Cognitive development in children of adolescent mothers: The impact of socioeconomic risk and maternal sensitivity

BackgroundAdolescent motherhood is accompanied by a constellation of risk factors that translate into developmental risk for the off-spring. Socioeconomic risk that is associated with adolescent motherhood as well as maternal interactive behaviors may contribute to the impact of adolescent motherhood on children’s developmental outcome.ObjectiveTherefore, the aim of the current study was to investigate differences in children’s cognitive development between children of adolescent and adult mothers in their first two years of life and to examine whether socioeconomic risk (e.g. such as educational and financial problems) and/or maternal sensitivity mediate developmental differences between children of adolescent and adult mothers.MethodsAdolescent mothers (<21 years; N = 64) and adult mothers (>25 years; N = 34) and their infants were included in the current study. Child cognitive development and maternal sensitivity were assessed at three different time points (T1: mean child age 5.26 months; T2: mean child age 14.69 months; T3: mean child age 21.16 months).ResultsChildren of adult mothers showed better cognitive performance at T3 compared to children of adolescent mothers but not at T1 and T2. A multiple mediation model including socioeconomic risk and maternal sensitivity as serial mediators demonstrated that the effect of adolescent motherhood on cognitive development was mediated in a causal effect chain with socioeconomic risk negatively affecting maternal sensitivity and maternal sensitivity affecting children’s cognitive development.DiscussionThe present findings demonstrate that maternal interactive behaviors are not only a simple predictor of cognitive development but may also act as a mediator of the association between more distal variables such as socioeconomic risk and cognitive development in adolescent mothers. This supports the need to promote prevention and intervention programs for adolescent mothers during the early postpartum period to reduce socioeconomic problems and enhance maternal interactive behaviors.     

Counter‐intuitive moral judgement following traumatic brain injury

Several neurological patient populations, including traumatic brain injury (TBI), appear to produce an abnormally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of judgements to moral dilemmas; they tend to make judgements that maximize the welfare of the majority, rather than deontological judgements based on the following of moral rules (e.g., do not harm others). However, this patient research has always used extreme dilemmas with highly valued moral rules (e.g., do not kill). Data from healthy participants, however, suggest that when a wider range of dilemmas are employed, involving less valued moral rules (e.g., do not lie), moral judgements demonstrate sensitivity to the psychological intuitiveness of the judgements, rather than their deontological or utilitarian content (Kahane et al., Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7, 2011, 393). We sought the moral judgements of 30 TBI participants and 30 controls on moral dilemmas where content (utilitarian/deontological) and intuition (intuitive/counter‐intuitive) were measured concurrently. Overall TBI participants made utilitarian judgements in equal proportions to controls; disproportionately favouring utilitarian judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive, and deontological judgements only when they were counter‐intuitive. These results speak against the view that TBI causes a specific utilitarian bias, suggesting instead that moral intuition is broadly disrupted following TBI.     

Attachment styles and clinical correlates in people at ultra high risk for psychosis

Evidence suggests that attachment styles may influence subclinical psychosis phenotypes (schizotypy) and affective disorders and may play a part in the association between psychosis and childhood adversity. However, the role of attachment in the initial stages of psychosis remains poorly understood. Our main aim was to describe and compare attachment styles in 60 individuals at ultra high risk for psychosis (UHR) and a matched sample of 60 healthy volunteers (HV). The HV had lower anxious and avoidant attachment scores than the UHR individuals (p < .001). Sixty-nine percentage of the UHR group had more than one DSM-IV diagnosis, mainly affective and anxiety disorders. The UHR group experienced more trauma (p < .001) and more mood and anxiety symptoms (p < .001). Interestingly, in our UHR group, only schizotypy paranoia was correlated with insecure attachment. In the HV group, depression, anxiety, schizotypy paranoia, and social anxiety were correlated with insecure attachment. This difference and some discrepancies with previous studies involving UHR suggest that individuals at UHR may compose a heterogeneous group; some experience significant mood and/or anxiety symptoms that may not be explained by specific attachment styles. Nonetheless, measuring attachment in UHR individuals could help maximize therapeutic relationships to enhance recovery.     

Do tests facilitate decision‐making performance on a transfer task?

