Hypercorrection of high-confidence errors in the classroom

People often have erroneous knowledge about the world that is firmly entrenched in memory and endorsed with high confidence. Although strong errors in memory would seem difficult to “un-learn,” evidence suggests that errors are more likely to be corrected through feedback when they are originally endorsed with high confidence compared to low confidence. This hypercorrection effect has been predominantly studied in laboratory settings with general knowledge (i.e., trivia) questions, however, and has not been systematically explored in authentic classroom contexts. In the current study, college students in an introductory horticulture class answered questions about the course content, rated their confidence in their answers, received feedback of the correct answers, and then later completed a posttest. Results revealed a significant hypercorrection effect, along with a tendency for students with higher prior knowledge of the material to express higher confidence in, and in turn more effective correction of, their error responses.     

Integrating Covariates into Social Relations Models: A Plausible Values Approach for Handling Measurement Error in Perceiver and Target Effects

The Social Relations Model (SRM) is a conceptual and analytical approach to examining dyadic behaviors and interpersonal perceptions within groups. In an SRM, the perceiver effect describes a person's tendency to perceive other group members in a certain way, whereas the target effect measures the tendency to be perceived by others in certain ways. In SRM research, it is often of interest to relate these individual SRM effects to covariates. However, the estimated individual SRM effects might not provide a very reliable measure of the true, unobserved SRM effects, resulting in distorted estimates of associations with other variables. This article introduces a plausible values approach that allows users to correct for measurement error when assessing the association of individual SRM effects with other individual difference variables. In the plausible values approach, the latent, true individual SRM effects are treated as missing values and are imputed from an imputation model by applying Bayesian estimation techniques. In a simulation study, the statistical properties of the plausible values approach are compared with two approaches that have been used in previous research. A data example from educational psychology is presented to illustrate how the plausible values approach can be implemented with the software WinBUGS.     

Reducing the Negative Effect of the Retention Interval on the Composite Face Recognition

Our memories are quite fragile. We sometimes recognize something unseen as something seen before. This error often causes serious problems, such as the misidentification of composite faces in a criminal investigation. In such a scene, people occasionally claim to have seen a face that is actually a composite face consisting of facial parts separately seen before; this error is called the memory conjunction error. Although the likelihood of the memory conjunction error increases over time, previous studies suggest that it could be suppressed by the number of response options, which are expected to affect the criterion for the “Old” response. Our results show that the presence of three response options reduced the memory conjunction error. Additionally, providing information about the existence of composite faces affected the sensitivity for detecting old faces, whereas three response options affected the criterion. This study might contribute to the improvement of procedures for eyewitness testimony.     

What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

Decision making and confidence given uncertain advice

We study human decision making in a simple forced-choice task that manipulates the frequency and accuracy of available information. Empirically, we find that people make decisions consistent with the advice provided, but that their subjective confidence in their decisions shows 2 interesting properties. First, people's confidence does not depend solely on the accuracy of the advice. Rather, confidence seems to be influenced by both the frequency and accuracy of the advice. Second, people are less confident in their guessed decisions when they have to make relatively more of them. Theoretically, we develop and evaluate a type of sequential sampling process model—known as a self-regulating accumulator—that accounts for both decision making and confidence. The model captures the regularities in people's behavior with interpretable parameter values, and we show its ability to fit the data is not due to excessive model complexity. Using the model, we draw conclusions about some properties of human reasoning under uncertainty.     

How to achieve synergy in group decision making: Lessons to be learned from the hidden profile paradigm

Based on over 25 years of research on hidden profiles and information sharing in groups, and particularly our own work in this area, we outline a general model of how groups can achieve better decisions in a hidden profile situation than their individual members would have been capable of (i.e., synergy). At its core the model defines intensity and bias as the two key parameters that have to be optimised with regard to both the discussion of information and the processing of information in order to ensure synergy in group decision making. We review the empirical literature on information sharing and group decision making in the hidden profile paradigm (with a particular focus on our own studies) to illustrate how group decision quality can be enhanced by increasing intensity and decreasing bias in the discussion and processing of information. Finally we also outline why we think that the lessons learned from research using the hidden profile paradigm can be generalised to group decision-making research in general, and how these lessons can stimulate studies in other fields of group decision-making and group performance research.