Advances in Latino Family Research: Cultural Adaptations of Evidence-Based Interventions

The stark contrast between frequent calls for research and practice that are applicable across a broad spectrum of cultural and ethnically diverse groups and the dearth of empirical knowledge about Latino families provided the impetus for this special issue on advances in Latino family research. A focus on empirically based practice frames the issue, focusing specifically on how concepts (expressed emotion, parenting style) can be used within interventions, how Latino parents perceive efforts to deliver evidence-based interventions, and how pilot projects that delivered culturally adapted interventions in three separate cities impacted family functioning. In all, the introduction highlights the complexities for researchers in meeting the needs of the field to ensure that effective interventions are applicable across cultural groups. Meeting the challenges is important to address the need of the growing Latino population. Advances in intervention research with ethnic minorities also stand to contribute to the advancement of intervention research broadly. This special issue provides examples of efforts that are underway to better understand what treatments work for Latino families, provided by whom, for what specific problems, and in which specific circumstances, paving the way to begin attempting to answer a challenge posed more than 40 years ago by Gordon Paul.     

Human‐Animal Bonds I: The Relational Significance of Companion Animals

The importance of human‐animal bonds has been documented throughout history, across cultures, and in recent research. However, attachments with companion animals have been undervalued and even pathologized in the field of mental health. This article briefly surveys the evolution of human‐animal bonds, reviews research on their health and mental health benefits, and examines their profound relational significance across the life course. Finally, the emerging field of animal‐assisted interventions is described, noting applications in hospital and eldercare settings, and in innovative school, prison, farm, and community programs. The aim of this overview paper is to stimulate more attention to these vital bonds in systems‐oriented theory, practice, and research. A companion paper in this issue focuses on the role of pets and relational dynamics in family systems and family therapy ( Walsh, 2009a ).     

Multidimensional Family Therapy HIV/STD Risk-Reduction Intervention: An Integrative Family-Based Model for Drug-Involved Juvenile Offenders

Drug and juvenile justice involved youths show remarkably high rates of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)/sexually transmitted disease (STD) risk behaviors. However, existing interventions aimed at reducing adolescent HIV risk behavior have rarely targeted these vulnerable young adolescents, and many approaches focus on individual-level change without attention to family or contextual influences. We describe a new, family-based HIV/STD prevention model that embeds HIV/STD focused multifamily groups within an adolescent drug abuse and delinquency evidence-based treatment, Multidimensional Family Therapy (MDFT). The approach has been evaluated in a multisite randomized clinical trial with juvenile justice involved youths in the National Institute on Drug Abuse Criminal Justice Drug Abuse Treatment Studies ( http://www.cjdats.org ). Preliminary baseline to 6-month outcomes are promising. We describe research on family risk and protective factors for adolescent problem behaviors, and offer a rationale for family-based approaches to reduce HIV/STD risk in this population. We describe the development and implementation of the Multidimensional Family Therapy HIV/STD risk-reduction intervention (MDFT-HIV/STD) in terms of using multifamily groups and their integration in standard MDFT and also offers a clinical vignette. The potential significance of this empirically based intervention development work is high; MDFT-HIV/STD is the first model to address largely unmet HIV/STD prevention and sexual health needs of substance abusing juvenile offenders within the context of a family-oriented evidence-based intervention.     

'My capital secret': Literature and the psychoanalytic agon

Taking as my departure point Freud 's unequivocal claim in The Question of Lay Analysis that psychoanalytic education should include "the history of civilization, mythology, the psychology of religion, and the science of literature" ( Freud, 1926b, p . 246), I advocate for an integration of psychoanalysis with the arts, the humanities, and the social sciences in psychoanalytic training. Foundations in these fields are not only acceptable as preliminary to clinical training but will also provide the diverse intellectual climate that is urgently needed in psychoanalytic institutes whose discursive range is often quite narrow. To provide one example of the salutary effect of such disciplinary integration on clinical practice, I illustrate how the transformative power of literature provides compelling metaphors for the psychoanalytic encounter. Through an example drawn from within my own experience as literary critic and psychoanalyst, I describe the ways that the troubling tensions in Milton's Samson Agonistes functioned to illuminate, for me, an analysand 's 'capital secret'.     

Learning, risk attitude and hot stoves in restless bandit problems

This research examines decisions from experience in restless bandit problems. Two experiments revealed four main effects. (1) Risk neutrality: the typical participant did not learn to become risk averse, a contradiction of the hot stove effect. (2) Sensitivity to the transition probabilities that govern the Markov process. (3) Positive recency: the probability of a risky choice being repeated was higher after a win than after a loss. (4) Inertia: the probability of a risky choice being repeated following a loss was higher than the probability of a risky choice after a safe choice. These results can be described with a simple contingent sampler model, which assumes that choices are made based on small samples of experiences contingent on the current state.     

