Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of “true” in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of “true” could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms (“proform”, “antecedent”, etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom’s case that “is true” is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian’s argument against deflationism).     

On three arguments against categorical structuralism

Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory.     

Counting distinctions: on the conceptual foundations of Shannon’s information theory

Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or “subobjects”). In “subset logic,” predicates are modeled as subsets of a universe and a predicate applies to an individual if the individual is in the subset. Partitions are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a “distinction” [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u, u′) from the universe U] is dual to an “element”. A predicate modeled by a partition π on U would apply to a distinction if the pair of elements was distinguished by the partition π, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered |U|² pairs from the finite universe. That yields a notion of “logical entropy” for partitions and a “logical information theory.” The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon’s theory gives the average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a conceptual underpinning for Shannon’s theory based on the logical notion of “distinctions.” This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gian-Carlo Rota—mathematician, philosopher, mentor, and friend.     

Indeterminacy,identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered

In this paper I argue that Gareth Evans’ famous proof of the impossibility of de re indeterminate identity fails on a counterpart-theoretic interpretation of the determinacy operators. I attempt to motivate a counterpart-theoretic reading of the determinacy operators and then show that, understood counterpart-theoretically, Evans’ argument is straightforwardly invalid.     

关系推理中信念偏差效应的研究

采用结论评估范式,考察时向和空间关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式,以及心理模型理论对关系推理中信念偏差效应的解释力。研究结果表明,关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式与三段论有所不同,不论是时间推理还是空间推理中都存在信念主效应,但没有发现信念与逻辑的交互作用;心理模型理论不能对关系推理中信念偏差效应作出合理解释。     

同一性地位理论及其扩展模型

Marcia的同一性地位理论及其模型开辟了同一性研究的实证道路。在此基础上产生了诸多扩展模型,主要有Berzonsky的同一性风格模型;Grotevant的同一性探索过程模型;Kerplman的同一性控制模型;Luyckx的四维度模型;Crocetti的三维度模型。该文对这些模型的基本内容、价值与局限进行了简评,并指出了同一性地位理论模型发展的特点及未来趋势。     

Identifiability and Equivalence of GLLIRM Models

The generalized logit–linear item response model (GLLIRM) is a linearly constrained nominal categories model (NCM) that computes the scale and intercept parameters for categories as a weighted sum of basic parameters. This paper addresses the problems of the identifiability of the basic parameters and the equivalence between different GLLIRM models. It is shown that the identifiability of the basic parameters depends on the size and rank of the coefficient matrix of the linear functions. Moreover, two models are observationally equivalent if the product of the respective coefficient matrices has full column rank. Finally, the paper also explores the relations between the parameters of nested models. I would like to express my gratitude to the editor and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. This work was supported by the Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) grant: CCG07-UAM/ESP-1615.     

Coefficients Alpha,Beta, Omega,and the glb: Comments on Sijtsma

There are three fundamental problems in Sijtsma (Psychometrika, 2008): (1) contrary to the name, the glb is not the greatest lower bound of reliability but rather is systematically less than ω _t (McDonald, Test theory: A unified treatment, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1999), (2) we agree with Sijtsma that when considering how well a test measures one concept, α is not appropriate, but recommend ω _t rather than the glb, and (3) the end user needs procedures that are readily available in open source software.     

A confusion of tongues between psychoanalysis and philosophy: Is the controversy over drive versus relational theory a philosophical one?

In recent years the controversy over Drive versus Relational models of the psyche has become entangled in a philosophical controversy over epistemology. Some have argued that the Drive model was a relic of an age of positivistic science, while Relational models are a product of a postmodern condition. This paper argues that the controversy need not be a philosophical one, and that Relational views are not, in fact, a product of postmodernism, nor are they necessarily dependent on a postmodern epistemology. Separating the epistemological from the psychological more carefully may help return the debate to its proper, psychoanalytic domain, and perhaps contribute to a more fruitful dialogue across what, at times, seems like an abyss between Relational views and Drive theory.     

Good vibrations: Analytic process as coupled oscillations

This paper develops a new model for the action of psychoanalysis based on concepts from non-linear dynamics (chaos theory and complexity theory). It shows that the analyst–analysand couple may be conceptualized as a new configuration with its own properties that promote complex development in both members of the couple. These developments are an emergent result of the formation of the analyst–analysand couple and are significantly independent of the particular content of the manifest interaction of the couple. The well-studied phenomena of coupled oscillators suggest the specific features of the analysand–analyst interaction that are likely to be most important in conceptualizing analytic change. The model has substantial clinical applications since efforts to arrange for a coupled oscillator system that is central to it are distinct from many of the traditional considerations associated with creating an analytic situation.