Primitive religious thought and the evolution of religion

In an article in this journal about the ideas of Levy-Brühl, Don Wiebe reviewed ideas from anthropology to argue that there is indeed a primitive mentality, and that mythopoeic religious thought is an instance of this mentality. Wiebe ends by declaring religious thought generally to be mythopoeic. The anthropological literature does support well Wiebe's thesis that primitive thought is primitive, in particular those studies which use Piaget's theory of cognitive development as a guide for interpreting primitive and other thought styles. But Piaget's theory can be extended to interpret other stages of culture and thought. This aids in recognizing that religious thought develops in stages also, from primitive folktales to archaic complex myths, and then to classical rationalized theologies and most recently to symbolic theologies.     

Native Americans and Alcohol: Past,Present, and Future

Native Americans have higher rates of alcohol use, frequency of use, and increased rates of fetal alcohol syndrome, compared with other ethnic groups (J. Hisnanick, 1992; P. A. May, 1996; J. M. Wallace et al., 2003). High prevalence rates of alcohol misuse among Native Americans must be understood in light of their unique history, which has resulted in trauma and exposure to many risk factors for problem alcohol use. Many risk factors have been identified in the general population; however, only some of these risk factors have been examined among Native American populations. The unique history and world view of Native Americans mean that, often, risk factors operate differently from the way they do in other populations. The authors discuss interventions and promising treatments.     

‘Outing’ Qoheleth: On the Search for Homosexuality in the Wisdom Tradition

Abstract

U. Wernik has recently commented upon the attempts of liberals and conservatives to co-opt the Bible in support of their respective positions on homosexuality. Focusing on same-sex relationships within the Bible, he offers six arguments in support of ‘outing’ Qoheleth as a homosexual. Here each is evaluated in turn. It is argued that a more convincing interpretation of all six is available in the light of the culture of Qoheleth's world. It is also argued that in the light of the ongoing essentialist/constructionist debate, Wernik's decision to impose the term ‘homosexual’ on the ancient world is deeply problematic. His ultimate failure to convince, however, does not definitively answer the question of Qoheleth's sexuality, but it is clear that any attempt to make good his claim in future must overcome significant textual and theoretical difficulties if it is to succeed. On the basis of current evidence, the view that Qoheleth's sexuality was identical to that which was most culturally acceptable in his own day remains the most likely option.     

Dynamics of scientific change and cognitive science. An epistemological update / Dinámica de cambio y ciencias cognitivas. Una puesta al día epistemológica

Abstract

I explore two proposals on the dynamics of scientific change in the general philosophy of science and I evaluate the extent to which they can be applied in the cognitive sciences. I do this by paying special attention to the youth and diversity which characterize this field of scientific research. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of uses of Kuhn’s work: direct but loose applications of Kuhnean concepts to the history of cognitive science, on the one hand, and indirect applications of certain aspects of Kuhnean ideas, on the other hand. Secondly, I criticize their pertinence on the basis of the secondary role which theories play in the field. Finally, I defend the fertility of the concept of ‘research tradition’ proposed by Laudan, by focusing on the previously highlighted set of idiosyncratic characteristics of the cognitive sciences.     

After Kohlberg: Some implications of an Ethics of Virtue for the theory of moral education and development

It is beyond serious dispute that post-war reflection upon and research into moral education and development has been well nigh dominated by an extensive and ambitious research programme influenced and initiated by the modem cognitive developmental theorist Lawrence Kohlberg — a programme which can also be seen, moreover, as standing in a tradition of philosophical reflection about the nature of moral life going back to such significant enlightenment thinkers as Kant and Rousseau. It will also be familiar, however, that a powerful critique of this essentially liberal conception of the nature of moral life and values has lately gathered momentum under the influence of contemporary post-analytical and communitarian social and moral theorists variously under the spell of Aristotle. In the first place, then, this paper argues that a basically Kohlbergian approach to thinking about moral education is difficult — if not impossible — to sustain in the face of this neo-Aristotelian critique; secondly, however, it attempts to explore the possibilities of an alternative virtue-theoretical basis for understanding the nature of moral life and education.     

THE BIBLICAL ROOTS OF LOCKE'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Locke's consciousness‐based theory of personal identity resulted not only from his agnosticism on substance, but also from his biblical theology. This theory was intended to complement and sustain Locke's moral and theological commitments to a system of otherworldly rewards and sanctions as revealed in Scripture. Moreover, he inferred mortalist ideas from the Bible, rejecting the resurrection of the same body and maintaining that the soul dies at physical death and will be resurrected by divine miracle. Accordingly, personal identity is neither in the soul, nor in the body, nor in a union of soul and body. To Locke, personal identity is in consciousness, which, extending “backwards to any past Action or Thought,” enables the self, both in this life and upon resurrection for the Last Judgment, to recognize that “it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Essay II.xxvii.9).     

Are we born and do we die?

The stranglehold on our imagination by the mind-body dualisms that permeate the culture is such that most people seem to suppose that "body" and "soul" name distinct and separable entities. Resisting such dualisms in favour of an old-fashioned Aristotelean view of the soul as the form of the body, this essay considers two questions: do human parents produce human beings, and do human beings die? The doctrine of the special creation of the individual soul seems to require us to answer the first question in the negative because, according to this doctrine, parents only produce matter for the God-given soul to form. As to the second, many people seem to suppose that human beings do not die, only their bodies do. Arguing against the view that immortality is a natural property of human minds, the essay suggests (with the help of Joseph Ratzinger) that, whether we speak of "immortality" or of "resurrection", life from death is neither nature, nor achievement, but gift.     

Toward a constructive eschatology: An appraisal of Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen's contributions

Faced with diverse cultural challenges to hope, a constructive eschatology should do justice to the entire reality and develop a robust future-oriented hope that helps to transform the present. In this regard Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen has made a significant contribution, especially in dialogue with natural sciences and other faith traditions, to retrieve the cosmic dimension of Christian hope, as well as to address liberationist and ecofeminist critiques of some distorted hopes. After recommending distinctive features of Kärkkäinen's constructive proposal, I suggest advancing it further by combining the phenomenological insight into the lived body with the concept of temporal holism.     

Experiences of the Risen Jesus: The Foundational Historical Issue in the Early Proclamation of the Resurrection

Abstract : That Jesus' disciples experienced what they believed were appearances of the risen Jesus after his death is generally conceded by the critical scholarly community. The nature of these experiences is the key component in recent historical discussions. Drawn from a survey of recent scholarly resurrection studies, and building upon agreed data, various reasons are given to establish the reality of the disciples' experiences. Three major responses to the cause of these experiences are also outlined. The chief goal of this essay is not to decide between these three positions, but to narrow the focus of the current discussion.