Too good to be true? Psychological responses to uncommon options in risk–reward environments

Risks and rewards, or payoffs and probabilities, are inversely related in many choice environments. We investigated people's psychological responses to uncommon combinations of risk and reward that deviate from learned regularities (e.g., options that offer a high payoff with an unusually high probability) as they evaluated risky options. In two experiments (N = 183), participants first priced monetary gambles drawn from environments in which risks and rewards were negatively correlated, positively correlated, or uncorrelated. In later trials, they evaluated gambles with uncommon combinations of risk and reward—that is, options that deviated from the respective environment's risk–reward structure. Pricing, response times, and (in Experiment 2) pupil dilation were recorded. In both experiments, participants took more time when responding to uncommon compared to foreseeable options or when the same options were presented in an uncorrelated risk–reward environment. This result was most pronounced when the uncommon gambles offered higher expected values compared to the other gambles in the set. Moreover, these uncommon, high‐value options were associated with an increase in pupil size. These results suggest that people's evaluations of risky options are based not only on the options' payoffs and probabilities but also on the extent to which they fit the risk–reward structure of the environment.     

“WHITE CRISIS” AND/AS “EXISTENTIAL RISK,” OR THE ENTANGLED APOCALYPTICISM OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

In this article, I present a critique of Robert Geraci's Apocalyptic artificial intelligence (AI) discourse, drawing attention to certain shortcomings which become apparent when the analytical lens shifts from religion to the race–religion nexus. Building on earlier work, I explore the phenomenon of existential risk associated with Apocalyptic AI in relation to “White Crisis,” a modern racial phenomenon with premodern religious origins. Adopting a critical race theoretical and decolonial perspective, I argue that all three phenomena are entangled and they should be understood as a strategy, albeit perhaps merely rhetorical, for maintaining white hegemony under nonwhite contestation. I further suggest that this claim can be shown to be supported by the disclosure of continuity through change in the long‐durée entanglement of race and religion associated with the establishment, maintenance, expansion, and refinement of the modern/colonial world system if and when such phenomena are understood as iterative shifts in a programmatic trajectory of domination which might usefully be framed as “algorithmic racism.”     

Toward a new conceptualization and operationalization of risk perception within the genetic counseling domain

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an historical overview of studies of risk, risk perception, and decision making under risk within the genetic counseling domain. Second, it proposes an alternative conceptualization and operationalization for the study of risk perception. The conceptualization involves probability, adversity, incompleteness, and ambiguity. Prior studies of risk perception focus on the recurrence risk and operationalize risk perception by asking for interpretations of the magnitude of the probability of the outcome. Their focus is on the probability of a particular outcome. We formulate the problem in terms of a gamble and suggest that risk perception be operationalized in terms of the riskiness of the gamble. Our focus is on the riskiness of a decision option which entails two or more outcomes.     

Normative and Descriptive Models of Military Decisions to Deploy Precision Strike Capabilities

Precision strike capabilities represent a significant and highly controversial part of present day military operations. And yet, there is a surprising dearth of empirical research on military decision making in this domain. In this article, we therefore review different psychological perspectives on how these decisions can be made. Specifically, we compare the application of normative models of judgment and choice against the empirical research on human decision making, which suggests that people are more likely to employ heuristic strategies. We suggest that several features of decision tasks in the precision strike domain evoke the use of intuitive (heuristic) decision making whereas other features such as the sometimes unfamiliar (or novel) nature of the decision task requires analytic strategies to generate good solutions. Therefore, decisions about precision strike capabilities are best made with a mixture of intuitive and analytic thought, a mode of thinking known as quasirationality.     

