Intuition and The Junctures of Judgment in Decision Procedures for Clinical Ethics

Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However, intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions. However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern about intuition.     

重复学习判断中的低自信效应

学习判断是元认知判断的一种重要形式,是对未来回忆成绩的预测。重复学习判断中的低自信效应是一个有趣而反常的现象,指在重复学习测验中,学习判断往往低估了回忆成绩的增加,出现低自信的一种现象。目前,大部分实验证据支持重复学习判断中的低自信效应是普遍存在的,但也有一些实验结果表明该效应是受一定条件限制的。对于这种低自信效应的作用机制,研究者提出了不同的理论模型（如,锚定调整假说、记忆偏向消除理论、过去测验记忆的启发式假说等）进行了深入探讨。最后,文章还指出了此领域现有研究的局限和有待研究的问题     

主观概率判断中次可加性的三因素实验研究

采用三因素完全随机实验探究主观概率判断是否满足次可加性规律,结果表明:(1)分解方式、分解数量和分解事例的典型性等三个因素对主观概率判断均有显著的影响。(2)次可加性不是一种普遍现象,主观概率判断中也会出现可加性和超可加性:把事件隐分为非典型事例时会出现超可加性,把事件隐分为典型或者典型加非典型性的事例时会出现可加性,而把事件显分时会一致出现次可加性。     

Ambiguous comparative judgment: Fuzzy set model and data analysis

Abstract:  This paper proposed two types of fuzzy set models for ambiguous comparative judgments, which did not always hold transitivity and comparability properties. The first type of model was a fuzzy theoretical extension of the additive difference model for preference that was used to explain ambiguous preference strength. The second was a fuzzy logic model for explaining ambiguous preference in which preference strength was bounded, such as a probability measure. In both models, multi-attribute weighting parameters and all attribute values were assumed to be asymmetric fuzzy L-R numbers. For each model, a method of parameter estimation using fuzzy regression analysis was proposed. Numerical examples were also provided for comparison. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the proposed models were discussed.     

Ordering our world: The quest for traces of temporal organization in autobiographical memory

An experiment examined the idea, derived from the Self Memory System model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), that autobiographical events are sometimes tagged in memory with labels reflecting the life era in which an event occurred. The presence of such labels should affect the ease of judgments of the order in which life events occurred. Accordingly, 39 participants judged the order of two autobiographical events. Latency data consistently showed that between-era judgments were faster than within-era judgments, when the eras were defined in terms of either: (a) college versus high school, (b) academic quarter within year, or (c) academic year within school. The accuracy data similarly supported the presence of a between-era judgment effect for the college versus high school dichotomy.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

Moral expertise

We offer a theory of moral expertise based on an updated version of the Thomistic concept of habitus. We maintain that mature moral control arises from internalized standards of belief married to corresponding actions; the result is moral expertise. Beliefs and actions (conceptualized as habitus) coalesce in a moral identity, which is then sustained by the beliefs and actions that comprise the habitus; what we do affects who we are and what we believe, just as what we believe guides what we do. In support of these claims, we examine recent research on moral judgment, moral identity, and moral emotions.     

Development and Validation of a New Measure of Intuition: The Types of Intuition Scale

The Types of Intuition Scale (TIntS) measures three types of intuition identified in a literature review by Pretz and Totz (2007): holistic, inferential, and affective. Holistic intuitions integrate diverse sources of information in a Gestalt‐like, non‐analytical manner; inferential intuitions are based on previously analytical processes that have become automatic; and affective intuitions are based on feelings. Current intuition measures inadequately assess these distinct types. We report four validity studies: Study 1 reports the reliability and factor structure of the TIntS and correlations with extant intuition and personality measures. Study 2 presents a confirmatory factor analysis. Studies 3 and 4 examine the predictive validity of the TIntS with respect to clinical decision making in occupational therapy and musical performance. Scales were internally consistent and stable over time, and factor analyses supported the predicted distinctions among them. Correlations with existing measures of intuition, personality, and behavior showed that the TIntS is unique in its assessment of all three types of intuition in one measure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulatory focus as a predictor of omission bias in moral judgment: Mediating role of anticipated regrets

Omission bias occurs when people are more reluctant to accept negative consequences caused by their actions than by their inaction. Recent research on omission bias in decision‐making has found evidence for individual differences, thus indicating that some people are more likely to show omission inclination than others. The present research aims to explore the role of regulatory focus as individual difference variables in omission bias. Moreover, we examine whether anticipated regret mediates the relationship between regulatory focus and moral judgement. Moral judgement tasks utilized include: (i) moral dilemma scenarios (Study 1); and (ii) ethical scenarios embracing apparent legal rule violations (Study 2). The results of both studies show that only prevention focus is significantly related to omission bias in moral judgement. Specifically, this relationship holds regardless of the nature of the ‘omission’ (whether they are deontological or utilitarian). In addition, anticipated regret/guilt for action was found to mediate the relationship between prevention focus and omission bias. Implications and limitations are discussed based on the results of the current study.     

Ethical Situations and Their Effects on Judgments of Punishment

We compared the punitiveness of two groups following a manipulation in which participants were either able to cheat on a simple number-matching task, by taking more money then they rightfully earned, or prevented from doing so on the same task. After completing the task, participants read a number of small vignettes of politicians who had acted questionably, and then were asked to rate the scenarios on both how wrong the behavior was and how much punishment it deserved. Participants given the opportunity to cheat with impunity were significantly less punitive when judging questionable behavior on the part of elected officials.