水平达到推动生命走向＂需要＂的最高层次——＂自我实现需要＂的强度;6）＂需要层次＂与生命质量存在着内在关联;7）儿童＂原始需要＂满足的方法为：在儿童＂原始需要＂机能强度与寓含＂新奇、探索、操作＂属性的＂原始需要＂对象即外部刺激之间建立起犹如昆虫与花类般默契的真正联系。     

Compulsive Hoarding: Current Research and Theory

Compulsive hoarding has emerged as a treatment refractory and impairing psychological disorder. Although promising research over the past decade has substantially furthered an understanding of hoarding, the etiology, diagnostic status, and associated features of this phenomenon are not yet completely understood. This article reviews current research on hoarding, including comorbidity and diagnostic issues, theoretical models, and treatment approaches. A cognitive–behavioral model of compulsive hoarding (R. O. Frost and G. Steketee, 1998) is presented, including the proposed information-processing deficits, beliefs and cognitions, and excessive emotional attachment to possessions. In addition, existing treatment approaches that target the cognitive and behavioral components of acquisition, difficulty organizing, and avoidance of discarding are described. Future directions for compulsive hoarding research are suggested to improve diagnostic clarity, refine therapeutic techniques, and enhance treatment response.     

Seeing is not enough: manipulating choice options causes focusing and preference change in multiattribute risky decision‐making

We show that preferences depend on the attributes that can be directly manipulated when people need to integrate multiple sources of information because direct manipulation causes focusing bias. This effect appears even when all relevant information is simultaneously and explicitly presented at the time the decisions are made. Participants decided how much to save, what investment risk to take and observed the future financial consequences in terms of the mean and variability of the expected retirement income. Participants who manipulated only the future income distribution saved more and took less risk. This effect disappears when the risk‐related variables are removed, which indicates that task complexity is a mediator of such focusing effects. A more balanced trade‐off between the choice attributes was selected when all attributes were manipulated. However, when there is a dichotomy between manipulating versus observing choice attributes, then decisions were based mostly on the manipulated attributes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Much ado about nothing: The zero effect in life‐saving decisions

Zero is a special value in our daily lives, and previous research on how zero values affect decision making leaves many questions to be explored. The present research examined the zero effect in life‐saving decisions and found that people expressed strong preferences for options offering a possibility that no one will die, even when the expected loss was relatively high. The prominence effect (the notion that the option with possibly zero deaths is easy to defend and justify) was proposed as one possible explanation. Furthermore, we also found that the zero effect in these life‐saving decisions occurs only in loss framing rather than gain framing. We discuss the relationships between the zero effect, framing, and evaluation mode in life saving and other domains.     

Naming,race, and white supremacy in the teaching of religion and Islam: Incorporating intersectional interventions

The need to confront issues of race and white supremacy in our teaching of religion is critically important, but through the pedagogical convention of naming, we take the first step in inviting our students to understand the hows and whys of it. I will explore the ways that Charles Long's theory of signification and counter‐signification can be pedagogically deployed to incorporate intersectional interventions in the teaching of religion in America, specifically in the case of an Islam in America course.     

A SCIENTIFIC ACCOUNT OF MEANING: DEFLATIONARY BUT NOT DISENCHANTING

In The Really Hard Problem , Owen Flanagan maintains that accounting for meaning requires going beyond the resources of the physical, biological, social, and mind sciences. He notes that the religious myths and fantastical stories that once "funded" flourishing lives and made life meaningful have been epistemically discredited by science but nevertheless insists that meaning does exist and can be fully accounted for only in a form of systematic philosophical theorizing that is continuous with science and does not need to invoke myth. He sees such a mode of thought as a new, empirical-normative science, which he labels eudaimonistic scientia , that evades the disenchantment produced by natural scientific accounts of meaning. I argue that such an empirical-normative science does not provide us with a scientific account of meaning but is itself simply another way of making sense of one's life that is open to scientific explanation. Such an explanation will be deflationary in the sense that it presumes no greater scheme of things for meaning beyond the span of human existence (collective and possibly individual) but not disenchanting in that it does not explain away the flourishing lives human persons and communities create for themselves.     

