Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy

Although decision makers often consult other people's opinions to improve their decisions, they fail to do so optimally. One main obstacle to incorporating others' opinions efficiently is one's own opinion. We theorize that decision makers could improve their performance by suspending their own judgment. In three studies, participants used others' opinions to estimate uncertain quantities (the caloric value of foods). In the full‐view condition, participants could form independent estimates prior to receiving others' opinions, whereas participants in the blindfold condition could not form prior opinions. We obtained an intriguing blindfold effect. In all studies, the blindfolded participants provided more accurate estimates than did the full‐view participants. Several policy‐capturing measures indicated that the advantage of the blindfolded participants was due to their unbiased weighting of others' opinions. The full‐view participants, in contrast, adhered to their prior opinion and thus failed to exploit the information contained in others' opinions. Moreover, in all three studies, the blindfolded participants were not cognizant of their advantage and expressed less confidence in their estimates than did the full‐view participants. The results are discussed in relation to theories of opinion revision and group decision making. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Updating: A psychologically basic situation of probability revision

The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992 Katsuno, A. and Mendelzon, A. 1992. “On the difference between updating a knowledge base and revising it”. In Belief revision, Edited by: Gärdenfors, P. 183–203. Cambridge, , UK: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), in which the universe is evolving. In that case the structure of the universe has definitely been transformed and the revision message conveys information on the resulting universe. The second part of the paper presents four experiments based on the Monty Hall puzzle that aim to show that updating is a natural frame for individuals to revise their beliefs.     

The effects of source trustworthiness and inference type on human belief revision

We investigated whether people revise their beliefs as a function of inference type or source trustworthiness. By doing so we aimed to find out if belief revision is better explained by mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002 Johnson-Laird, P. N. and Byrne, R. M. J. 2002. Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109: 211–228. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) or by a conditional probability view (Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003 Over, D. E. and Evans, J. St. B. T. 2003. The probability of conditionals: The psychological evidence. Mind & Language, 18: 340–358. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Oaksford & Chater, 2001 Oaksford, M. and Chater, N. 2001. The probabilistic approach to human reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Science, 5: 349–357. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We used modified modes ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT) problems in which the first two premises were uttered by persons with varying degrees of trustworthiness. A third statement was presented as a fact and established inconsistency in the set of propositions. The participants' task was to indicate which of the first two premises they believed more after receiving the fact. We found that the belief in the conditional premise dropped significantly when this premise was stated by a low- rather than a high-trustworthy source. Moreover we found that the conditional premise was believed more in MT than in MP problems. Both findings are best explained by the conditional probability hypothesis (e.g., Evans et al., 2003 Evans, J. St. B. T., Handley, S. J. and Over, D. E. 2003. Conditionals and conditional probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, : 321–335. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]).     

Katz’s Revisability Paradox Dissolved

Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: noncontradiction, universal revisability and pragmatic ordering. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are statements within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as properties of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine.     

The revisionist's rubric: conceptual engineering and the discontinuity objection

This paper is about conceptual engineering (CE). Specifically, it discusses a common objection to CE, which I call the Discontinuity Objection. According to the Discontinuity Objection, CE leads to problematic discontinuities in subject and/or inquiry – making it philosophically uninteresting or irrelevant. I argue that a conceptual engineer can dismiss the Discontinuity Objection by showing that the pre-engineering concept persists through the proposed changes. In other words, the Discontinuity Objection does not apply if the proposal involves identity-preserving changes. Two existing views on identity-preserving changes are considered and rejected. I then argue that an identity-preserving conceptual change is one that allows the concept to continue to perform its function. A concept’s function is its job, its point and purpose, its role in a conceptual repertoire. In a slogan: Preserve a concept’s function, and you preserve the concept itself; preserve the concept, and you preserve the subject. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of this view.     

My partner’s stories: relationships between personal and vicarious life stories within romantic couples

In this paper, we examined relationships and differences between personal and vicarious life stories, i.e., the life stories one knows of others. Personal and vicarious life stories of both members of 51 young couples (102 participants), based on McAdams’ Life Story Interview (2008), were collected. We found significant positive relationships between participants’ personal and vicarious life stories on agency and communion themes and redemption sequences. We also found significant positive relationships between participants’ vicarious life stories about their partners and those partners’ personal life stories on agency and communion, but not redemption. Furthermore, these relationships were not explained by similarity between couples’ two personal life stories, as no associations were found between couples’ personal stories on agency, communion and redemption. These results suggest that the way we construct the vicarious life stories of close others may reflect how we construct our personal life stories.     

A mechanism for reducing delay discounting by altering temporal attention

Rewards that are not immediately available are discounted compared to rewards that are immediately available. The more a person discounts a delayed reward, the more likely that person is to have a range of behavioral problems, including clinical disorders. This latter observation has motivated the search for interventions that reduce discounting. One surprisingly simple method to reduce discounting is an "explicit-zero" reframing that states default or null outcomes. Reframing a classical discounting choice as "something now but nothing later" versus "nothing now but more later" decreases discount rates. However, it is not clear how this "explicit-zero" framing intervention works. The present studies delineate and test two possible mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. One mechanism proposes that the explicit-zero framing creates the impression of an improving sequence, thereby enhancing the present value of the delayed reward. A second possible mechanism posits an increase in attention allocation to temporally distant reward representations. In four experiments, we distinguish between these two hypothesized mechanisms and conclude that the temporal attention hypothesis is superior for explaining our results. We propose a model of temporal attention whereby framing affects intertemporal preferences by modifying present bias.     

Self-regulation during a single performance episode: Mood-as-information in the absence of formal feedback

This investigation used a daily diary methodology to examine goal revision and effort allocation processes over a single, 2-weeks performance episode in which individuals prepared for a course exam. Growth curve modeling revealed that daily goal exhibited a curvilinear trend in which it was stable and relatively high at the beginning of the time period, but rapidly declined as the exam approached. Daily effort exhibited a trend opposite of the goal trend, remaining low and relatively stable at the beginning and increasingly rapidly as the exam approached. Current mood predicted daily goal revision, with positive mood being positively related to goal revision and negative mood being negatively related to goal revision. The traits of behavioral activation system (BAS) sensitivity and behavioral inhibition system (BIS) sensitivity moderated within-person relationships of positive and negative mood with goal revision. Simultaneous and lagged relationships among mood, goals, and daily effort were also examined.     

Seven-month-olds detect ordinal numerical relationships within temporal sequences

Previous evidence has shown that 11-month-olds represent ordinal relations between purely numerical values, whereas younger infants require a confluence of numerical and non-numerical cues. In this study, we show that when multiple featural cues (i.e., color and shape) are provided, 7-month-olds detect reversals in the ordinal direction of numerical sequences relying solely on number when non-numerical quantitative cues are controlled. These results provide evidence for the influence of featural information and multiple cue integration on infants’ proneness to detect ordinal numerical information.