The Effect of Information Quantity on Distinctive Accuracy and Normativity of Personality Trait Judgments

Information quantity is an important moderator of personality judgment accuracy. Some evidence suggests that the amount of available information is positively related to accuracy. The current study utilized the social accuracy model to investigate the effects of differences in thin slices of information quantity on the distinctive accuracy and normativity of personality trait judgments. It was hypothesized that distinctive accuracy and normativity would increase as information quantity increased. Participants were 431 individuals who participated in an online study that varied the length of stimulus target observations (30 seconds, 1 minute, 3 minutes, and 5 minutes), after which judges rated targets using other‐report measures of the Big Five personality traits. For all traits combined, significant levels of accuracy were found for all observation lengths, but distinctive accuracy and normativity did not increase as video length increased. Findings varied for individual traits. For distinctive accuracy, there was a linear increase with information quantity for Extraversion and a non‐linear relationship for Conscientiousness, while there was a linear decrease for Openness. For normativity, there was a linear increase with information quantity for Agreeableness and a non‐linear relationship for Conscientiousness. There are important differences in how observation length affects distinctive accuracy and normativity for different personality traits. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

The loss‐bet paradox: Actuaries,accountants, and other numerate people rate numerically inferior gambles as superior

Psychologists have convincingly demonstrated that preferences are not always stable and, instead, are often “constructed” based on information available in the judgment or decision context. In 4 studies with experts (accountants and actuaries in Studies 1 and 2, respectively) and a diverse lay population (Studies 3 and 4), the evidence was consistent with the highly numerate being more likely than the less numerate to construct their preferences by rating a numerically inferior bet as superior (i.e., the bets effect). Thus, the effect generalizes beyond a college student sample, and preference construction differs by numeracy. Contrary to prior thinking about preference construction, however, high expertise and high ability (rather than low) consistently related to the paradoxical phenomenon. Results across studies including Study 3's experimental modifications of the task supported the hypothesized number comparison process (and not a lack of expertise with monetary outcomes and probabilities or numeracy‐related differences in attention to numbers) as the effect's underlying cause. The bets effect was not attenuated by Study 4's instructions to think about what would be purchased with bet winnings. Task results combined with free‐response coding supported the notion that highly numerate participants have a systematic and persistent inclination for doing simple and complex number operations that drive their judgments (even after controlling for nonnumeric intelligence). Implications for 3 types of dual‐process theories are discussed. The results were inconsistent with default‐interventionist theories, consistent or unclear with respect to fuzzy trace theory, and consistent with interactive theories.     

Age differences in moral judgment: Older adults are more deontological than younger adults

In 2 studies, an older and a younger age group morally evaluated dilemmas contrasting a deontological judgment (do not harm others) against a utilitarian judgment (do what is best for the majority). Previous research suggests that deontological moral judgments are often underpinned by affective reactions and utilitarian moral judgments by deliberative thinking. Separately, research on the psychology of aging has shown that affect plays a more prominent role in the judgments and decision making of older (vs. younger) adults. Yet age remains a largely overlooked factor in moral judgment research. Here, we therefore investigated whether older adults would make more deontological judgments on the basis of experiencing different affective reactions to moral dilemmas as compared with younger adults. Results from 2 experiments indicated that older adults made significantly more deontological moral judgments. Mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between age and making more deontological moral judgments is partly explained by older adults exhibiting significantly more negative affective reactions and having more morally idealistic beliefs as compared with younger adults.     

直觉还是推理,道德判断如何形成?

道德判断形成的机制一直存在争议,许多研究者通过实证研究来探索诸因素对道德判断的影响,这有助于理清不同因素的作用,但却难以构建道德判断形成的理论框架。文章系统性地回顾和总结了道德判断形成的五个经典理论模型及其相关理论,并结合实证研究的成果梳理了道德判断形成中理性、情绪、认知、直觉和推理之间的关系。基于此,构建了以直觉和推理为基本路径,基于规则的认知和情绪为调节因素的道德判断形成的理论框架。现有的理论模型和实证研究在该框架下均可以的得到较好的解释。同时,根据该框架,建议未来的实证研究中应当注重对影响因素的分类以及对实验情景的控制。     

Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertainty-monitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with non-human animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities.     

