Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity

Abstract

Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

Professional judgement in the assessment of risk: is there a role for systemic practice?

Risk assessment is an example of professional decision‐making pared to its stark essentials. Political pressures towards accountability and the need for defensible decisions encourage a ‘tick‐box’ approach to risk assessment, but this can create unrealistic expectations of certainty. In practice, as technological approaches produce ever more complex formal tools for assessing risk, their effectiveness remains dubious while our human decision‐making apparatus is marginalized. This article examines whether we should respect our ability to apprehend complex multi‐stranded narrative realities intuitively, with the hope that such intuitions might contribute to professional decision‐making. This idea is explored with reference to a case study.     

It's immoral,but I'd do it! Psychopathy traits affect decision‐making in sacrificial dilemmas and in everyday moral situations

This research investigated whether emotional hyporeactivity affects moral judgements and choices of action in sacrificial moral dilemmas and in everyday moral conflict situations in which harm to other's welfare is differentially involved. Twenty‐six participants with high trait psychopathy (HP) and 25 with low trait psychopathy (LP) were selected based on the primary psychopathy scale of the Levenson Self‐Report Psychopathy Scale. HP participants were more likely to sacrifice one person to save others in sacrificial dilemmas and to pursue a personal advantage in everyday moral situations entailing harm to another's good. While deciding in these situations, HP participants experienced lower unpleasantness as compared to LP participants. Conversely, no group differences emerged in choice of action and unpleasantness ratings for everyday moral situations that did not entail harm to others. Importantly, moral judgements did not differ in the two groups. These results suggest that high psychopathy trait affects choices of action in sacrificial dilemmas because of reduced emotional reactivity to harmful acts. The dissociation between choice of action and moral judgement suggests that the former is more closely related to emotional experience. Also, emotion seems to play a critical role in discriminating harmful from harmless acts and in driving decisions accordingly.     

Aesthetic judgements and motivation

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.     

From personal goals disclosed to personality judgments composed: Trait perceptions made on the basis of idiographic goals

Traits and goals represent discrete units of personality. Here, we examined the consensus, validity, and cues of trait judgments made on the basis of targets’ goals. Targets (N = 409) generated lists of personal goals and rated their traits. Observers were provided with targets’ (a) lists of goals, (b) first goals, or (c) fifth goals, and then reported trait judgments of targets. Perceptions of targets, which were formed on the basis of the emotional content of goals, were largely consistent among observers. Furthermore, observer reports made on the basis of participants’ lists of goals converged with self-reports of all traits whereas reports made on the basis of single goals converged with self-reports of certain (e.g., extraversion), but not all, traits.     

Effects of dysphoria and induced negative mood on the processes underlying hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of facts or events once the actual facts or events are known. Several theoretical frameworks suggest that affective states might influence hindsight bias. Nondysphoric participants (n?=?123, BDI?≤?13) in negative or neutral mood, and dysphoric participants (n?=?19, BDI?>?13) generated and recalled answers to difficult knowledge questions. All groups showed hindsight bias, that is, their recalled estimates were closer to the correct answer when this answer was shown at recall. Multinomial modelling revealed, however, that under dysphoria and induced negative mood different processes contributed to hindsight bias. Dysphoria, but not induced negative mood, was associated with a stronger reconstruction bias, compared with neutral mood. A recollection bias appeared in neutral, but neither in induced negative nor dysphoric mood. These findings highlight differences between the cognitive consequences of dysphoria and induced negative mood.     

Being similar while judging right and wrong: The effects of personal and situational similarity on moral judgements

This study investigated the effects of similarity with the transgressor and the victim on the perceived immorality of the transgression. Participants read two stories describing a person that cheated on their partner and a police officer that mistreated somebody. In the first story we manipulated participants' personal similarity to the transgressor and in the second their personal similarity to the victim. In each story, participants' past situational similarity to the target character was assessed according to their previous experiences of being in the same position. Results show that both personal and past situational similarity to the transgressor determine less severe moral judgements, while personal and past situational similarity with the victim have the opposite effect. We also tested several potential mediators of these effects, derived from competing theoretical accounts of the influence of similarity on perceived responsibility. Empathy emerged as mediating most of the effects of similarity on moral judgements, except those induced by past situational similarity with the victim. The foreseen probability of being in a similar situation mediated only the effects of similarity to the transgressor, and not those of similarity to the victim. Overall, results highlight the complex mechanisms of the influences of similarity on moral judgements.     

Wisdom in clinical reasoning and medical practice

Exploring informal components of clinical reasoning, we argue that they need to be understood via the analysis of professional wisdom. Wise decisions are needed where action or insight is vital, but neither everyday nor expert knowledge provides solutions. Wisdom combines experiential, intellectual, ethical, emotional and practical capacities; we contend that it is also more strongly social than is usually appreciated. But many accounts of reasoning specifically rule out such features as irrational. Seeking to illuminate how wisdom operates, we therefore build on Aristotle’s work on informal reasoning. His account of rhetorical communication shows how non-formal components can play active parts in reasoning, retaining, or even enhancing its reasonableness. We extend this account, applying it to forms of healthcare-related reasoning which are characterised by the need for wise decision-making. We then go on to explore some of what clinical wise reasoning may mean, concluding with a case taken from psychotherapeutic practice.

项目的激活强度与元记忆判断

本实验采用不同于国外由Ｈａｒｔ首创的ＦＯＫ（Ｆｅｅｌｌｉｎｇ－ｏｆ－Ｋｎｏｗｉｎｇ）研究方法的新方法──模糊再认判断法（Ｆｕｚｚｙ－Ｒｅｃｏｇｎｉｔｉｏｎｊｕｄｇｅｍｅｎｔ,简称ＦＲ）来研究无记忆判断及其产生机制．实验中安排了范畴判断与字词识记相结合,造成四种不同激活强度的字词,让被试对其进行ＦＲ判断,并用迫选再认作为标准测验进行验证．结果表明,范畴判断的语义激活增强了字词的激活强度,从而影响ＦＲ判断的等级．识记项目的激活强度愈高,相应的ＦＲ判断等级也愈高．