Experimentation on humans and nonhumans

In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.     

Real World Justice

Despite a high and growing global average income, billions of human beings are still condemned to lifelong severe poverty with all its attendant evils of low life expectancy, social exclusion, ill health, illiteracy, dependency, and effective enslavement. We citizens of the rich countries are conditioned to think of this problem as an occasion for assistance. Thanks in part to the rationalizations dispensed by our economists, most of us do not realize how deeply we are implicated, through the new global economic order our states have imposed, in this ongoing catastrophe. My sketch of how we are so implicated follows the argument of my book, World Poverty and Human Rights, but takes the form of a response to the books critics.     

Message from the Indigenous Peoples Pre-Assembly Meeting

This is the message from the meeting of Indigenous Peoples held before the 11th Assembly of the World Council of Churches, which met in Karlsruhe, Germany, in August–September 2022. The Indigenous Peoples Pre-Assembly Meeting gathered participants from 40 different Indigenous nations who called on the WCC and its member churches to support them in their journeys to recover their God-given identities, stating in the message that “the road to reconciliation leads through restoration of justice, because without justice, we cannot stand as equals.”     

The Evaluation of Parental Fitness in Termination of Parental Rights Cases: A Functional-Contextual Perspective

This article highlights issues involved in carrying out evaluations for termination of parental rights cases and suggests caution for mental health professionals doing such evaluations. It argues that current models of parenting that come from the child development and child maltreatment fields are too narrow in their focus to act as a foundation for such evaluations and are often based on research with select groups in our society making them open to bias. Similarly, it is argued that traditional assessment measures are limited in their utility for responding to the kinds of relational and basic care questions asked in such evaluations. A functional-contextual model is offered as an alternative with examples of potentially useful measurement strategies. With such a frame as a starting point, the field might progress to providing more useful information to courts. Future research directions to improve this practice arena are discussed.     

The engineer’s moral right to reputational fairness

This essay explores the issue of the moral rights of engineers. An historical case study is presented in which an accomplished, loyal, senior engineer was apparently wronged as a result of actions taken by his employer in pursuit of legitimate business interests. Belief that the engineer was wronged is justified by showing that what happened to him violated what can validly be termed one of his moral rights as an engineer: the right to reputational fairness. It is then argued that, this right notwithstanding, under certain circumstances it is morally permissible for employers to override it. The paper concludes by identifying two complementary facets of this right, discussing its scope, and indicating what is required of employers obliged to respect it in two types of action contexts. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the History of Technology in Washington, D.C. on October 16, 1993. I am indebted to Stephanie J. Bird, Taft Broome, Deborah Johnson, Carl Mitcham, Walter Vincenti, Vivian Weil, and Caroline Whitbeck for helpful critical comments. Professor of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management and, by courtesy, of Civil Engineering, and in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society, School of Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 94305-2120.