The response dynamics of preferential choice

The ubiquity of psychological process models requires an increased degree of sophistication in the methods and metrics that we use to evaluate them. We contribute to this venture by capitalizing on recent work in cognitive science analyzing response dynamics, which shows that the bearing information processing dynamics have on intended action is also revealed in the motor system. This decidedly “embodied” view suggests that researchers are missing out on potential dependent variables with which to evaluate their models—those associated with the motor response that produces a choice. The current work develops a method for collecting and analyzing such data in the domain of decision making. We first validate this method using widely normed stimuli from the International Affective Picture System (Experiment 1), and demonstrate that curvature in response trajectories provides a metric of the competition between choice options. We next extend the method to risky decision making (Experiment 2) and develop predictions for three popular classes of process model. The data provided by response dynamics demonstrate that choices contrary to the maxim of risk seeking in losses and risk aversion in gains may be the product of at least one “online” preference reversal, and can thus begin to discriminate amongst the candidate models. Finally, we incorporate attentional data collected via eye-tracking (Experiment 3) to develop a formal computational model of joint information sampling and preference accumulation. In sum, we validate response dynamics for use in preferential choice tasks and demonstrate the unique conclusions afforded by response dynamics over and above traditional methods.     

Distinctive Preferences Toward Risk in the Substantive Domain of Sociality*

As with standard models of rationality, theorists generally treat prospect theory's demonstration of risk aversion in gains but risk tolerance in losses as domain‐general. Yet evolutionary psychology suggests that natural selection has designed a domain specific cognitive architecture—with systems specialized for some substantive domains but not others. Here we address risky choices through that lens asking whether humans' risk responses dispose them to enter social relationships even when doing so is counter to normative rationality and regardless of whether the “enter” versus “not enter” choice is framed as between gains and losses. Laboratory findings in five sites across three countries provide a positive answer to both possibilities. Participants could enter or not enter inherently risky social relationships. They were more willing to enter such relationships than rational choice models would predict and were equally so willing regardless of whether equivalent alternatives were framed as gains and as losses. With the “social context” extracted in otherwise identical games, participants' risk responses were consistent with prospect theory. The present findings suggest the possibility of adaptations designed to facilitate sociality—despite its risks and how those risks are framed.     

Deciding the Fate of Others: The Cognitive Underpinnings of Racially Biased Juror Decision Making

In criminal law, jurors are supposed to ignore defendant race when considering factual matters of culpability. However, when judging the merits of a criminal case, jurors’ ability (or inability) to avoid bias may affect verdicts. Fact-based decision making expend cognitive resources, while heuristic-based decisions (e.g., using criminal stereotypes) conserve resources. Here, we investigated whether differences in cognitive resources and prejudice attitudes about Blacks influenced trial outcomes. We tested the impact of working memory capacity (WMC), cognitive load, prejudice, and target race (Black, White) on penalties ascribed to fictional criminal defendants in ambiguous-fact cases. Results showed that when “loaded,” prejudiced-low-WMC persons supported guilty verdicts with higher confidence more often for Black than White defendants. Conversely, regardless of WMC or prejudice attitude, participants penalized White defendants more often when not loaded. We suggest that cognitive resources and prejudice attitude influence fact-based decisions. Links to juror judgments and potential trial outcomes are discussed.     

The egocentric nature of procedural justice: Social value orientation as moderator of reactions to decision-making procedures

In four studies, the authors investigated the individual-oriented versus social-oriented nature of procedural justice effects by comparing fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures among proself versus prosocial oriented individuals. In Studies 1 through 3, we measured participants’ social value orientation and manipulated whether or not they were granted or denied voice in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed that the effects of voice versus no-voice on fairness-based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions were significantly more pronounced for individuals with proself orientations than for individuals with prosocial orientations. These findings were extended in Study 4, a field study in which perceived procedural justice was a stronger predictor of satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviors among proselfs than among prosocials. These findings suggest that procedural justice effects can be accounted for by self-oriented motives or needs, rather than prosocial motives that are often conceptualized as being associated with justice.     

La décision médicale et la relation médecin–patient en oncologie

The announcement of the cancer diagnosis and his treatment is an important moment in the set up of the doctor–patient relationship. The law of contracts has long governed the relationship between the doctor and the patient. But the legislature clearly demonstrated its will to consider the patient as full actor of his health, leaving the regime of medical decision, the shared decision. This shared decision is based on an obligation to inform the patient on his health and knows many exceptions (minor patients or adults under guardianship, emergency). In Oncology, the medical decision is a decision coordinated between doctors in the multidisciplinary consultation meetings. This decision is considered as a guarantee of the quality of the medical care. It does not preclude the time of the doctor–patient relationship.