Judgments of blame and forgiveness: A comparison of young adults,older adults,and older adults with dementia

IntroductionAlzheimer's disease may modify moral judgment.ObjectiveIn two studies, we assessed the impact of dementia on blame and forgiveness. Study 1 compared the ways in which young adults, older adults, and older adults with dementia cognitively integrated two factors. Study 2 assessed the number of different factors that older adults with dementia were able to integrate during these moral judgments.MethodThe participants recorded their moral judgements in a blame task and in a forgiveness task. In study 1, the two questionnaires contained scenarios built from the combination of two factors. In study 2, the participants were confronted with the same tasks under three different conditions with scenarios that combined three, four or five factors.ResultsThe data from study 1 showed that the older adults with dementia did not combine the two factors in the same way as young adults did: the combination depended on the type of moral judgment. Study 2 revealed differences in moral judgment between older adults with dementia and adults without dementia in all tasks (i.e. with three, four or five factors combined).ConclusionDementia has an impact on moral judgments. Moral judgment among people with dementia is both task- and condition-dependant.     

帮忙失败后我会被差评吗?好心帮倒忙中的预测偏差

好心帮倒忙事件时有发生, 帮忙失败的施助者往往认为受助者会苛责自己, 因而可能不愿再次提供帮助。这种预测准确吗?通过6个研究( N = 1763), 对比施助者对受助者反应的预测和受助者的实际反应, 发现了施助者在好心帮倒忙时的预测偏差：他们高估了受助者的负面反应。而在帮忙成功时, 施助者未出现预测偏差或预测偏差的强度较弱。导致该预测偏差的原因是, 施助者更为关注自身的能力, 以为受助者也关注自己的能力, 而受助者更为在意施助者的温暖程度。     

建议距离和线索丰富性对建议采纳的影响

基于社会判断理论,研究以80名大学生为被试,通过JAS范式考察了建议距离对建议采纳和自信心变化的影响以及线索丰富性在这一过程中的作用。结果发现随着建议距离的增加,建议权重仅在线索信息较丰富的情况下呈先增后减的倒U型趋势,而绝对观点转变和自信心变化均不受线索丰富性的影响,分别呈递增和递减趋势。即建议距离对不同建议采纳指标有不同影响,建议距离与建议权重之间存在倒U曲线关系且线索丰富性起到了调节作用。     

Halo effects from agency behaviors and communion behaviors depend on social context: Why technicians benefit more from showing tidiness than nurses do

We investigate halo effects from agency behaviors and communion behaviors in different social contexts. According to the salient dimension model, attributes elicit halo effects on the ratings of other, unrelated attributes when they are relevant in a situation. Given that communion behaviors are more relevant in social and care‐related jobs, they should elicit stronger halo effects than agency behaviors in this context. In the context of scientific and technical jobs, this difference should be weakened or even reversed. Three experiments support the predicted interaction of context and behavior on halo effects. This interaction was stronger for negative than for positive behaviors. These results have implications for understanding the basic processes of halo effects as well as their real‐world effects in job‐related contexts.     

An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises

We analyze the effect of election promises on electoral behavior in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, politicians can make nonbinding election promises about how to split an endowment between themselves and the group. We find that promises affect both voting and voter beliefs about how much the politician will contribute to the public fund. The relationship is inverted U‐shaped with decreasing credibility of higher promises. Contributions of politicians are correlated with their promises in a similar pattern. The election promises are generally credible unless particularly high. Politicians keep promises more often if a reelection is possible and if the politician came into power by vote rather than by random draw. Voters reward high contributions in the previous period and punish promise breaking even after controlling for the contribution in the previous period or voters' beliefs about future contributions. By controlling for voters' beliefs, we distinguish retrospective from prospective voting. Our results suggest that voters both use promises for prospective voting and retrospectively punish broken promises.     

Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination

There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non‐moral intuitive probabilities.     

On Judgments of Approximately Equal

Although precision is often important in quantitative judgment, sometimes, it is valuable to recognize that two quantities are roughly the same. Fuzzy‐trace theory suggests that approximately equal judgments rely on gist representations (i.e., meaningful fuzzy categories of quantity). We conducted three experiments to investigate approximately equal judgments with number pairs presented in different formats, both with and without semantic content (breast cancer statistics). In each study, the ratio of the smaller divided by larger number predicted approximately equal judgments. Experiment 1 also examined how knowledge of breast cancer, presentation format (frequencies vs. percentages), and differences in gist comprehension of breast cancer information influence fuzzy equality judgments. As predicted by the fuzzy‐trace theory concept of denominator neglect, approximately equal judgments were more sensitive, as measured by signal detection theory (SDT) analyses, when presented as percentages. In both experiments with breast cancer statistics, people were more likely to judge number pairs approximately equal when they were embedded in sentences about breast cancer, and breast cancer knowledge predicted increased perception of equality, when appropriately consistent with reliable sources, and increased judgment sensitivity. In Experiment 2, a simple intervention focusing on gist meaning increased source‐consistent approximately equal judgments, increased SDT judgment sensitivity, and decreased SDT response bias. In Experiment 3, using number pairs devoid of semantic context spanning four orders of magnitude, we further examined ratio similarity. Overall, more knowledgeable judges and those who better understood the gist of meaningful numbers were more likely to judge literally different numbers as “approximately equal” rather than make precise discriminations that were meaningless. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning to Decide with and without Reasoning: How Task Experience Affects Attribute Weighting and Preference Stability

Certain experiments have shown that reasoning may weaken the stability of people's preferences, especially with regard to well‐learned perceptual judgment and decision‐making tasks, while learning has an opposite, consistency‐enhancing effect on preferences. We examined the effects of these factors in a visual multi‐attribute decision‐making task where reasoning, in contrast, has been found to benefit judgments by making them more stable. The initial assumption in this study was that this benefit would be typical for novel tasks, like the one employed here, and that it would decrease when the task is thoroughly learned. This assumption was examined in three experiments by contrasting it with an alternative assumption that this previously obtained beneficial effect is caused solely by learning, not by reasoning. It was found that learning indeed makes preferences more stable by consolidating the weights of the attributes. Reasoning, however, does not benefit this task when it is completely novel but facilitates learning and stability of the preferences long run, therefore increasing the consistency of the participants in the macrolevel. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Geopolitical Forecasting Skill in Strategic Intelligence

Extending research by the authors on intelligence forecasting, the forecasting skill of 3622 geopolitical forecasts extracted from strategic intelligence reports was examined. The codable subset of forecasts (N = 2013) was expressed with verbal probabilities (e.g., likely) and translated to numeric probability equivalents. This subset showed very good calibration and discrimination, but also underconfidence. There was no support for the hypothesis that forecasting skill was good mainly because of the general ease of forecasting topics. First, forecasting skill was as good among authoritative key judgments as in the general set. Second, forecasts that were assigned high degrees of certainty, indicative of ease, (p ≤ 0.05 or p ≥ 0.95) did not discriminate as well as less certain forecasts (0.05 < p < 0.95), and these subsets did not differ in calibration. Sensitivity and benchmarking tests further revealed that if the 1609 uncodable forecasts were all assigned forecast probabilities of .5 (i.e., if all followed a “cautious ignorance” rule), skill characteristics would still show a large effect size improvement over a variety of guesswork strategies. The findings support a cautiously optimistic assessment of forecasting skill in strategic intelligence and indicate that such skill is not primarily attributable to the selection of easy forecasting topics. However, the large proportion of uncodable cases suggests that intelligence forecasts could be improved by avoiding imprecise language that affects not only the codability but also, in all likelihood, the interpretability and indicative value of forecasts for intelligence consumers. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.