The effect of rearing environments on the contrafreeloading phenomenon in rats

Eight naive rats were reared in enriched or impoverished environments for 39 days after weaning and then lived in operant chambers, in which they could obtain food pellets freely or by lever pressing, for 25 or 30 days. The animals raised in an impoverished environment acquired the bar-press response quickly when placed in the operant chambers and maintained a preference for obtaining food via bar pressing. Animals raised in an enriched environment did not learn to lever press, as demonstrated by low levels of responding and the lack of bar pressing when free food was subsequently removed. It was concluded that restricting animals' postweaning environments facilitated learning in a choice situation, probably because of increased activity levels. The results are interpreted in relation to previous studies on rearing environments and on contrafreeloading.     

"八荣八耻"的道德哲学

“八荣八耻”的社会主义荣辱观,把社会主义道德的要求聚焦到荣辱观,集中点击人的良心,可谓四两拨千斤;“八荣八耻”督促人们作出善恶选择,启迪了个人的道德自觉、自主和自律,同时也强调了公民的道德权利和义务;“八荣八耻”的落实重在修养和践行,为社会主义道德建设与和谐社会的构建创造了精神条件。     

THE COMMUNITY VIEW REVISITED

Abstract: Joining a vast Wittgensteinian anti‐theoretical movement, John Canfield has argued that it is possible to read the claims that (1) “language is essentially communal” and (2) “it is conceptually possible that a Crusoe isolated from birth should speak or follow rules” in such a way that they are perfectly compatible, and, indeed, that Wittgenstein held them both at once. The key to doing this is to drain them of any theoretical content or implications that would put each claim at odds with the other. I argue here, first of all, that it is not possible to detheorize both (1) and (2) and still hope to say anything illuminating about the nature of language. In fact, Canfield himself does not succeed in detheorizing both (1) and (2) but ends up trivializing (1) and leaving (2) with quite a bit of theoretical content. I further argue, however, that this is getting the matter the wrong way around. Contra Canfield et al., it is only when we recognize this that we can appreciate how radical and innovative Wittgenstein's claims about language really are.     

Stopping rules for multi-category computerized classification testing

Computerized classification testing (CCT) aims to classify persons into one of two or more possible categories to make decisions such as mastery/non-mastery or meet most/meet all/exceed. A defining feature of CCT is its stopping criterion: the test terminates when there is enough confidence to make a decision. There is abundant research on CCT with a single cut-off, and two common stopping criteria are the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) statistic and the generalized likelihood ratio statistic (GLR). However, there is a relative scarcity of research extending the SPRT to the multi-hypothesis case for when there is more than one cut-off. In this paper, we propose a new multi-category GLR (mGLR) statistic as well as a stochastically curtailed version of the CCT with three or more categories. A simulation study was conducted to show that the mGLR statistic outperformed the existing stopping rules by generating shorter average test length without sacrificing classification accuracy. Results also revealed that the stochastically curtailed mGLR successfully increased test efficiency in certain testing conditions.     

Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

Analysing the influence of attitude and habit on bicycle commuting

New transport trends have emerged in developing countries to promote bicycling due to its individual and societal benefits. Although bicycle infrastructure provision has been one of the most utilised strategies to encourage bicycling, it has had a limited immediate impact on the bicycling modal share. Published research indicates the need to incorporate the psychosocial dimension to understand commuters' transport behaviour and explain why bicycling infrastructure usage is lower than expected. This study highlights the processes behind bicycle mode choice decisions, explicitly incorporating pro-bicycle attitudes and habits, while also considering the influence of socioeconomic, bicycle facilities and bicycling experience variables on shaping that attitude. For this purpose, an online survey was designed and sent to students, faculty members and staff of two Chilean universities to collect ad-hoc data. The modelling used an approach based on an integrated choice and latent variable model. The main findings are: attitude in itself is a relevant construct to explain behaviour; bicycling infrastructure contribute to explain bicycle choice but only indirectly through attitude; socioeconomic characteristics, bicycling familiarity and practical issues have both a direct effect on bicycle choice decision and an indirect one by fostering pro-bicycling attitudes. Additionally, results show that the explicit inclusion of habit reduces the contribution of pro-bicycle attitude in explaining bicycle choice. This might be due to interaction and reinforcement between habit and attitude.     