Testing can improve later recall of information. However, much less is known about the potential use of testing in promoting the transfer of learning. In this study, we investigated whether testing improves decision‐making performance on a transfer task in a sample of 98 university students using a between‐subjects design. After studying several statements about a fictional disease under different learning conditions (restudy, free recall, and multiple‐choice), participants were asked to recall this information and subsequently make medical decisions concerning the fictional disease (i.e., the transfer task). The present study found no advantage of testing conditions over restudy condition on the 30‐min delayed memory task. However, participants in the active retrieval practice (i.e., free recall) group performed significantly better on the transfer task over those in both restudy and multiple‐choice groups. These results suggest free‐recall tests promote the transfer of learning.     

Why Improvement Can Trump Consistent Strong Performance: The Role of Effort Perceptions

How do evaluators form comparative judgments of improved versus consistently strong performance records with equivalent recent performance? We propose that evaluators judge those with improved records to be more deserving of future opportunities (e.g., a promotion) and that this can be explained – at least in part – by perceptions of effort investments. Specifically, evaluators rely on improvement to judge effort and hence devalue consistent strong performance. Five studies supported these propositions. Evaluators perceived greater effort investment and trait effort in individuals with improved profiles than those with consistent profiles and consequently thought that those with improved profiles were more deserving of future opportunities. We discuss implications of these results across various decision contexts. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidence for Opportunity Cost Neglect in the Poor

People often neglect opportunity costs: They do not fully take into account forgone alternatives outside of a particular choice set. Several scholars have suggested that poor people should be more likely to spontaneously consider opportunity costs, because budget constraints should lead to an increased focus on trade‐offs. We did not find support for this hypothesis in five high‐powered experiments (total N = 2325). The experiments used different products (both material and experiential) with both high and low prices (from $8.50 to $249.99) and different methods of reminding participants of opportunity costs. High‐income and low‐income participants showed an equally strong decrease in willingness to buy when reminded of opportunity costs, implying that both the rich and the poor neglect opportunity costs. © 2017 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

The Role of Anticipated Regret in Advice Taking

Across five studies, we demonstrate that anticipated future regret influences receptiveness to advice. While making a revision to one's own judgment based on advice, people can anticipate two kinds of future regret: (a) the regret of following non‐beneficial advice and (b) the regret of ignoring beneficial advice. In studies 1a (scenario task) and 1b (judgment task), we find that anticipated regret from erring after following advice is greater than anticipated regret from erring after ignoring advice. Furthermore, receptiveness decreases as the difference between anticipated regret from following and from ignoring advice increases. In study 2, we demonstrate that perceived justifiability of one's own initial decision is greater than that of advice. This difference in perceived justifiability influences anticipated regret and that, in turn, influences receptiveness. In study 3, we investigate the effect of advisor's expertise on perceived justifiability, anticipated regret, and receptiveness. In study 4, we propose and test an intervention to improve receptiveness based on self‐generation of advice justifications. Participants who were asked to self‐generate justifications for the advice were more receptive to it. This effect was mediated by perceived justifiability and anticipated regret. These findings shed further light on what prevents people from being receptive to advice and how this can be improved. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Salience Versus Proportional Reasoning: Rethinking the Mechanism Behind Graphical Display Effects

Two experiments examined predictions from two separate explanations for previously observed display effects for communicating low‐probability risks: foreground:background salience and proportional reasoning. According to foreground:background salience, people's risk perceptions are based on the relative salience of the foreground (number of people harmed) versus the background (number of people at risk), such that calling attention to the background makes the risk seem smaller. Conversely, the proportional reasoning explanation states that what matters is whether the respondent attends to the proportion, which conveys how small the risk is. In Experiment 1, we made the background more salient via color and bolding; in contrast to the foreground:background salience prediction, this manipulation did not influence participants' risk aversion. In Experiment 2, we separately manipulated whether the foreground and the background were displayed graphically or numerically. In keeping with the proportional reasoning hypothesis, there was an interaction whereby participants given formats that displayed the foreground and background in the same modality (graphs or numbers, thereby making the proportion easier to form) saw the probability as smaller and were less risk averse than participants given the information in different modalities. There was also a main effect of displaying the background graphically, providing some support for foreground:background salience. In total, this work suggests that the proportional reasoning account provides a good explanation of many display effects related to communicating low‐probability risks, although there is some role for foreground:background salience as well. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.