Regular Minimality and Thurstonian-type modeling

A Thurstonian-type model for pairwise comparisons is any model in which the response (e.g., “they are the same” or “they are different”) to two stimuli being compared depends, deterministically or probabilistically, on the realizations of two randomly varying representations (perceptual images) of these stimuli. The two perceptual images in such a model may be stochastically interdependent but each has to be selectively dependent on its stimulus. It has been previously shown that all possible discrimination probability functions for same–different comparisons can be generated by Thurstonian-type models of the simplest variety, with independent percepts and deterministic decision rules. It has also been shown, however, that a broad class of Thurstonian-type models, called “well-behaved” (and including, e.g., models with multivariate normal perceptual representations whose parameters are smooth functions of stimuli) cannot simultaneously account for two empirically plausible properties of same–different comparisons, Regular Minimality (which essentially says that “being least discriminable from” is a symmetric relation) and nonconstancy of the minima of discrimination probabilities (the fact that different pairs of least discriminable stimuli are discriminated with different probabilities). These results have been obtained for stimulus spaces represented by regions of Euclidean spaces. In this paper, the impossibility for well-behaved Thurstonian-type models to simultaneously account for Regular Minimality and nonconstancy of minima is established for a much broader notion of well-behavedness applied to a much broader class of stimulus spaces (any Hausdorff arc-connected ones). The universality of Thurstonian-type models with independent perceptual images and deterministic decision rules is shown (by a simpler proof than before) to hold for arbitrary stimulus spaces.     

Parental involvement in children's learning: Comparing parents of children with and without Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

The present study examined involvement in children's learning among parents of 101 children between 8 and 12 years of age (53 parents of children with ADHD, 48 parents of children without ADHD). Compared to parents of children without ADHD, parents of children with ADHD reported lower self-efficacy in their ability to help their children, felt less welcome and supported by their children's schools and teachers, and perceived less time and energy for involvement in their children's academic lives. Mothers of children with and without ADHD reported similar types and levels of involvement behaviors in the home. Fathers of children with ADHD reported being more disengaged from their children's learning and using more coercive and punitive interactions regarding their children's achievement compared to fathers of children without ADHD. These findings underscore the difficulties in parent-supported learning practices and home-school collaboration initiatives faced by parents of children with ADHD and educators alike. Implications for school psychology practice are discussed.     

Is knowledge a natural kind?

The project of treating knowledge as an empirical object of study has gained popularity in recent naturalistic epistemology. It is argued here that the assumption that such an object of study exists is in tension with other central elements of naturalistic philosophy. Two hypotheses are considered. In the first, “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the relational character of truth creates a problem. In the second hypothesis “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the evolutionarily successful behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the problem lies in the fact that evolution by natural selection is not necessarily conducive to truth. The result does not necessarily amount to eliminativism, however, since the naturalist may consistently reject the condition of truth that lies behind these problems.     

Determination,realization and mental causation

How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (henceforth, ‘determination’) provides the key to solving the problem of MC: if mental properties are determinables of their physical realizers, then (since determinables and determinates are distinct, yet don’t causally compete) all three threats may be avoided. Not everyone agrees that determination can do this good work, however. Some (e.g., Douglas Ehring, Eric Funkhauser, and Sven Walter) object that mental-physical realization can’t be determination, since such realization lacks one or other characteristic feature of determination. I argue that on a proper understanding of the features of determination key to solving the problem of MC these arguments can be resisted.     

Evidentialism and the problem of stored beliefs

Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one’s personal data or beliefs in one’s area of expertise, intuitively amount to knowledge, and so are justified. This uncontroversial datum arguably tells against evidentialism, the position according to which a belief is justified if it fits the available evidence: stored beliefs are normally not sustained by one’s available evidence. Conee and Feldman have tried to meet this potential objection by relaxing the notion of available evidence. According to their proposal, stored beliefs are dispositionally justified, because they are justified by the evidence one has the disposition to retrieve; such evidence, as a consequence, is to be characterize as available, though in a derivative sense. Goldman has criticized this proposal, by offering a counterexample to the claim that a disposition to generate a piece of evidence may qualify as a justifier. In this paper I critically examine two possible replies to Goldman’s example stemming from Conee and Feldman, and finally propose my own, based on a distinction, inspired by Audi, between dispositional evidence and the disposition to have evidence. Though this proposal differs from Conee and Feldman’s one, I will conclude that it fits pretty well their intuitions.