Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertainty-monitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with non-human animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities.     

Behaviors speak louder than explicit reports: Implicit metacognition in 2.5‐year‐old children

Recent research has shown that children as young as age 3.5 show behavioral responses to uncertainty although they are not able to report it explicitly. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that some form of metacognition is already available to guide children's decisions before the age of 3. Two groups of 2.5‐ and 3.5‐year‐old children were asked to complete a forced‐choice perceptual identification test and to explicitly rate their confidence in each decision. Moreover, participants had the opportunity to ask for a cue to help them decide if their response was correct. Our results revealed that all children asked for a cue more often after an incorrect response than after a correct response in the forced‐choice identification test, indicating a good ability to implicitly introspect on the results of their cognitive operations. On the contrary, none of these children displayed metacognitive sensitivity when making explicit confidence judgments, consistent with previous evidence of later development of explicit metacognition. Critically, our findings suggest that implicit metacognition exists much earlier than typically assumed, as early as 2.5 years of age.     

工作场所不文明行为受害者向实施者反转的机制

梳理和归纳了导致工作场所不文明行为的受害者反转为实施者的组织事件, 包括团队层次的不作为领导行为和领导不文明行为以及个体层次的同事不文明行为。借助事件系统理论对受害者反转为实施者的认知过程进行了说明, 如果组织事件的强度足够引起受害者的控制化信息加工, 则其可能改变自己的原有行为进而实施工作场所不文明行为; 根据社会信息加工理论, 受害者的控制化信息加工可以通过三条路径实现, 即学习过程, 归因过程和道德判断过程。建议未来研究进一步探讨情绪和认知两者在不文明行为受害者角色反转中的作用, 以及工作领域之外的因素在其中的作用, 并且能够使用日记研究法进行验证; 未来研究还可以探讨工作场所不文明行为的旁观者反转为实施者的机制。     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Getting scarred and winning lotteries: effects of exemplar cuing and statistical format on imagining low‐probability events

Three experiments tested the exemplar cuing and frequency format accounts of how the ‘imaginability’ of low‐probability events is enhanced. The experiments manipulated imaginability by varying the statistics used to describe negative (e.g. being scarred as a result of laser surgery) and positive (e.g. winning a lottery) low‐probability events. The results strongly supported the frequency format account, whereby imaginability is enhanced through the use of frequency formats for conveying statistical information (e.g. 20 out of 2000 as opposed to 0.01%). However, only limited support was found for exemplar cuing (EC) theory. Overall the results support the claim that the imaginability of outcomes plays a key role in thinking about low‐probability events, but question the mechanisms specified by EC theory for mediating such effects. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Portrait of a narcissist: Manifestations of narcissism in physical appearance

Narcissism is characterized in part by an acute concern for one’s appearance. Despite this fundamental aspect of narcissism, little is known about whether narcissism is manifested in features of physical appearance. Can you tell if someone is narcissistic just by looking at them? Our results indicate that snap judgments of narcissism based on full-body photographs are at least as accurate as snap judgments of any of the big five personality traits. Narcissists are more likely to wear expensive, flashy clothing, have an organized, neat appearance requiring a lot of preparation, and (in females) wear makeup and show cleavage. Furthermore, observers’ judgments correlate with the presence of these cues, suggesting that they are drawing on the correct information when making their judgments. Finally, observers’ judgments are associated with three of the four facets of narcissism and capture the unique constellation of personality traits typical of narcissists (i.e., high extraversion and low agreeableness). These findings suggest that physical appearance reflects narcissists’ personality, preoccupation with good looks, and desire to be the center of attention, and serves as a vehicle with which to promote their status.     

Information integration in multiple cue judgment: a division of labor hypothesis

There is considerable evidence that judgment is constrained to additive integration of information. The authors propose an explanation of why serial and additive cognitive integration can produce accurate multiple cue judgment both in additive and non-additive environments in terms of an adaptive division of labor between multiple representations. It is hypothesized that, whereas the additive, independent linear effect of each cue can be explicitly abstracted and integrated by a serial, additive judgment process, a variety of sophisticated task properties, like non-additive cue combination, non-linear relations, and inter-cue correlation, are carried implicitly by exemplar memory. Three experiments investigating the effect of additive versus non-additive cue combination verify the predicted shift in cognitive representations as a function of the underlying combination rule.     

Moral Feedback and Motivation: Revisiting the Undermining Effect

Social psychologists have evidence that evaluative feedback on others’ choices sometimes has unwelcome negative effects on hearers’ motivation. Holroyd’s article (Holroyd J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 10:267–278, 2007) draws attention to one such result, the undermining effect, that should help to challenge moral philosophers’ complacency about blame and praise. The cause for concern is actually greater than she indicates, both because there are multiple kinds of negative effect on hearer motivation, and because these are not, as she hopes, reliably counteracted by implicit features of praise and blame. The communicative ideal that she articulates does point us in the right direction, but it requires further elaboration. Once it is spelled out, we find that realizing this ideal, in light of the empirical research, requires rethinking the role of verdict-like judgments within moral feedback.

Turning failures into successes: a methodological shortcoming in empirical research on surrogate accuracy

Decision making for incompetent patients is a much-discussed topic in bioethics. According to one influential decision making standard, the substituted judgment standard, a surrogate decision maker ought to make the decision that the incompetent patient would have made, had he or she been competent. Empirical research has been conducted in order to find out whether surrogate decision makers are sufficiently good at doing their job, as this is defined by the substituted judgment standard. This research investigates to what extent surrogates are able to predict what the patient would have preferred in the relevant circumstances. In this paper we address a methodological shortcoming evident in a significant number of studies. The mistake consists in categorizing responses that only express uncertainty as predictions that the patient would be positive to treatment, on the grounds that the clinical default is to provide treatment unless it is refused. We argue that this practice is based on confusion and that it risks damaging the research on surrogate accuracy.

D. Z. Phillips and reasonable belief

As an illustration of what Phillips called the “heterogeneity of sense,” this essay concentrates on differences in what is meant by a “reason for belief.” Sometimes saying that a belief is reasonable simply commends the belief’s unquestioned acceptance as a part of what we understand as a sensible outlook. Here the standard picture of justifying truth claims on evidential grounds breaks down; and it also breaks down in cases of fundamental moral and religious disagreement, where the basic beliefs that we hold affect our conception of what counts as a reliable ground of judgment. Phillips accepts the resultant variations in our conceptions of rational judgment as a part of logic, just as Wittgenstein did. All objective means of determining the truth or falsity of an assertion presume some underlying conceptual agreement about what counts as good judgment. This means that the possibility of objective justification is limited. But no pernicious relativism results from this view, for as Wittgenstein said, “After reason comes persuasion.” There is, moreover, a non-objective criterion of sorts in the moral and religious requirement that one be able to live with one’s commitments. In such cases, good judgment is still possible, but it differs markedly from the standard model of making rational inferences.