Spirituality and education for global citizenship: developing student teachers’ perceptions and practice

Education for Global Citizenship (E4GC) offers many opportunities to explore spirituality and a sense of how one fits into the world at a range of levels. Beyond the Curriculum Boundaries is a project that enables student teachers to consider E4GC alongside issues of multiculturalism, antiracism and democracy education, with a strong focus on religious education and geography. This paper outlines the ethos behind the project, identifies key elements and themes, appraises student responses, and evaluates key learning points. Student teachers respond to the module in a variety of ways that inform their learning and teaching, and development takes place on both personal and professional levels: as the project has developed the awareness of children’s worldviews and the sense of interconnectedness with others has grown, adding an increasingly spiritual dimension to learning. This article argues that E4GC provides an effective vehicle for supporting the often‐overlooked spiritual dimension of children development.     

Parents' emotion‐related beliefs and behaviours in relation to children's coping with the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks

To assess relationships between parental socialization of emotion and children's coping following an intensely emotional event, parents' beliefs and behaviours regarding emotion and children's coping strategies were investigated after a set of terrorist attacks. Parents (n=51) filled out the Parents' Beliefs about Negative Emotions questionnaire and were interviewed within two weeks of the attacks. Their elementary and middle school‐aged children were interviewed eight weeks later. First, parents' beliefs were related to two kinds of parental behaviours. Parents' beliefs about both the value of and the danger of children's emotions were positively related to their discussion with their children. Parents' belief about children's emotions as dangerous was also negatively related to parents' expressiveness with their children. Second, parents' beliefs were related to five kinds of coping strategies reported by their children. Parents' belief about children's emotions as valuable predicted children's problem‐solving, emotion‐oriented, and support‐seeking coping following the terrorist attacks. Parents' belief about children's emotions as dangerous predicted children's avoidance and distraction coping following the attacks. Parents' beliefs about the importance of children's emotions may foster a family atmosphere that facilitates children's coping with intensely emotional events. Results support differentiated, multi‐faceted analysis of the broader construct of parental beliefs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ELCA at 20 Years: Flunking the Theological Test

Abstract : This article deals with four theological issues at the forefront of controversy in the ELCA. They are: 1) the naming of God; 2) the unique place of Jesus in the world's salvation; 3) the authority and interpretation of the Bible; 4) the place of the law in theological ethics. The response to these issues holds the key as to whether or to what extent the ELCA will be faithful to its confessional commitment or become just another variety of liberal Protestantism.     

Testing for selectivity in the dependence of random variables on external factors

Random variables A and B, whose joint distribution depends on factors (x,y), are selectively influenced by x and y, respectively, if A and B can be represented as functions of, respectively, (x,S_A,C) and (y,S_B,C), where S_A,S_B,C are stochastically independent and do not depend on (x,y). Selective influence implies selective dependence of marginal distributions on the respective factors: thus no parameter of A may depend on y. But parameters characterizing stochastic interdependence of A and B, such as their mixed moments, are generally functions of both x and y. We derive two simple necessary conditions for selective dependence of (A,B) on (x,y), which can be used to conduct a potential infinity of selectiveness tests. One condition is that, for any factor values x,x^′ and y,y^′,

s_xy≤s_xy^′+s_x^′y^′+s_x^′y,     

THE PARADOX OF INQUIRY IN AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS

Abstract: The Confessions recounts Augustine's successful search for God. But Augustine worries that one cannot search for God if one does not already know God. That version of the paradox of inquiry dominates and structures Confessions 1–10. I draw connections between the dramatic opening lines of book 1 and the climactic discussion in book 10.26–38 and argue that the latter discussion contains Augustine's resolution of the paradox of inquiry as it applies to the special case of searching for God. I claim that he develops a model, relying on the universal human experience of joy and truth, that identifies a starting point that (1) is common to all human beings, (2) is sufficient for guiding a successful search for God, and (3) avoids commitment to recollection of experiences prior to birth. The model is crucial to Augustine's rejection of traditional Platonist views about recollection.     

On Association Coefficients for 2×2 Tables and Properties That Do Not Depend on the Marginal Distributions

We discuss properties that association coefficients may have in general, e.g., zero value under statistical independence, and we examine coefficients for 2×2 tables with respect to these properties. Furthermore, we study a family of coefficients that are linear transformations of the observed proportion of agreement given the marginal probabilities. This family includes the phi coefficient and Cohen’s kappa. The main result is that the linear transformations that set the value under independence at zero and the maximum value at unity, transform all coefficients in this family into the same underlying coefficient. This coefficient happens to be Loevinger’s H.     

The Problem of Confucian Moral Cultivation and Its Solution: Using Ritual Propriety to Support Rule by Law

Thinking about the decline of morality in post-reform China,the author analyzes the development of virtuous governance based on moral education,and concludes that the reason why ancient rulers were so infatuated with it was the inhibitive function of public evaluation on moral transgressions in familiar neighborhoods.However,as China transforms into a dynamic and commercial society,and its people move from familiar neighborhoods to alienated communities in the cities,public evaluation is losing its power over moral transgressors.To prevent the collapse of the moral system,it is necessary to use rule by law to foster people's sense of justice and rule-consciousness-not to simply hope for the appearance of more altruists.This is possible because law is the embodiment of moral principle,and because legal restraints and penalties can be internalized as habits.After a sense of justice and rule-consciousness has been established in people,we can again take up Confucian virtue education to nurture people's sense of shame and dignity,and their humane and righteous mind.However,to stop the current chaos and corruption,it is urgent that we adopt rule by law and supplement it with moral education.     

The Development of Traditional Chinese View of Rule of Law and Its Modern Transformation

In the traditional order of the “rule of rites,” social status and relationships always held priority positions, which apparently went against the realization of social justice; Legalists thought highly of objectivity and avoided subjective randomness, and were more reasonable in this regard. However, following the integration of rites and law in the Han Dynasty, the technical aspect of Legalism emphasizing control of society and of the populace was strengthened, and in the meanwhile, their “true spirit” became concealed before long. The main signs of this are follows: (1) In the order of the “rule of rites,” the objectivity of law was gradually devoured by the subjectivity of human beings, thus the tradition where “human relationships replace law” came into being; (2) The law, which had shown the spirit of equality to a certain extent in the guise of Legalism, now degraded into a tool to maintain a hierarchy; (3) Rights were separated from duties, that is, some people enjoyed “rights without duties” as much as they wanted, while the rest were forced to carry out “duties without rights.” As history has warned us, in ruling a country, one cannot stake even the least bit of fortune upon human nature, and there can be only one bottom line and criterion, that is, common strict observance of and respect to “rules.” That should be the great value of the lesson that the pre-Qin Legalism has left for future generations.     

Agency, properties and causation

The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected, one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met.     

The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence

In response to Lawrence Solum's advocacy of a 'virtue–centred theory of judging', I argue that there is indeed important work to be done in identifying and characterising those qualities of character that constitute judicial virtues – those qualities that a person needs if she is to judge well (though I criticise Solum's account of one of the five pairs of judicial vices and virtues that he identifies – avarice and temperance). However, Solum's more ambitious claims – that a judge's vice necessarily corrupts her decisions, and that in at least some contexts we must define a legally correct decision as one that would be reached by a virtuous judge – should be rejected: we can undermine the former by attending to the requirements of due process, and the latter by attending to the ways in which a judge would try to justify her decision.