Behaviors speak louder than explicit reports: Implicit metacognition in 2.5‐year‐old children

Recent research has shown that children as young as age 3.5 show behavioral responses to uncertainty although they are not able to report it explicitly. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that some form of metacognition is already available to guide children's decisions before the age of 3. Two groups of 2.5‐ and 3.5‐year‐old children were asked to complete a forced‐choice perceptual identification test and to explicitly rate their confidence in each decision. Moreover, participants had the opportunity to ask for a cue to help them decide if their response was correct. Our results revealed that all children asked for a cue more often after an incorrect response than after a correct response in the forced‐choice identification test, indicating a good ability to implicitly introspect on the results of their cognitive operations. On the contrary, none of these children displayed metacognitive sensitivity when making explicit confidence judgments, consistent with previous evidence of later development of explicit metacognition. Critically, our findings suggest that implicit metacognition exists much earlier than typically assumed, as early as 2.5 years of age.     

多项式加工树模型在社会心理学中的应用

多项式加工树（multinomial processing tree, MPT）从理论模型出发,使用多项式模型来拟合行为数据并估计理论模型中各个加工过程发生的可能性。该模型能够有效分离和量化不同心理过程,被广泛应用于社会认知研究之中,如态度、刻板印象等。本文首先介绍该模型的基本原理及其实现,并以道德判断为例说明其在社会心理学中的最新应用。最后,总结其对社会心理学研究的意义,即可以作为一种方法提高研究的效度和精度,具有较高的实用价值,并指出其潜在不足。     

工作场所不文明行为受害者向实施者反转的机制

梳理和归纳了导致工作场所不文明行为的受害者反转为实施者的组织事件, 包括团队层次的不作为领导行为和领导不文明行为以及个体层次的同事不文明行为。借助事件系统理论对受害者反转为实施者的认知过程进行了说明, 如果组织事件的强度足够引起受害者的控制化信息加工, 则其可能改变自己的原有行为进而实施工作场所不文明行为; 根据社会信息加工理论, 受害者的控制化信息加工可以通过三条路径实现, 即学习过程, 归因过程和道德判断过程。建议未来研究进一步探讨情绪和认知两者在不文明行为受害者角色反转中的作用, 以及工作领域之外的因素在其中的作用, 并且能够使用日记研究法进行验证; 未来研究还可以探讨工作场所不文明行为的旁观者反转为实施者的机制。     

Use of absolute and comparative performance feedback in absolute and comparative judgments and decisions

Which matters more—beliefs about absolute ability or ability relative to others? This study set out to compare the effects of such beliefs on satisfaction with performance, self-evaluations, and bets on future performance. In Experiment 1, undergraduate participants were told they had answered 20% correct, 80% correct, or were not given their scores on a practice test. Orthogonal to this manipulation, participants learned that their performance placed them in the 23rd percentile or 77th percentile, or they did not receive comparative feedback. Participants were then given a chance to place bets on two games—one in which they needed to get more than 50% right to double their money (absolute bet), and one in which they needed to beat more than 50% of other test-takers (comparative bet). Absolute feedback influenced comparative betting, particularly when no comparative feedback was available. Comparative feedback exerted weaker and inconsistent effects on absolute bets. Absolute feedback also had stronger (and more consistent) effects on satisfaction with performance and state self-esteem. Experiment 2 replicated these effects in a different university sample, and demonstrated that the effects emerge even when bets are placed after participants rate their satisfaction with their performance (although these ratings do not mediate the effect of feedback on bets). These findings suggest that information about one’s absolute standing on a dimension may be more influential than information about comparative standing, partially supporting a key tenet of Festinger’s [Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.] theory of social comparison.     

Getting scarred and winning lotteries: effects of exemplar cuing and statistical format on imagining low‐probability events

Three experiments tested the exemplar cuing and frequency format accounts of how the ‘imaginability’ of low‐probability events is enhanced. The experiments manipulated imaginability by varying the statistics used to describe negative (e.g. being scarred as a result of laser surgery) and positive (e.g. winning a lottery) low‐probability events. The results strongly supported the frequency format account, whereby imaginability is enhanced through the use of frequency formats for conveying statistical information (e.g. 20 out of 2000 as opposed to 0.01%). However, only limited support was found for exemplar cuing (EC) theory. Overall the results support the claim that the imaginability of outcomes plays a key role in thinking about low‐probability events, but question the mechanisms specified by EC theory for mediating such effects. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.