The effects of statistical training on choice heuristics in choice under uncertainty

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) proposed that decision makers perceive choice uncertainty in two ways: (1) as a distribution of possible outcomes or (2) as a single uncertain outcome. Using statistical training as a factor that influences these perceptions, and thus the type of decision approach individuals use, we found that individuals with different levels of experience displayed differences in the decisions they made and in the choice heuristics used to make those decisions. Statistically naive individuals were more likely to prefer loss-minimizing alternatives, use a more non-compensatory heuristic, and spend more time on loss-related information than their statistically experienced counterparts. When a distributional cue, indicating the distributional nature of choice outcomes, was presented to both experience groups, the naive group was found to use a decision approach similar to the experienced group and to make similar decisions. The results are discussed in terms of the need to include factors that alter individuals' approaches to uncertainty in future behavioral models of uncertain choice.     

Regression II. Development through regression

As shown in our previous paper (‘Regression I. Experimental approaches to regression’, JAP, 65, 2, 345-65), the common mechanism of regression can be described as reversible dedifferentiation, which is understood as a relative increase of the proportion of low-differentiated (older) systems in actualized experience. Experimental data show that regression following disease (chronic tension headache) is followed by adaptation and an increase in system differentiation in that experience domain which contains systems responsible for that adaptation. The results of mathematical modelling support the idea that reversible dedifferentiation can be one of the mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of adaptation through learning. Reversible dedifferentiation, which is phenomenologically described as regression, is a general mechanism for restructuring the organism-environment interactions in situations where behaviours that were effective in the past become ineffective. Reversible dedifferentiation has evolved as a component of adaptation when new behaviours are formed and large-scale modifications in the existing behaviours are required in the face of changes in the external and/or internal environment. Thus, the authors believe that this article provides evidence for Jung’s view that regression is not only a ‘return’ to past forms of thinking, affects and behaviour, but that regressive processes provide a significant impetus for psychological growth and development.     

How representations of number and numeracy predict decision paradoxes: A fuzzy-trace theory approach

Higher numeracy has been associated with decision biases in some numerical judgment-and-decision problems. According to fuzzy-trace theory, understanding such paradoxes involves broadening the concept of numeracy to include processing the gist of numbers—their categorical and ordinal relations—in addition to objective (verbatim) knowledge about numbers. We assess multiple representations of gist, as well as numeracy, and use them to better understand and predict systematic paradoxes in judgment and decision-making. In two samples (Ns = 978 and 957), we assessed categorical (some vs. none) and ordinal gist representations of numbers (higher vs. lower, as in relative magnitude judgment, estimation, approximation, and simple ratio comparison), objective numeracy, and a nonverbal, nonnumeric measure of fluid intelligence in predicting: (a) decision preferences exhibiting the Allais paradox and (b) attractiveness ratings of bets with and without a small loss in which the loss bet is rated higher than the objectively superior no-loss bet. Categorical and ordinal gist tasks predicted unique variance in paradoxical decisions and judgments, beyond objective numeracy and intelligence. Whereas objective numeracy predicted choosing or rating according to literal numerical superiority, appreciating the categorical and ordinal gist of numbers was pivotal in predicting paradoxes. These results bring important paradoxes under the same explanatory umbrella, which assumes three types of representations of numbers—categorical gist, ordinal gist, and objective (verbatim)—that vary in their strength across individuals.     

Adding versus averaging: Evaluability theory applied to job choice decisions

While the unique roles of individual job attributes (e.g., salary and benefits) in job and organizational attraction have received extensive research attention, research examining the mechanisms through which an overall evaluation of a job option is made by combining evaluations of individual attributes is scarce. The current study examined the process through which job choice decisions are made under three conditions: when evaluating a single job offer, when comparing two job offers, and when evaluating more than two job offers. In Study 1, it was found that when a single job offer is evaluated, the average of perceived values of attributes in an offer (e.g., the perceived attractiveness of a salary) drives the choice, whereas the difference between jobs is what matters when two jobs are evaluated simultaneously, potentially leading to a preference reversal between conditions when the same two jobs are evaluated. In Study 2, it was found that average values of attributes across options (e.g., average salary in all job offers received) influence job choice when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously. These findings indicate that in all three conditions, job choice decisions are influenced by the evaluability of the choice set, which becomes low when a single job offer is evaluated without any context, or when more than two job offers are evaluated simultaneously, and becomes high when two jobs are compared with each other. When evaluability is low, candidates resort to averaging as the decision rule, whereas adding is used when evaluability is high.