When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley?

As the trolley problem runs its course, consequentialists tend to adopt one of two strategies: (a) silently take comfort in the fact that deontological rivals face their own enduring difficulties, or (b) appeal to cognitive psychology to discredit the deontological intuitions on which the trolley problem depends. I refer to the first strategy as silent schadenfreude and the second as debunking attack. My aim in this paper is to argue that consequentialists ought to reject both strategies and instead opt for what I call robust advantage. This strategy emphasizes the intricate calculations that consequentialists employ to defend against objections based on friendship and integrity. I argue that these calculations offer consequentialism an explanatory advantage over deontology in the context of the trolley problem. It requires striking a delicate balance between deeply internalized dispositions to avoid causing harm and a context-sensitive ability to prevent disasters; however, empirical data help consequentialism on this front by illustrating that the integration of separate cognitive functions is an ordinary part of human psychology.     

Mill’s act-utilitarian interpreters on Utilitarianism chapter V paragraph 14

In the fourteenth paragraph of the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism, J. S. Mill writes that ‘We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.’ I criticize the attempts of three commentators who have recently presented act-utilitarian readings of Mill – Roger Crisp, David Brink, and Piers Norris Turner – to accommodate this passage.     

基督教伦理理论的两种类型

在西方基督徒中间,对与性、家庭生活和医学伦理问题相联系的个体道德问题,存在着严重的分歧.因为在今天的基督徒中间存在着两种伦理理论决定着他们的观点,第一种道德判断是"道义论",另一种道德判断叫做"后果主义".     

肝移植的伦理学问题

肝脏移植和其它器官移植一起实现了人类长期以来渴望生命再生的梦想,并成为终末期肝病的有效治疗方法。器官移植也面对许多伦理道德方面的难题。供体,特别是活体器官的摘取,受体的选择等,都受到社会道德观的制约。从伦理道德角度来分析如何制定相关的法律法规,成为当前社会关注的热点。从受体的利益、人体科研的道德规范以及相关制度的伦理学要求等方面,较为详细的阐述肝移植伦理学的基本原则。     

Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-Breakers from Would-Be Law-Makers

An interesting fact about customary international law is that the only way you can propose an amendment to it is by breaking it. How can that be differentiated from plain law-breaking? What moral standards might apply to that sort of international conduct? I propose we use ones analogous to the ordinary standards for distinguishing civil disobedients from ordinary law-breakers: would-be law-makers, like civil disobedients, must break the law openly; they must accept the legal consequences of doing so; and they must be prepared to have the same rules applied to them as everyone else.     

儿童情绪伪装能力的发展研究

该文介绍了国外儿童情绪伪装能力发展及其影响因素的近期研究,这些研究结果表明：儿童最早在斗岁出现情绪伪装的认知能力,6岁时这种能力得到完善;儿童对情绪伪装认知能力和对物理属性的表面与真实的区分能力具有潜在的一致的认知基础;儿童情绪伪装能力的完善和错误信念的获得有关;文化通过社会化过程影响儿童的情绪伪装的发展。     

用不同外部表征方式集中呈现信息条件下的因果力判断

在分别用文字陈述、表格和图形三种外部表征方式集中呈现因果信息的条件下,用直接估计因果力大小的实验范式考察单一因果关系因果力估计的特点,检验概率对比模型,效力PC理论和pCI规则。让287名大学生被试估计不同化学药物影响动物基因变异的能力。结果发现,对单一因果关系因果力估计具有以下4个特点：⑴不对称性：在预防原因条件下的因果力估计较多符合效力PC理论,而在产生原因条件下的因果力估计一般符合概率对比模型;⑵文字陈述、表格和图形三种信息外部表征方式,不影响产生原因条件下的因果力估计,但影响预防原因条件下的因果力估计。在预防原因条件下,与文字陈述和表格表征相比,图形表征会促使更多被试按效力PC理论来做因果力估计;⑶没有被试使用pCI规则;⑷被试估计因果力所使用的规则存在明显的个体差异。     

Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs

Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson's claim is either harmless or her argument for the claim is uncompelling. On the first conception of teleology, consequentialists need not hold that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, which allows them to deflect this criticism. On the second account of teleology, even assuming that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson's argument does not necessarily defeat such views.     

Persons as goods: response to Patrick Lee.

Developing a British perspective on the abortion debate, I take up some ideas from Patrick Lee's fine paper, and pursue, in particular, the idea of individual humans as goods in themselves. I argue that this notion helps us to avoid the familiar mistake of making moral value impersonal. It also shows us the way out of consequentalism. Since the most philosophically viable notion of the person, the individual human, is (as Lee argues) a notion of individual substance that is there from conception, the move has a third effect, which is to rule out abortion.