From the clarity of ideas to the validity of judgments: Kant's farewell to epistemic perfectionism

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity.     

道德判断中心理状态和事件因果关系的作用:兼对道德判断双加工过程理论的检验

考察青少年儿童和成人在道德判断中利用心理状态和事件因果关系信息的差异,并验证道德判断双加工过程理论.以道德判断中“行为坏的”程度和“应担负的道德责任程度”作为判断问题类型,共有10～11岁和13～15岁的青少年儿童及大学生各120名,完成道德判断测试任务.结果表明在不同的道德判断问题类型下,事件中他人愿望和信念、因果关系信息的作用模式是不同的,支持道德判断双加工过程理论.10～11岁儿童和13～15岁青少年在判断行为坏的程度时,利用心理状态信息和因果关系信息与成人类似.在判断应担负的道德责任程度时,10～11岁儿童更注重行为结果,并且不能综合应用心理状态信息和事件的因果关系信息.13～15岁青少年的道德判断中心理状态信息和事件因果关系信息的作用与成人的情况类似,但在进行应担负的道德责任程度判断时,还不能融合信念与因果关系信息进行道德判断.研究结果为道德判断双加工过程理论提供了支持,而且表明从儿童青少年到成人,利用心理状态和因果关系信息进行道德判断存在不断发展和成熟的过程.     

A group construal account of drop-in-the-bucket thinking in policy preference and moral judgment

Decisions, both moral and mundane, about saving individuals or resources at risk are often influenced not only by numbers saved and lost, but also by proportions of groups saved and lost. Consider choosing between a program that saves 60 of 240 lives at risk and one that saves 50 of 100. The first option maximizes absolute number saved; the second, proportion saved. In two studies, we show that the influence of proportions on such decisions depends on how items at risk are mentally represented. In particular, we show that proportions have greater influence on people's decisions to the extent that the items at risk are construed as forming groups, as opposed to distinct individuals. Construal was manipulated by means of animated displays in which resources at risk moved either independently (promoting individual construal) or jointly (promoting group construal). Results support the hypothesis that (a) decision makers form mental representations which vary in the degree to which resources at risk are construed as groups versus individuals and (b) construal of resources as groups promotes the influence of proportions on decisions and moral judgments.     

Moral signals, public outrage, and immaterial harms

Public outrage is often triggered by “immaterially” harmful acts (i.e., acts with relatively negligible consequences). A well-known example involves corporate salaries and perks: they generate public outrage yet their financial cost is relatively minor. The present research explains this paradox by appealing to a person-centered approach to moral judgment. Strong moral reactions can occur when relatively harmless acts provide highly diagnostic information about moral character. Studies 1a and 1b first demonstrate dissociation between moral evaluations of persons and their actions—although violence toward a human was viewed as a more blameworthy act than violence toward an animal, the latter was viewed as more revealing of bad moral character. Study 2 then shows that person-centered cues directly influence moral judgments—participants preferred to hire a more expensive CEO when the alternative candidate requested a frivolous perk as part of his compensation package, an effect mediated by the informativeness of his request.     

Resources versus respect: Social judgments based on targets' power and status positions

In two experiments, we investigate how individuals' levels of power and status interact to determine how they are perceived by others. We find that power and status have similar, positive, effects on judged dominance. We also find that power has a negative effect on perceived warmth, but status moderates this “power penalty”: high power without status is associated with low warmth, but power with status is judged warm. Consequently, we find high status individuals, regardless of power level, are perceived positively - dominant and warm - whereas high power-low status individuals are judged most negatively — dominant and cold (Experiments 1 and 2). As a result, perceivers expect positive interactions with high status individuals, but negative interactions with high power, low status individuals (Experiment 2). These findings provide insight into power and status social judgments, and further our understanding of similarities and differences between these distinct, yet related, constructs.     

Cost-Benefit Analysis Mediation of the Relationship Between Sensation Seeking and Risk Behavior

Risk behavior during adolescence results in substantial morbidity and mortality. Sensation seeking consistently relates to engagement in risk behavior, but the psychological mediators of this relationship remain unclear. The current study demonstrates that adolescents’ judgments of the costs versus benefits of risk behavior were a significant mediator of this relationship. Participants were 406 racially and ethnically diverse adolescents ages 12-17 (M = 14.5, SD = 1.7; 48.3% female) who participated in a larger multi-site investigation of personality and neurocognitive predictors of risk behavior. Data were collected via self-report in a single laboratory session. Mediation of the relationship of sensation seeking to risk behavior was tested using structural equation modeling. Results indicated that higher levels of sensation seeking predicted weighing the benefits of risk behavior higher than its costs, which in turn predicted higher levels of risk behavior. Implications of these findings for understanding mechanisms underlying adolescents’ risk behavior and directions for future research are discussed.     

认知负荷与编码方式影响小学数学学业不良生的前瞻记忆及其成分

通过两个实验探讨认知负荷对小学数学学业不良生前瞻记忆及其成分的影响, 以及是否可以通过执行意向编码提高其前瞻记忆及其成分的成绩。实验1结果显示数学学业不良生前瞻记忆、前瞻成分及回溯成分正确率显著低于数学学优生, 高认知负荷条件前瞻记忆、前瞻成分及回溯成分的正确率显著低于低认知负荷条件; 实验2结果显示执行意向编码条件下, 数学学业不良生前瞻记忆成绩显著好于标准编码条件, 前瞻成分和回溯成分的正确率高于标准编码条件。结果表明数学学业不良生前瞻记忆及其成分表现差于数学学优生; 无论认知负荷高低, 执行意向编码均可通过提升前瞻成分和回溯成分改善数学学业不良生前瞻记忆表现。     

For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment

People often judge it unacceptable to directly harm a person, even when this is necessary to produce an overall positive outcome, such as saving five other lives. We demonstrate that similar judgments arise when people consider damage to owned objects. In two experiments, participants considered dilemmas where saving five inanimate objects required destroying one. Participants judged this unacceptable when it required violating another’s ownership rights, but not otherwise. They also judged that sacrificing another’s object was less acceptable as a means than as a side-effect; judgments did not depend on whether property damage involved personal force. These findings inform theories of moral decision-making. They show that utilitarian judgment can be decreased without physical harm to persons, and without personal force. The findings also show that the distinction between means and side-effects influences the acceptability of damaging objects, and that ownership impacts utilitarian moral judgment.     

Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory

Evaluations of analogous situations are an important source for our moral intuitions. A puzzling recent set of findings in experiments exploring transfer effects between intuitions about moral dilemmas has demonstrated a striking asymmetry. Transfer often occurred with a specific ordering of moral dilemmas, but not when the sequence was reversed. In this article we present a new theory of transfer between moral intuitions that focuses on two components of moral dilemmas, namely their causal structure and their default evaluations. According to this theory, transfer effects are expected when the causal models underlying the considered dilemmas allow for a mapping of the highlighted aspect of the first scenario onto the causal structure of the second dilemma, and when the default evaluations of the two dilemmas substantially differ. The theory’s key predictions for the occurrence and the direction of transfer effects between two moral dilemmas are tested in five experiments with various variants of moral dilemmas from different domains. A sixth experiment tests the predictions of the theory for how the target action in the moral dilemmas is represented.