Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

编码后奖赏影响基于议程的学习：奖赏预期和结果的作用

基于ABR模型考察奖赏预期和奖赏结果对不同难度词对记忆与元记忆的影响。结果发现：(1)限时学习条件下,奖赏结果促进不同难度词对记忆成绩和学习判断,奖赏预期仅提高简单词对的记忆成绩。(2)自定步调学习条件下,定时学习判断时奖赏结果仅影响学习判断;奖赏预期促进高难度词对的学习时间分配,从而提高记忆成绩和学习判断。(3)在自定步调学习时,奖赏预期超越难度成为影响学习时间分配的因素。以上结果表明,个体会综合奖赏预期、奖赏结果和难度构建学习议程,足够大的奖赏预期会超越难度成为议程构建的主导因素。但奖赏预期和奖赏结果对记忆成绩、学习时间分配和学习判断的影响受学习条件调节。     

The judgment-choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring?

The study examines the relative merits of a noncompatibility and a restructuring explanation of the recurrent empirical finding that a prominent attribute looms larger in choices than in judgments. Pairs of equally attractive options were presented to 72 undergraduates who were assigned to six conditions in which they performed (1) only preference judgments or choices, (2) preference judgments or choices preceded by judgments of attractiveness of attribute levels, or (3) preference judgments or choices accompanied by think-aloud reports. The results replicated the prominence effect for choices, but a prominence effect was also found for preference judgments. In accordance with the restructuring explanation, the think-aloud protocols indicated that options were more often restructured in choices than in preference judgments. However, restructuring could not explain the prominence effect observed for preference judgments. A modified compatibility hypothesis is offered as an alternative explanation.     

Hemispheric differences in semantic-relatedness judgments

Subjects judged the semantic relatedness of word pairs presented to the left or right visual field. The word pairs were presented one below the other. On critical trials, the words' referents had a typical spatial relation, with one referent oriented above the other (e.g. ATTIC/BASEMENT). The spatial relation of the words either matched or mismatched the spatial relation of their referents. When presented to the left hemisphere, the match or mismatch did not have an effect. However, there was a reliable mismatch effect for pairs presented to the right hemisphere. The results are interpreted in the context of perceptual theories of mental representation.     

Younger and older adults weigh multiple cues in a similar manner to generate judgments of learning

One’s memory for past test performance (MPT) is a key piece of information individuals use when deciding how to restudy material. We used a multi-trial recognition memory task to examine adult age differences in the influence of MPT (measured by actual Trial 1 memory accuracy and subjective confidence judgments, CJs) along with Trial 1 judgments of learning (JOLs), objective and participant-estimated recognition fluencies, and Trial 2 study time on Trial 2 JOLs. We found evidence of simultaneous and independent influences of multiple objective and subjective (i.e., metacognitive) cues on Trial 2 JOLs, and these relationships were highly similar for younger and older adults. Individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy and CJs on Trial 2 JOLs indicate that individuals may vary in the degree to which they rely on each MPT cue when assessing subsequent memory confidence. Aging appears to spare the ability to access multiple cues when making JOLs.     

A calibration explanation of serial position effects in evaluative judgments

Judges often evaluate stimulus series on dimensions for which no physical scale exists; for example, when judging academic ability in oral examinations. We propose that judges deal with this problem by calibrating an internal judgment scale that maps stimulus input onto available judgment categories. This calibration process implies serial position effects: Judges should initially avoid extreme categories, because using extreme categories reduces judgmental degrees of freedom, thereby increasing the possibility of internal consistency violations. In four experiments, we show that judgments become indeed more extreme later in a series of judgments. Judges evaluated the same good (poor) performances more positive (negative) at the end of a sequence compared to the beginning. Judges’ expertise did not prevent the effect, but allowing end-of-sequence judgments reduced serial position effects. We discuss the implications and possible remedies of these calibration effects on judgment extremity.     

Predictors of children's prosocial lie-telling: Motivation, socialization variables, and moral understanding

Children tell prosocial lies for self- and other-oriented reasons. However, it is unclear how motivational and socialization factors affect their lying. Furthermore, it is unclear whether children’s moral understanding and evaluations of prosocial lie scenarios (including perceptions of vignette characters’ feelings) predict their actual prosocial behaviors. These were explored in two studies. In Study 1, 72 children (36 second graders and 36 fourth graders) participated in a disappointing gift paradigm in either a high-cost condition (lost a good gift for a disappointing one) or a low-cost condition (received a disappointing gift). More children lied in the low-cost condition (94%) than in the high-cost condition (72%), with no age difference. In Study 2, 117 children (42 preschoolers, 41 early elementary school age, and 34 late elementary school age) participated in either a high- or low-cost disappointing gift paradigm and responded to prosocial vignette scenarios. Parents reported on their parenting practices and family emotional expressivity. Again, more children lied in the low-cost condition (68%) than in the high-cost condition (40%); however, there was an age effect among children in the high-cost condition. Preschoolers were less likely than older children to lie when there was a high personal cost. In addition, compared with truth-tellers, prosocial liars had parents who were more authoritative but expressed less positive emotion within the family. Finally, there was an interaction between children’s prosocial lie-telling behavior and their evaluations of the protagonist’s and recipient’s feelings. Findings contribute to understanding the trajectory of children’s prosocial lie-telling, their reasons for telling such lies, and their knowledge about interpersonal communication.     

Are lies more wrong than errors? Accuracy judgments of inaccurate statements

People are often mistaken when estimating and predicting quantities, and sometimes they report values that they know are false: they lie. There exists, however, little research devoted to how such deviations are being perceived. In four vignette studies, participants were asked to rate the accuracy of inaccurate statements about quantities (prices, numbers and amounts). The results indicate that overstatements are generally judged to be more inaccurate than understatements of the same magnitude; self-favorable (optimistic) statements are considered more inaccurate than unfavorable (pessimistic) statements, and false reports (lies) are perceived to be more inaccurate than equally mistaken estimates. Lies about the future did not differ from lies about the past, but own lies were perceived as larger than the same lies attributed to another person. It is suggested that estimates are judged according to how close they come to the true values (close estimates are more correct than estimates that are less close), whereas lies are judged as deviant from truth, with less importance attached to the magnitude of the deviation.