Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

帮助情境中的预测偏差:成因与应对

理解帮助情境中社会性判断的特征对促成高效率和满意度的互动具有深远的现实意义.帮助与被帮助者因占据不同角色, 对帮助可能性,质量,心理感受和偏好方式等存在不对称的知觉, 进而在预测对方心理与行为时发生偏差, 可能阻碍合作的产生和亲社会行为的传递.此类偏差具有必然性, 受个体认知策略局限性和社会性因素的影响, 并可根据其成因有的放矢地应对.未来可以探讨帮助发生的媒介,双方的社会关系以及帮助的类型与偏差的关系.     

Causal judgments about empirical information in an interrupted time series design

Empirical information available for causal judgment in everyday life tends to take the form of quasi-experimental designs, lacking control groups, more than the form of contingency information that is usually presented in experiments. Stimuli were presented in which values of an outcome variable for a single individual were recorded over six time periods, and an intervention was introduced between the fifth and sixth time periods. Participants judged whether and how much the intervention affected the outcome. With numerical stimulus information, judgments were higher for a pre-intervention profile in which all values were the same than for pre-intervention profiles with any other kind of trend. With graphical stimulus information, judgments were more sensitive to trends, tending to be higher when an increase after the intervention was preceded by a decreasing series than when it was preceded by an increasing series ending on the same value at the fifth time period. It is suggested that a feature-analytic model, in which the salience of different features of information varies between presentation formats, may provide the best prospect of explaining the results.     

The effect of feedback on children’s metacognitive judgments: a heuristic account

In three experiments, we investigated whether the feedback effect on the accuracy of children’s metacognitive judgments results from an improvement in monitoring processes or the use of the Anchoring-and-Adjustment heuristic. Experiment 1 revealed that adding feedback increased the accuracy of young children’s (aged 4, 6, and 8 years) memory prediction. In Experiment 2, the influence of an external anchor on children’s metacognitive judgment was established. Finally, in Experiment 3, two memory tasks that differed in terms of difficulty were administered. Participants were randomly assigned to an anchoring (high/low/no anchor) and a feedback (feedback/no feedback) condition. Results demonstrated that children in the feedback condition adjusted their predictions toward the feedback, regardless of the task’s difficulty. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that external information provided by feedback is used as an anchor for judgment. This interpretation is strengthened by the correlation found between the two scores computed to assess participants’ susceptibility to anchoring and feedback effects, which indicates that children who are more sensitive to the anchoring effect are also more sensitive to the feedback effect.     

Boys,girls, and the school cultural environment: Teachers’ judgment and students’ values

Due to gender socialization, girls are more likely to endorse self-transcendence values (e.g., helping people) compared to boys, whereas boys are more likely to endorse self-enhancement values (e.g., wanting to be in charge) compared to girls. In two studies, we investigated teachers’ judgment regarding the display of these values in school and students’ endorsement of the self-transcendence and self-enhancement values in two contexts: home and school. In Study 1 (N = 240), teachers evaluated a student perceived as strongly endorsing the self-transcendence values more positively compared to a student perceived as strongly endorsing the self-enhancement values, regardless of the student’s gender. In Study 2 (N = 151), boys endorsed the self-enhancement values more than the self-transcendence values at home, whereas the opposite occurred in the school context. Girls did not vary across contexts, endorsing the self-transcendence values more than the self-enhancement values in both contexts. Possible consequences on boys’ school-related outcomes are discussed.     

False consensus in situational judgment tests: What would others do?

We introduce an alternative response instruction to reduce the fakability of situational judgment tests. This novel instruction is based on the false consensus effect, a robust social psychological bias whereby people infer that the majority of other people’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors are aligned with their own. In four studies, including both field and laboratory data (total N = 882), we demonstrate that participants show a false consensus bias when asked what others would do in situational judgment tests. Furthermore, the situational judgment test based on the false consensus effect turned out to relatively difficult to be fake, and produced scores that were meaningfully correlated with conceptually related traits, as well as both self-reported and behavioral outcomes.     

员工非伦理行为如何招致同事攻击:道义公正视角

通过整合理性判断与道义公正模型,聚焦非伦理行为实施者被同事攻击的现象,提出员工的非伦理行为导致同事道义不公正,进而引发同事的攻击行为。并且,这个过程分别受到伦理领导的正向影响和任务互依性的负向影响。通过分析265组来自浙江省一家大型制造企业一线员工的双点数据,结果表明同事道义不公正在员工非伦理行为与其被同事攻击之间起到了中介作用;伦理领导正向调节了非伦理行为对同事道义不公正的影响,即伦理领导增强了员工非伦理行为对同事道义不公正的正向作用,从而导致同事攻击行为的产生;任务互依性负向调节了同事道义不公正与攻击行为之间的正向关系,并且减弱了同事道义不公正在员工非伦理行为与攻击行为之间的中介作用。研究结果为控制和预防职场非伦理行为提供了理论依据和实践启示。     

Evaluating Effort: Influences of Evaluation Mode on Judgments of Task‐specific Efforts

The claim that humans adapt their actions in ways that avoid effortful processing (whether cognitive or physical) is a staple of various theories of human behavior. Although much work has been carried out focusing on the determinants of such behaviors, less attention has been given to how individuals evaluate effort. In the current set of experiments, we utilized the general evaluability theory to examine the evaluability of effort by examining subjective value functions across different evaluation modes. Individuals judged the anticipated effort of four task‐specific efforts indexed by stimulus rotation, items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation across joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single evaluation modes (i.e., judged in isolation). General evaluability theory hypothesizes that highly evaluable attributes should be consistently evaluated (i.e., demonstrate similar subjective value functions) between the two modes. Across six experiments, we demonstrate that the perceived effort associated with items to be remembered, weight to be lifted, and stimulus degradation can be considered relatively evaluable, while the effort associated with stimulus rotation may be relatively inevaluable. Results are discussed within the context of subjective evaluation, internal reference information, and strategy selection. In addition, methodological implications of evaluation modes are considered. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reconciling Compensatory and Noncompensatory Strategies of Cue Weighting: A Causal Model Approach

When forming a judgment about any unknown item, people must draw inferences from information that is already known. This paper examines causal relationships between cues as a relevant factor influencing how people determine the amount of weight to place on each piece of available evidence. We propose that people draw from their beliefs about specific causal relationships between cues when determining how much weight to place on those cues, and that understanding this process can help reconcile differences between predictions of compensatory and lexicographic heuristic strategies. As causal relationships change, different cues become more or less important. Across three experiments, we find support for the use of causal models in determining cue weights, but leave open the possibility that they work in concert with other strategies as well. We conclude by discussing relative strengths and weaknesses of the causal model approach relative to existing models, and suggest areas for future research. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.