Was Life Better in the “Good Old Days”? Intertemporal Judgments of Life Satisfaction

Intertemporal judgments are paired comparisons between the present time and some other time (e.g. “How satisfied are you with your life these days compared to five years ago?”). These judgments can provide evidence on the question, “Is life satisfaction in developed nations increasing, decreasing, or remaining constant?” This paper provides the first review of intertemporal judgments of life satisfaction, and reports a meta-analysis of 71 such studies from 9 developed countries. Results show that in every survey that asks people how happy their own lives are now compared to some past time, a majority says they are happier now than in the past. The meta-analysis also shows that this question must be carefully distinguished from asking about quality of life of the average person, which shows a majority believing that life was better for the “average person” in the past. These two beliefs are logically inconsistent, since the average respondent actually says their satisfaction is higher now. We consider several sources of bias that may influence these results, including cognitive processing heuristics, self-appraisal (desirability) bias, and information bias in media news.     

现象学与逻辑学

无论在胡塞尔思想中还是在海德格尔思想中,现象学与逻辑学的关系都构成一个核心问题。本文首先再现了胡塞尔前后期在此问题上的相关研究,并指出他的超越论逻辑学的要点在于对本质的前逻辑直观,也是最有可能为逻辑学提供哲学支撑的因素。其次,在海德格尔方面,根据律概念成为讨论现象学与逻辑学关系的切入点,由此导出他的“存在理解”、“无蔽”和“自由”的概念解释。他们的共同点在于：把形式逻辑看作陈述逻辑,并试图用前谓词判断的哲学逻辑学来为它奠基。     

Individualization,singularization and e-ducation (between indifference and responsibility)

It is commonly supposed that acting and judging ought to rest on a community-wide, binding definition of what is right and respectable, that is, a substantial consensus. Such consensus is thought possible only when we engage shared values and criteria, when we use knowledge and abilities appropriated through education. On this view, education deals with the reproduction of consensus and, hence, with the passing on of traditions and norms. On my view, we need to question the framework in which the debate over social erosion takes place. I take a cue from remarks of Hannah Arendt and question the presupposition that acting and judging in a right way requires both common values and the appropriation of what we call knowledge of criteria and principles. I do not suggest that knowledge has nothing to do with acting and judging. Rather, I wish to draw attention to (Arendt's concept of) thinking as a condition for acting and judging. Here, thinking has nothing to do with knowledge or with appropriation. Rather, it has to do with living-together with somebody. Educa-tion for thinking is, then, a public thinking which leads out of the serf and into communal responsibility. On this treatment, the educator is to be a faithful guardian of this calling out into responsibility.     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Turning failures into successes: a methodological shortcoming in empirical research on surrogate accuracy

Decision making for incompetent patients is a much-discussed topic in bioethics. According to one influential decision making standard, the substituted judgment standard, a surrogate decision maker ought to make the decision that the incompetent patient would have made, had he or she been competent. Empirical research has been conducted in order to find out whether surrogate decision makers are sufficiently good at doing their job, as this is defined by the substituted judgment standard. This research investigates to what extent surrogates are able to predict what the patient would have preferred in the relevant circumstances. In this paper we address a methodological shortcoming evident in a significant number of studies. The mistake consists in categorizing responses that only express uncertainty as predictions that the patient would be positive to treatment, on the grounds that the clinical default is to provide treatment unless it is refused. We argue that this practice is based on confusion and that it risks damaging the research on surrogate accuracy.

Ambiguous comparative judgment: Fuzzy set model and data analysis

Abstract:  This paper proposed two types of fuzzy set models for ambiguous comparative judgments, which did not always hold transitivity and comparability properties. The first type of model was a fuzzy theoretical extension of the additive difference model for preference that was used to explain ambiguous preference strength. The second was a fuzzy logic model for explaining ambiguous preference in which preference strength was bounded, such as a probability measure. In both models, multi-attribute weighting parameters and all attribute values were assumed to be asymmetric fuzzy L-R numbers. For each model, a method of parameter estimation using fuzzy regression analysis was proposed. Numerical examples were also provided for comparison. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the proposed models were discussed.     

Children’s social cognition about proactive aggression

In this study, 6- and 9-year-old children (N = 258) observed two instances of proactive aggression (one relational and the other direct aggression) that were committed by members of a group toward out-group members. Participants were either members of the group or independent observers. Analyses of participants’ social cognition about the aggressor and the aggression (cause of aggression, moral judgment of aggression, attitudes toward the aggressor, and exclusion of the aggressor) indicated that, overall, group members were more positive toward aggressors than were independent observers. Although intergroup competition was perceived to be the cause of the aggression, participants disapproved of both types of aggression (especially direct aggression), disapproval increased with age, and girls disapproved of relational aggression more than did boys. Group members’ social cognition about the aggressor and the aggression comprised a coherent cognitive process for both types of aggression, but the observers’ process was simpler and differed by aggression type.     

Unconscious task set priming with phonological and semantic tasks

Whether unconscious stimuli can modulate the preparation of a cognitive task is still controversial. Using a backward masking paradigm, we investigated whether the modulation could be observed even if the prime was made unconscious in 100% of the trials. In two behavioral experiments, subjects were instructed to initiate a phonological or semantic task on an upcoming word, following an explicit instruction and an unconscious prime. When the SOA between prime and instruction was sufficiently long (84 ms), primes congruent with the task set instruction led to speedier responses than incongruent primes. In the other condition (36 ms), no task set priming was observed. Repetition priming had the opposite tendency, suggesting the observed task set facilitation cannot be ascribed solely to perceptual repetition priming. Our results therefore confirm that unconscious information can modulate cognitive control for currently active task sets, providing sufficient time is available before the conscious decision.     

Reflection and reasoning in moral judgment

While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered a scenario involving incest between consenting adult siblings, a scenario known for eliciting emotionally driven condemnation that resists reasoned persuasion. Here, we manipulated two factors related to moral reasoning: argument strength and deliberation time. These factors interacted in a manner consistent with moral reasoning: A strong argument defending the incestuous behavior was more persuasive than a weak argument, but only when increased deliberation time encouraged subjects to reflect.     

Conflict detection during moral decision-making: evidence for deontic reasoners’ utilitarian sensitivity

Moral dilemmas often force us to decide between deontological (harming others is wrong) and utilitarian (harming others can be acceptable depending on the consequences) considerations. Cognitive scientists have shown that utilitarian responders typically engage demanding deliberate thinking to override a conflicting intuitive deontological response. A key question is whether deontic responders also take utilitarian considerations into account and detect that there are conflicting responses at play. The present study addressed this issue by contrasting people's processing of moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions. Results showed that deontic responders were slower and less confident about their decision when solving the conflict (vs. no-conflict) dilemmas. This suggests that they are considering both deontic and utilitarian aspects of their decision and indicates that a deontic decision is more informed and less oblivious than it might appear.