Cumulative and non-cumulative semantic interference in object naming: Evidence from blocked and continuous manipulations of semantic context

Experiments involving blocked and continuous manipulations of the semantic naming context demonstrate that, when speakers name several taxonomically related objects in close succession, they display persistent interference effects. A review of studies using the blocked paradigm shows that, unlike the continuous paradigm, it typically does not induce cumulative interference effects in healthy speakers. This contrasts with the simulation results obtained from a model of semantic context effects recently put forward by Oppenheim and colleagues [Oppenheim, G. M., Dell, G. S., & Schwartz, M. F. (2010). The dark side of incremental learning: A model of cumulative semantic interference during lexical access in speech production. Cognition, 114, 227--262], which generates cumulative effects in both paradigms. We propose that the effects are non-cumulative in the blocked paradigm, because it allows participants to bias top-down the levels of activation of lexical-semantic representations, thereby curtailing the accumulating interference. Indeed, prior research has shown that the interference effects in the blocked paradigm are exacerbated when participants carry out a concurrent digit-retention task, loading on working memory and reducing their capacity to exert a top-down bias. In Experiment 1, combining the continuous paradigm with a digit-retention task, we demonstrate that this does not exacerbate cumulative context effects, corroborating the selective role of working memory and the associated top-down biasing mechanism in the blocked paradigm. A review of neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies demonstrates that left inferior frontal regions may play a critical role in controlling semantic interference top-down. We discuss the implications of these findings for language production research and for models of lexical-semantic encoding.     

Effects of Item Difficulty on the Retrieval of Solutions during Cognitive Skill Acquisition: Age Differences

ABSTRACT

In cognitive skill learning, shifts to better strategies for obtaining solutions often occur while associations between problems and solutions are being strengthened. In two skill learning experiments, we examined the effects of item difficulty on the retrieval of solutions and the learning of problem–solution associations in younger and older adults. The results of both experiments demonstrated an ‘easy effect’ in both younger and older adults, such that the retrieval of solutions as well recognition memory for problems was best for the easier items. In addition, a ‘hard effect’ was found in younger adults, but not in older adults, whereby the retrieval of solutions as well as recognition memory for problems was better for harder items than for medium-difficulty items. The finding that increased computational demands at the item level delayed item memorization and the retrieval of solutions in older adults but not younger adults is consistent with a general-resources account of age-related differences in skill learning.     

The real trouble with intentionality

I argue that the project of naturalizing intentionality is misconceived. Intentionality should not be considered as a challenge to our naturalistic world-view, but rather as something which gives rise to a logical problem: how to save the principle of indiscernibility of identicals from apparent counterexamples arising from intensional discourse.     

What’s ours is yours: recall of history for lesser-known countries is guided by one’s own national history

ABSTRACT

The present studies examine how people recall history. Sometimes, certain national histories are well known and sometimes they are not. We propose that, under certain circumstances, culturally distinctive representations of typical national histories can be used to guide recall, particularly in cases where the history is not well known. We focus on three national samples with varied levels of knowledge about each history: Great Britain, India, and the United States. In Study 1, we establish typical historical event templates for each nation consisting of events that a large proportion of participants from each sample identify as important in a typical nation’s history. We examine points of divergence between the different groups’ typical event templates and the valences of these events. In Study 2, we test and find that, in conditions of less knowledge, participants tend to refer to particular historical events that coincide with events unique to their own group’s typical history. In Study 3, we demonstrate that this effect can be found even when a group possesses a reasonable amount of knowledge about the target country. We conclude by discussing the implications in relation to how such a retrieval strategy might inform interpretations of events in the present.     

Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

The horserace between distractors and targets: Retrieval-based probe responding depends on distractor–target asynchrony

According to models assuming binding of stimulus and response features, any features can be integrated into a compound (consisting of stimulus and response features) and stored in episodic memory, even features irrelevant to the task. Reencountering any part of such an episode can retrieve the entire episode (or “event file”), including the response. That is, even the repeated presentation of a distractor can retrieve a response given to a target stimulus accompanied by this very distractor. We analysed how distractor-induced retrieval of an event-file competes with the response generation process triggered by the target by varying the stimulus onset asynchrony of targets and distractors. In particular, we used a selection task with prime–probe sequences and asynchronous onset of distractors and targets on the probe. Distractor-induced retrieval was only observed if the probe distractor appeared before or simultaneously with the probe target but not if the probe distractor appeared after probe target onset.     

Representationalism,perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts

This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion (blur, perspective, double vision, etc.) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack details present in clear experiences. I argue that since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that do not, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a degradation in content. I also discuss the prospects for a positive account of the contents specific to distorted experiences. I argue that the prospects for such an account are dim, but that this is due to limitations of our phenomenal concepts, not to the falsity of the representationalist thesis.     

Mathematical Abilities in Elementary School Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Although clinical practitioners often express concerns about the mathematical functioning of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), the field of mathematics remains a relatively unexplored topic in individuals with ASD. Moreover, research findings are fragmentary and hold inconclusive results. The present study aimed to examine whether grade 1 (aged 6–7 years) to 4 (aged 9–10 years) elementary school children with ASD scored significantly different from age‐adequate norms on mathematics. To this end, a multi‐componential approach of mathematics was used. Four domains of mathematics were assessed in 121 children with ASD: procedural calculation, number fact retrieval, word/language problems, and time‐related competences. All children attended general education classrooms, following the standard curriculum, and were coached by integrated educational services. Children with ASD showed a strength in word/language problems in second and fourth grade. There was evidence of a weakness for procedural calculation in first grade and for time‐related competences in first and third grade. In all other cases, average scores were shown. As such, results revealed a profile of strengths, average abilities, and weaknesses in mathematics and highlighted the importance of focusing on different domains of mathematics. Because a high variability in mathematical performance could be observed, we recommend an individual assessment when considering the mathematical trajectory of children with ASD. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is recitation an effective tool for adult learners?

The effects of recitation on subsequent recall were examined in 4 experiments modeled after those of Gates (1917). Participants underwent a study phase, a recitation phase, and a test phase. During the recitation phase participants were to attempt to recall the previously studied material and then to restudy it when they could not recall any new information. They were encouraged to switch between recalling and restudying. The proportion of the total acquisition time that was spent in recitation was varied. Unlike the classic findings reported by Gates (1917) in schoolchildren, there was no consistent evidence that recitation enhanced learning in these adult learners.