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121.
已有研究发现决策者在为自己与不同他人决策时,其风险偏好存在差异。但是当对后果严重性不同的事件进行决策时,上述结果也并不总是如此。为了探究在人身安全情境中决策者面对后果严重程度不同的任务时,为自己和为他人决策时风险偏好的差异,实验一采用人际亲密度和决策所带来消极结果的严重程度分别操纵心理距离与后果严重性,结果发现决策者在后果严重任务中的决策比后果不严重任务更保守,为自己和为陌生人决策均比为最好朋友决策更冒险。这可能是由于决策者知觉到的决策责任不同所致。因此在实验一的基础上实验二引入决策责任这一变量,考察其在心理距离对风险决策影响中的作用,研究结果证明了我们的假设。 相似文献
122.
In this dialogue Derk Pereboom and Marcel Brass discuss the free will problem from the perspective of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. First, they give their opinion on how the two disciplines contribute to the free will problem. While Pereboom is optimistic regarding the contribution of science, Brass is more pessimistic and questions the usefulness of an empirical approach to the question whether free will exists or not. Then they outline their position on the free will problem. The idea of a transcendental agent is discussed in more detail. Furthermore, it is discussed whether free will scepticism is a politically, socially, psychologically viable position. Pereboom argues that promoting the idea of free will scepticism can have a positive impact on retributive emotions and the political practice regarding retributive punishment. Brass argues that retributive emotions are deeply rooted in evolution and therefore difficult to change via high-level beliefs about free will. Finally, the future of the free will debate is discussed. Both agree that the dialogue between philosophy and psychology should be intensified. Philosophy can benefit from taking empirical research more seriously. Psychology and neuroscience can benefit from philosophy by appreciating the sophistication and conceptual clarity of the philosophical debate. Both have to find a common language and define common problems that can be tackled from both perspectives. 相似文献
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125.
William Schweiker 《Dialog》2008,47(3):208-216
Abstract : This essay explores the connection between religious practices and torture with specific reference to the debate in the USA about ‘waterboarding’ as part of the so‐called War on Terror. After isolating some defining features of torture, the essay examines the historical background of waterboarding in the symbolism of Christian baptism and how this symbolism was used during the Inquisition and the Reformation as part of the torture of heretics and others. Mindful of this sordid use of a Christian rite meant to celebrate new life, the essay thereby clarifies Christian responsibility in the political order. That responsibility requires uncovering the religious roots of some forms of torture, resisting their use by the State, and, further, seeking to render current Christian practice both humane and life giving. 相似文献
126.
Nicola S. Schutte John M. Malouff Ian Price Samantha Walter Greg Burke Catherine Wilkinson 《Current Psychology》2008,27(2):102-111
Two studies applied a person–situation model to examine the effect of emotional affordances of situations. Participants rated
their emotional functioning as more extensive in situations classified as being high in emotional affordance than those classified
as low in emotional affordance. Participants who scored higher on the individual difference characteristic of emotional intelligence
were more interested in entering high emotional affordance situations than were individuals lower in emotional intelligence,
and participants who scored higher on emotional intelligence were rated by others as being more successful in high emotional
affordance situations than individuals lower in emotional intelligence. These results provide preliminary evidence that the
interaction between emotional intelligence and situations may influence emotional functioning. 相似文献
127.
运用情景模拟和角色扮演的方法,研究大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任归因结构及其应对策略。对416名被试的研究结果显示:(1)责任归因的心理结构是一个“责任推断→责任情感→责任行为”的一元结构模式。(2)我国大学生的责任推断过程与维纳的经典理论基本一致,但在行为应对策略上存在一定的文化差异。(3)大学生对网瘾和作弊的责任推断倾向明显并与情感体验基本保持一致,但与行为应对策略存在一定的冲突。(4)大学生在网瘾和作弊的责任推断、情感体验以及应对策略上存在一定差异。 相似文献
128.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):167-189
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues
that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that
her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible,
unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that
we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that
even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned
(even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main
objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own
account.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
129.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
130.
论构建和谐医患关系的社会责任 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
围绕近年来备受社会关注的医患关系,对当前医患关系不和谐的社会失责进行了分析,认为造成这种失责原因是医疗体制不合理、社会卫生保障制度不完善、医疗卫生改革滞后、医药市场存在严重弊端、医学人文教育不尽人意等。在此基础上,明确提出构建和谐医患关系的社会责任是要建立平等互惠的医患关系、完善和谐医患关系的制度建设、建立有效的社会监督体系、健全社会医疗保障体系、深化医疗卫生体制改革、加强对医患冲突的社会管理等。 相似文献