Ontogeny of early event memory: II. Encoding and retrieval by 2- and 3-month-olds

The ability of 2-month-old infants to discriminate changes in a 5-object crib mobile following a retention interval of 24 hr was assessed using the mobile conjugate reinforcement paradigm. Infants were trained in 3 daily 15-min sessions to produce mobile movement by footkicking. Twenty-four hr later, independent groups received generalization tests with mobiles containing 1–5 novel objects substituted into their original training mobile. A control group was tested with the original training mobile. These findings were compared with findings of 2 previous studies involving identical procedures with 3-month-olds, reanalyzed for measures of individual performance over successive test minutes. Although, in absolute terms, 2-month-olds had a flat generalization gradient relative to 3-month-olds, when each infant's kick rate during the generalization test was expressed relative to that infant's kick rate before, and at the end of, training, it was found that the generalization gradients of 2- and 3-month-olds were indistinguishable. The relative response measures indicated a surprising degree of specificity by both age groups: Test mobiles containing more than 1 novel object did not cue retrieval, but test mobiles containing no more than 1 new object yielded perfect retention and complete generalization. These data indicate that infants as young as 2 months are capable of encoding and maintaining a representation of the specific details of their training context for at least 24 hr and, after that delay, can perform fine discriminations based on the discrepancy between their test context and that representation.     

An assessment of the role of handling cues in "spontaneous recovery" after extinction

Three experiments examined the assertion that presession handling cues that accompany training with reinforcement might account for spontaneous recovery when they reoccur following extinction. In Experiment 1, after extensive training on a variable-interval schedule, key pecking in pigeons was extinguished following either normal or distinctively different handling and transportational cues. Those cues resulted in enhanced spontaneous recovery 24 hr later when normal cues were reinstated. In Experiment 2, however, subjects tested following the normal handling cues showed no more spontaneous recovery than did subjects that spent the entire extinction-test interval in the experimental chambers and thus were tested without handling cues altogether. In Experiment 3, a group whose test for recovery began 10 min after being placed in the chambers yielded as much spontaneous recovery as did a group tested normally. Furthermore, a group for which extinction began at mid-session and for which handling therefore could not be a discriminative cue for extinction showed no more spontaneous recovery than did the other two groups. Handling cues thus contributed to spontaneous recovery only after explicit discrimination training, as provided in Experiment 1.     

Searles Kritik am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung des Chinesischzimmers

Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's Gedankenexperiment results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.     

How rejection of essences expresses despair

The Self and the ego in Jung's psychology are an instance of what Edmund Husserl called a 'double intentionality': one tending toward meaning is distinct from another tending toward meaning, yet they are reciprocally inseparable from each other. As perception in a present moment and memory of a past are impossible without each other, so an intending of ego and that of Self are impossible without each other. Accompanying the ego (mostly in the background) during each moment of time is a tending towards a particular Idea or essence. This reciprocity is expressed in a unique way over a lifetime and is like the relation of mother and child, and so it is important for all of us born of women to retain a sense of essences and the fullness of Self. 'Constructivism', however, is a current belief held by some feminists, and it influences both theorizing and practice in analytical psychology. It involves a rejection of essences, a revision of Jung's Idea of Self, and an attempt to conduct analysis without reference to an intentional subjective Self. Such constructivist revision expresses a despair both about essences as Ideas and about Self as intentional and subjective. It is despair over Self in a Kierkegaardian sense.     

编码与提取方式对生成效应的影响

实验采用两种编码方式和测验类型考查了编码与提取方式的一致性对生成效应的影响。结果显示：(1)在进行字形加工的知觉辨认测验中,生成过程主要依据字形编码的形近字出现了生成效应;主要依据字义编码的反义字没有出现此效应。(2)在依赖字义提取的自由回忆中,形近字和反义字都出现了生成效应。因而编码与提取方式的一致性可能对生成效应有影响。     

人脸加工中身份语义信息提取的加工方式

人脸加工过程中,从人脸知觉到身份信息提取是一个系列的过程还是平行加工的过程,是人脸研究的热点问题之一。通过比较脸—脸(FF)、名字—名字(NN)、脸—名字(FN)和名字—脸(NF)等四种刺激类型条件下被试对其作夫妇判断和性别配对判断时的反应时分析,发现判断任务与刺激类型之间存在显著交互作用。在性别判断任务中,FF反应最快,NF其次,FN和NN最慢;而在夫妇判断任务中,四种刺激类型间无显著差异。反应错误率分析也显示相似的结果。实验结果支持人脸识别到身份信息提取过程为系列加工的观点。     

分心物特性抑制对记忆提取的影响

本研究通过严格的实验设计,深入考察了分心物特性抑制和记忆提取的关系。研究表明,高分心物特性抑制组被试的记忆提取成绩比低分心物特性抑制组被试的成绩好,两者的差异显著。这说明分心物特性抑制对记忆提取有重要的影响;在信息加工过程中,分心物抑制是一种有效的、控制性和策略性的提取机制;在存在干扰或反应竞争的情境下,这种机制通过直接抑制无关信息的激活扩散,而快速有效的提取目标信息。     

Normativity in Quine's Naturalism: The Technology of Truth-Seeking?

In this paper, I review Quine's response to the normativity charge against naturalized epistemology. On this charge, Quine's naturalized epistemology neglects the essential normativity of the traditional theory of knowledge and hence cannot count as its successor. According to Quine, normativity is retained in naturalism as ‘the technology of truth-seeking’. I first disambiguate Quine's naturalism into three programs of increasing strength and clarify the strongest program by means of the so-called Epistemic Skinner Box. Then, I investigate two ways in which the appeal to technology as normative enterprise can be made good. I argue that neither coheres with other aspects of Quine's philosophy, most notably the elimination of intentionality. Finally, I briefly consider a third reconstruction of the response, which involves an extension of the web of “belief” to practical know-how. I conclude that the normativity of Quine's (strong) naturalism cannot be found in the technology of truth-seeking. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

情绪对提取诱发遗忘的影响

从学习材料的情绪性和提取过程的情绪状态两方面考察了情绪对提取诱发遗忘的影响。结果发现提取练习对情绪性与非情绪性材料引发了同等程度的遗忘;提取练习阶段,当被试处于正性或中性情绪状态下也会发生明显的提取诱发遗忘现象,而当被试处于负性情绪状态时,提取练习不会导致对未提取项目的遗忘。研究结果表明,学习材料的情绪性不影响提取诱发遗忘,而提取过程的情绪状态会对提取诱发遗忘产生影响,负性情绪状态可以消除提取诱发遗忘。     

Use of experienced retrieval ease in self and social judgments

People base judgments from memory on both the content of the information they retrieve and the ease they experience in retrieving it (Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991). Ease of retrieval as information: another look at the availability heuristic. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202). Four studies demonstrate that people rely relatively more on the experienced ease of recall when making judgments about the self compared to judgments about others. This pattern was found for judgments of an “average” (Study 1a) or specific (Study 1b) other. Subjective retrieval ease was less informative when people were relatively less familiar with the specific other person. Providing an alternative explanation for the experienced difficulty of recall affected self, but not social, assessments (Study 2). In addition, the effect generalized to risk judgments about a state of the world; namely, the safety of one’s town (Study 3). A deeper appreciation of when and why people rely on different sources of accessible information when making judgments may help in understanding and reducing social conflict.