Moral Lumps

Can all goods or bads be broken down into smaller and smaller pieces? Can all goods or bads be added together with some other good or bad to get a larger amount? Further, how does moral significance track the disaggregation and the aggregation of moral goods and bads? In Part 1, I examine the limits placed on aggregation by moderate deontological moral theories. This paper focuses in particular on the work of Judith Thomson and T.M. Scanlon as well as on some of my own past work on the question of aggregation in the context of overriding rights. In Part 2, I examine consequentialist criticism that harms and benefits can be broken down into smaller pieces than the deontological theory allows and the argument that the moderate deontological view is too permissive since it allows aggregation of benefits within a single person's life. In Part 3 I suggest how a moderate deontological moral theory might respond to the criticisms. I cast my answer in terms of the existence of lumpy goods and bads. I argue that consequentialist critics of deontology are wrong to insist that all goods and bads can be disaggregated and aggregated at will. Instead, I offer the suggestion that most, or many, goods and bads come in morally significant lumps. That said, it will not always be obvious what those lumps are. Determining the texture of moral value is a substantive project in normative ethics. All I have hoped to do in this paper is suggest that two standard positions on how to group moral value are mistaken and give hope that we need not adopt one of the two. Part 4 of the paper responds to an objection and sets the stage for further work in value theory.     

Wisdom and good lives: A process perspective

Wisdom and good lives are related. On one hand, judgments about whether wisdom has been manifested are often based on conceptions of what is a good life. On the other hand, wisdom, as manifested by human endeavors throughout history which contributed to the common good over the long term, can itself transform the standards that we use to evaluate good lives. In this article, wisdom is defined as a process encompassing three core components—cognitive integration, embodiment in action, and positive effects for oneself and others. One form of wisdom, which transforms our conceptions of a good life, is discussed, using Mother Teresa's endeavor as an example. Her endeavor which embodied an integrated idea—serving Christ by serving the poorest of the poor—generated positive effects for herself and others, and has transformed people's conceptions of a good life. The relationship of this form of wisdom to hardship, happiness, and old age is also discussed.     

Ego Integrity in the Lives of Older Women: A Follow-Up of Mothers From the Sears,Maccoby, and Levin (1951) Patterns of Child Rearing Study

Ego integrity, Erik Erikson's (E. H. Erikson, 1963) concept of psychological maturity in later life and the pinnacle of 8 stages, has been one of the least studied of all his stage constructs. This paper explores the meaning of ego integrity (as assessed by C. D. Ryff & S. G. Heincke, 1983) in the lives of a sample of older women, by examining the predictors and concomitants of ego integrity (EI), using data from interviews conducted with the same women in 1951 and 1996 and a questionnaire administered in 1996. A 3-step regression model revealed that “identity” assessed in 1951 predicted generativity in 1996; the level of educational attainment and marital status were also significant predictors. In step 2, generativity alone predicted ego integrity, which in turn predicted depression. Ego integrity was associated with higher marital satisfaction in the mothers' lives, both in the past and in the present; it was implicated in better relationships with their adult children, in the mothers' willingness to both give and receive help, and in several dimensions of psychological well-being.     

"Biographical Lives" Revisited and Extended*

After reviewing the history, rationale, and Jim Rachels’ varied uses of the notion of biographical lives, the essay further develops its social dimensions and proposes an ontological analysis. Whether one person is leading one life or more turns on the number of separate social worlds he or she creates and maintains. Furthermore, lives are constituted by narrated events in a story. Lives, however, are not stories, but rather are extended “verbal objects,” that is, “narrative objects” with a hybrid character, both linguistic and by inference non-verbal. In this they are like facts, propositions, and histories, grasped only through their verbal expression. Being narrative and socially embedded, lives can arguably be extended beyond the death of the principal liver of a life by the commemorative actions of those who shared it. Jim hoped to persuade doctors to shift from a traditional Sanctity of Life principle to a Sanctity of Lives principle. Accordingly, they could stop pointless prolongation of biological life once a patient permanently loses consciousness, his criterion of the end of a biographical life. It might seem that allowing lives to be extended past that point or death would forego that clinical benefit, but that is not so. *Revision of remarks at the James Rachels Memorial Conference, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 24 September 2004.