Children's judgements and emotions about social exclusion based on weight

This study examined children's judgements and emotions associated with weight‐based social exclusion using an ethnically diverse sample of one hundred and seventeen 9‐ and 13‐year‐old children. Children were interviewed about three scenarios depicting weight‐based exclusion in athletic, academic, and social contexts. Children's judgements of exclusion, emotions attributed to the excluder and excluded targets, and justifications for judgements and emotions were examined. Overall, children judged weight‐based exclusion to be wrong for moral reasons. However, they viewed weight‐based exclusion in athletic contexts as less wrong compared with academic contexts, and they used more social‐conventional reasoning to justify judgements and emotions attributed to excluders in athletic contexts compared with academic and social contexts. Children also expected excluded targets to feel negative emotions, whereas a range of positive and negative emotions was attributed to excluders. In addition, older children were more accepting of weight‐based exclusion in athletic contexts than in academic and social contexts. We discuss the results in relation to the development of children's understanding of, and emotions associated with, exclusion based on weight.     

It’s not just “us” versus “them”: Moving beyond binary perspectives on intergroup processes

ABSTRACT

The social psychology of intergroup relations has emerged largely from studies of how one group of people (e.g., whites) think and feel about another (e.g., blacks). By reducing the social world to binary categories, this approach has provided an effective and efficient methodological framework. However, it has also obscured important features of social relations in historically divided societies. This paper highlights the importance of investigating intergroup relationships involving more than two groups and of exploring not only their psychological but also their political significance. Exemplifying this argument, we discuss the conditions under which members of disadvantaged groups either dissolve into internecine competition or unite to challenge the status quo, highlighting the role of complex forms of social comparison, identification, contact, and third-party support for collective action. Binary conceptualizations of intergroup relations, we conclude, are the product of specific sociohistorical practices rather than a natural starting point for psychological research.     

Reasonably Traditional: Self–Contradiction and Self–Reference in Alasdair MacIntyre's Account of Tradition–Based Rationality

Alasdair MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality has been the subject of much discussion, as well as the object of some recent charges of inconsistency. The author considers arguments by Jennifer Herdt, Peter Mehl, and John Haldane which attempt to show that MacIntyre's account of rationality is, in some way, inconsistent. It is argued that the various charges of inconsistency brought against MacIntyre by these critics can be understood as variations on two general types of criticism: (1) that MacIntyre's account of tradition–based rationality presents a picture of rationality with inconsistent internal elements, and (2) that MacIntyre, in the act of presenting his picture of rationality, makes the sort of claims to which his own account of rationality denies legitimacy, and thus MacIntyre's account is self–referentially incoherent. In response to criticisms of the first sort, it is argued that MacIntyre can further clarify or develop his position to take the current criticisms into account without altering the fundamental aspects of his picture of rationality. In response to the charge of self–referential incoherence, it is argued that the charge rests on a mistaken understanding of MacIntyre's position and of the nature of justification. In dealing with these arguments, the author hopes to not only vindicate MacIntyre's account of rationality against the charges of some of its recent critics, but also to shed some light on the nature of arguments both for and against relativism and historicism.     

苏浚生生易学之研究——兼论苏浚调和理学与心学的方法

苏浚是明代后期著名的理学家和易学家。苏浚易学属于义理易学,具有心学易的色彩。苏浚易学的主要贡献在于提出了圣人洗心而作《易》的观念,这为后世注经者以心论《易》提供了"合法"诠释的前提。在苏浚看来,学习《周易》,固然要学习《周易》所蕴含的各种人事及其道理,但更重要的是要学习圣人之心。另外,苏浚采用人心涵具天理这一思路,既承认了天理的本体性地位,又突出了心的重要性,从而表现出调和理学与心学的理论努力。     

An effective metacognitive strategy: learning by doing and explaining with a computer‐based Cognitive Tutor

Recent studies have shown that self‐explanation is an effective metacognitive strategy, but how can it be leveraged to improve students' learning in actual classrooms? How do instructional treatments that emphasizes self‐explanation affect students' learning, as compared to other instructional treatments? We investigated whether self‐explanation can be scaffolded effectively in a classroom environment using a Cognitive Tutor, which is intelligent instructional software that supports guided learning by doing. In two classroom experiments, we found that students who explained their steps during problem‐solving practice with a Cognitive Tutor learned with greater understanding compared to students who did not explain steps. The explainers better explained their solutions steps and were more successful on transfer problems. We interpret these results as follows: By engaging in explanation, students acquired better‐integrated visual and verbal declarative knowledge and acquired less shallow procedural knowledge. The research demonstrates that the benefits of self‐explanation can be achieved in a relatively simple computer‐based approach that scales well for classroom use.